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ABSTRACT
Agriculture has been singled out as one of the major nonpoint sources of water 
pollution. To identify alternative policy tools for the implementation of a non-regulatory 
approach to comply with the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program (CNPCP) 
required by The Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, policy makers 
need to determine factors that may influence producers’ willingness to adopt proposed Best 
Management Practices (BMPs).
Neoclassical economic concepts of utility maximization on the part of agricultural 
producers constitutes the theoretical background in this study, but it is enhanced with the 
incorporation of a well proved set of theoretical tools based on psychological constructs 
that account for the measurement of attitudes as complementary causes of behavior. Policy 
analysis and implementation are studied in terms of 1) achievement of environmentally 
desirable goals and 2) the aim of keeping agriculture as an economically viable activity.
A set of multivariate probit models are tested using primary data collected through 
a mail survey of Louisiana’s sugarcane producers. Results indicate that contemporaneous 
correlation of the error terms exists among management practices within management 
measures, and between management measures. It indicates that policy tools must be 
developed in an integrated manner.
The decision to adopt BMPs is significantly influenced by the number of times 
producers have met with extension service personnel and the number of grower meetings 
that the producer has attended in the previous year. Participation in cost-sharing has also 
had a very significant effect on adoption of best management practices, even if no cost
xii
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sharing programs exist for all practices. Risk of yield loss is not a factor in the adoption 
of the BMPs included in the study. Farmers’ belief that agriculture reduces the quality of 
water coming off farmland is significant for most management measures. Debt is also a 
significant variable for most management measures, with a positive sign. As compliance 
requirements become more stringent, tenure becomes a factor in the adoption of best 
management practices. Policy makers should consider these results as new strategies are 
developed to promote adoption of BMPs that reduce nonpoint source water pollution from 
agricultural sources.
xm
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Although 71 percent o f earth’s surface is covered with water and annual global 
precipitation is estimated to be around 126,000 cubic miles, there is a shortage of water. 
Only three percent of the earth’s water is fresh water, and only 0.003 percent of it is 
available in the form of freshwater for human use. In the U.S., approximately 75 percent 
of fresh water comes from surface sources. The per capita consumption of freshwater for 
domestic purposes in this country is around 90 gallons per day. Estimates indicate that 
about 30 to 50 percent of water used in the U.S. is wasted unnecessarily (Smith, 1995).
Many parts of the world are already experiencing contamination problems. For the 
U.S., according to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) 1991 Water Quality 
Inventory, one-third of all surface waters do not meet water quality standards (EPA, 1998). 
Toxic metals such as arsenic, cadmium, and mercury, as well as other contaminants such 
as chlorides and nitrates, are sources of surface water pollution. According to Smith 
(1995), the effects on human health of chemicals commonly found in drinking water 
include: cancer, liver, kidney, and nervous system damage, sterility in males, genetic 
mutations, fetal damage, and infant death. Worse yet, these are among the few chemicals 
for which adverse effects are known and tests are made.
There are two types of sources of water pollution: point and nonpoint sources. 
Section 502(14) of the Clean Water Act provides the following legal definition of ‘point. 
source’: “The term point source means any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, 
including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure,
1
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container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating 
craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not include 
agricultural storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated agriculture” (Clean 
Water Act, 1972).
According to the EPA, ‘nonpoint source’ pollution “generally results from land 
runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, drainage, seepage, or hydrologic 
modification” (EPA, 1998). Technically, the term ‘nonpoint source’ is defined to mean any 
source of water pollution that does not meet the legal definition of ‘point source.’ A 
broader description of nonpoint pollution is offered by EPA in its Guidance for Coastal 
Nonpoint Source Pollution Control (EPA, 1993), stating that nonpoint pollution is the 
pollution of water caused by rainfall or snow melt moving over and through the ground. 
“As the runoff moves, it picks up and carries away natural pollutants and pollutants 
resulting from human activity,” depositing them into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal waters, 
and ground waters (EPA, 1998).
State water officials in 60 percent of all states identified agriculture as the most 
common source of water pollution. According to EPA and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife 
Service, it is responsible for adverse impacts on fish commodities in 30 percent of the 
nation’s lake and rivers. According to Faeth(1995) “a tiny percentage of the pesticides 
applied to a field -less than 0.1 percent for many insecticides- actually reaches the target 
pest; the rest, [99.9 %] by definition, becomes an environmental contaminant.” It is also 
important to recognize that, according to the same author, only 50 percent of the nitrogen 
from all fertilizers applied in the U.S. is actually used by the crops, with the remaining 4.7
2
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million tons a year seeping into groundwater or draining into rivers, lakes, and estuaries. 
In general, it has been widely recognized that agricultural runoff is the most important 
nonpoint source of water pollution (Smith, 1995; EPA, 1998; Pimentel et al, 1997). 
Regulation
There are three basic approaches to deal with environmental problems in water 
resources. The first one is the reliance on self-interest and voluntarism. The second one 
is the so-called Command-and-control approach, where the government, through specific 
agencies, sets the standards and means to enforce them. A third option often proposed is 
the Incentive-Based Mechanisms approach, where some monetary measure (taxes, 
subsidies) is established to encourage a search to find the most efficient way to limit 
pollution. Each of these approaches has its own virtues and weaknesses. In dealing with 
water quality in the U.S., both of these approaches have been undertaken.
A number of federal laws to improve water quality have been passed and 
implemented over time. A succinct chronology of such regulation is as follows: the Water 
Quality Control Act, 1969; the Water Pollution Control Act, 1972; the Coastal Zone 
Management Act, 1972; the Safe Drinking Water Act, 1974; the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act, 1976; the Clean Water Act as amended in 1977 and 1987; the Safe 
Drinking Water Act as amended in 1986, and the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization 
Amendments of 1990.
The Clean Water Act (CWA)
The Clean Water Act was passed by Congress in 1972. In the congressional 
declaration of goals and policy, the stated objective of the act was to restore and maintain
3
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the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters (CWA, 1972). 
Among the fundamental provisions to attain this goal were: discharges of pollutants into 
the navigable waters were to be eliminated by 1985; water quality to provide for the 
protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and for recreation in and on the 
water was to be achieved by July of 1983; discharge of toxic pollutants in toxic amounts 
was to be prohibited; and provisions to secure federal financial assistance and development 
of waste management planning processes. A special provision was made for the 
development and implementation of programs for the control of nonpoint sources of 
pollution “in an expeditious manner” (CWA, 1972).
The Clean Water Act addresses nonpoint sources of pollution in provision number 
seven, and it emphasizes the need to control both point and nonpoint sources of pollution. 
Consistent with that provision, it requires that the Governor of each State, for that State or 
in combination with adjacent States, shall prepare and submit to the Administrator (EPA) 
for approval a management program to control nonpoint sources of pollution. It goes on 
to specify the content of each management program. Program provisions should include: 
the identification of the best management practices (BMPs) and measures which will be 
undertaken; accounting for the impact of each practice on water quality; the identification 
of programs aimed at implementation of the best management practices identified; a 
schedule that provides for utilization of the best management practices at the earliest 
practical date; a legal certification that the laws of the state or states provide adequate 
authority for the implementation of the program; and identification of sources of funding 
(CWA, 1972).
4
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The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
The Coastal Zone Management Act was enacted in 1972. For the purpose of the 
Act ‘coastal zone’ means “the coastal waters (including the lands therein and thereunder) 
and the adjacent shorelands (including the waters therein and thereunder), strongly 
influenced by each other and the proximity to the shorelines of the several coastal states, 
and includes islands, transitional and intertidal areas, salt mashes, wetlands, and beaches” 
(CZMA, 1972).
The Act declares as a national policy “to preserve, protect, develop, and where 
possible, to restore or enhance, the resources of the Nation’s coastal zone for this and future 
generations” (CZMA, 1972), as well as encouraging and assisting the states to develop and 
implement a management program aimed toward the wise use of the land and water 
resources of the coastal zone. It requires that such a management program should at least 
provide for the protection of natural resources within the coastal zone; the management of 
coastal development to minimize the loss of life and property; set priorities for coastal- 
dependent uses and orderly processes for siting major facilities; provide for public access 
for recreation purposes; consultation and coordination with Federal agencies; opportunities 
for public and local government participation; and planning for the siting of pollution 
control and aquaculture facilities. Before this management program is approved by the 
Secretary of Commerce, several requirements have to be met by the state. An important 
one, added by the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990, is that the 
program must include “enforceable policies and mechanisms to implement the applicable 
requirements of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program of the State required by
5
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section 6217 of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990”(CZARA, 
1990). For coordination and cooperation, the CZMA provides that the program shall not 
be approved unless the views of Federal agencies principally affected by such a program 
have been adequately considered. The CZMA also provides that all requirements 
established by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, the Clean Water Act, or established 
by the Federal Government or by any State or local government pursuant to such acts, shall 
be incorporated into any program developed to achieve the goals of the Coastal Zone 
Management Act.
Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990 (CZARA)
The Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990 (CZARA) made 
several amendments to the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972 which are incorporated 
in the analysis of the CZMA in the previous section. Although Section 6217 of the 
CZARA did not amend the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, its provisions are 
directly related to nonpoint sources of pollution. The CZARA requires that not later than 
30 months after the date of the publication of the Guidance for Coastal Nonpoint Source 
Pollution Control, each state must submit a Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program 
to the Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval. 
The purpose of such a program is to develop and implement management measures for 
nonpoint source pollution to restore and protect coastal waters. It states that “The program 
shall serve as an update and expansion of the State nonpoint source management program 
developed under Section 319 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as the program 
under that section relates to land and water uses affecting coastal waters” (CZARA, 1990).
6
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Fundamental to the CZARA’s required Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control 
Program is the implementation of management measures. The Coastal Zone Act 
Reauthorization Amendments of 1990 specifically define ‘management measures’ as: 
“economically achievable measures for the control of the addition of pollutants from 
existing and new categories and classes of nonpoint sources of pollution, which reflect the 
greatest degree of pollutant reduction achievable through the application of the best 
available nonpoint pollution control practices, technologies, processes, siting criteria, 
operating methods, or other alternatives” (CZARA, 1990).
Sugarcane Production in Louisiana
U. S. sugar production in fiscal year 1998/1999 is projected at 7.935 million short 
tons, raw value, one percent above 1997/98 (Agribiz, 1998). Sugarcane is the second most 
important agricultural commodity in terms ofpercentage of Louisiana’s total receipts (with 
11 percent) and represents the highest percentage of U.S. total value, with 31 percent 
(ERS-USDA, 1998).
Sugarcane was initially introduced to Louisiana in the early 1700's. About 550,000 
pounds of sugar were shipped from New Orleans by 1797. By 1801, there were 75 sugar 
mills in the state. Planting, cultivation and harvesting were done entirely by hand in the 
latter 19lh century. However, research has been vital to the survival and growth of the sugar 
industry in Louisiana, and is considered the most important factor in the steady growth of 
the industry from less than 5,000 tons in the late 1700's to a record high of more than 
1,000,000 tons in 1994. Economies of scale led to large centralized sugar factories and
7
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refineries in the 1800's and that trend continues. Currently, there are only two commercial 
refineries in Louisiana (LSU, 1998).
Import tariffs have affected the profitability of sugar since the 1820's when 
increased protection led to dramatic increases in sugarcane plantations (LSU, 1998). The 
complementary policies in place today are the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) non­
recourse loans and a tariff-based quota on imported sugar. According to Tolman (1998), 
to take advantage of this incentive, growers are forced into overusing non-land inputs such 
as fertilizers and chemicals, which cause extensive harm to the ecosystems. Tolman (1998) 
cites a recent Florida study which found that 80 percent of the fertilizer used in fertilizing 
sugarcane crops was transferred through drainage water to the Everglades, causing the vast 
replacement of native species by nonnative plants which cannot support many kinds of 
animal life.
Today, however, both domestic policies and international agreements are moving 
toward liberalization of trade in sugar, which might lead to major restructuring on the U.S. 
sugar industry. As of 1991, Louisiana had the lowest cost per pound of raw sugar in the 
U.S. at 11.3 cents per pound. Production costs were relatively lower than in 1985, when 
Louisiana had the third lowest production cost per pound (University of Arizona, 1998). 
It makes Louisiana’s sugar industry one of the most competitive in the U.S. On the other 
hand, “overcoming adversity has been a way of life for the Louisiana sugar industry. Of 
all threats, one of the most vexing has been federal legislation . . .” as the federal 
government establishes and eliminates support with “annoying regularity” (LSU, 1998). 
Growing concern about environmental quality may also impact the structure of sugarcane
8
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production. For example, since 1995 the Everglades Restoration Tax has been added to 
Florida costs (ERS-USDA, 1998). In addition, “Florida voters in November 1996 approved 
a constitutional amendment that requires polluters from farmland. . .  to be held ‘primarily 
responsible’ for stopping and cleaning up the pollution they cause” (Lee, 1998). In 
Louisiana, more stringent legislation is foreseen to impact production systems as the 
commitment grows toward improving water quality within the context of the Coastal Zone 
Management Act and its amendments.
Study Area
The study area is composed of the 21 parishes reporting sugarcane production in 
1997. Twelve of these parishes are part of the current Coastal Zone Management Area of 
Louisiana (Figure 1.1). The total cropland in the study area is 2,233,688 acres. Of the total 
cropland, 389,553 acres (17 percent) are in sugarcane. A total of 697 farms (10 percent) 
in the study area are dedicated to sugarcane production (Table 1.1).
According to the USD A 1997 Census of Agriculture, the average farm size in the 
State of Louisiana was 331 acres. For that year, the average size for sugarcane farms was 
570 acres in the study area. The minimum average size reported was 286 acres in 
Vermilion Parish and the maximum average size reported was 831 acres in Iberville Parish. 
The greater average farm size for sugarcane production explains why even though the 
number of sugarcane farms was only 4 percent of the total number of farms in the study 
area, sugarcane accounted for 17 percent of the total cropland area.
9
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Management Program
Additional Parishes in Proposed Seetion 
6217 Coastal Zone Management Program
Figure 1.1 Current and Proposed Coastal Zone Management Areas. Louisiana, 1998.
Table 1.1 Total Cropland, Sugarcane Production and Number of Farms, by Parish.
Parish
Total Cropland 
(acres)
Total Number 
of Farms 
(acres)
Sucarcane
Cropland
(acres)
Number of 
Sucarcane 
Farms
Acadia 239,624 544 (D) 5
Ascension 32,000 211 14,977 19
Assumption 52,556 78 35,228 58
Avoyelles 210,641 744 11,556 22
Calcasieu 140,044 545 (D) 2
Iberia 89,639 256 61,618 120
Iberville 70,924 123 32,425 39
Jefferson Davis 252,436 481 (D) 2
Lafayette 74,063 459 13,777 25
Lafourche 69,402 319 30,053 58
Pointe Coupee 159,762 339 21,012 33
Rapides 122,146 636 5,168 12
St. Charles 8,646 54 (D) 4
St. James 40,417 62 28,817 40
St. John The Baptist 6,264 24 3,703 7
St. Landry 224,118 802 9,196 14
St. Martin 66,417 216 31,215 67
St. Mary 65,199 88 45,710 59
Terrebone 30,956 107 14,592 20
Vermilion 256,064 843 22,035 77
West Baton Rouge 22,370 84 8,471 14
(D) Withheld to avoid disclosing data for indivic ual farms.
Source: USDA 1997 Census of Agriculture.
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Problem Statement
Agriculture has been singled out as one of the major nonpoint sources of water 
pollution in Louisiana. Agricultural runoff is considered one of the most pervasive 
problems in water quality, but when preventive measures are taken to reduce agricultural 
runoff, a serious threat to groundwater may develop as nutrients and pesticides infiltrate to 
the water table. The solution to the problem of agricultural nonpoint pollution is a typical 
policy problem of concentrated costs and diffused benefits. Costs are concentrated on 
farmers, who may be forced out of business if required to implement management measures 
that will reduce agricultural pollution. Benefits, on the other hand, are diffused among all 
members of society, including farmers.
The State of Louisiana, in trying to keep a voluntary approach to the implementation 
of the Louisiana Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program (CNPCP), is proposing to 
have a statewide comprehensive program and enforce state laws to correct for violations 
when they occur. The program allows the state to integrate the two coastal zone areas 
proposed within the framework of an existing program that is already identifiable by the 
public. At the same time educational and technical assistance programs will be developed 
that will allow the expansion of the area covered by the program as the need arises. On 
the other hand, according to the current status of the Louisiana CNPCP, if it does not meet 
EPA and NOAA requirements for final approval, the State of Louisiana may face federal 
penalty provisions, which will eventually cut the funding needed to carry out the existing 
coastal zone management program.
12
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To effectively implement the proposed strategy, policy decision makers in Louisiana 
need a full understanding of the current status of Best Management Practices (BMP) and 
their adoption in the state. Policy makers also need to determine how well producers 
understand current and proposed legislation that could affect their farming practices, as well 
as the factors that influence producers’ willingness to adopt proposed Best Management 
Practices (BMPs). There is also a need for an evaluation of the economic and 
environmental effectiveness of alternative BMPs in Louisiana, and the appropriate 
incentives that may be needed to accomplish the goals of better water quality in the state. 
Economic subsidies, educational strategies, and technical assistance alternatives need to be 
evaluated.
Justification
Historically, the agricultural community has been considered a steward of the soil. 
A number of conservation programs over the last fifty years have dramatically reduced soil 
erosion. However, soil erosion is still seventeen times higher than the sustainable rate 
(Pimentel et al, 1997) and as environmental concern grows, environmental regulation of 
agricultural production will likely increase in the future. The primary concerns of the 
agricultural community are 1) the reduction and control of agricultural nonpoint source 
pollution to improve water quality, and 2) maintaining the economic viability of the 
agricultural sector.
Although the EPA’s Guidance for Coastal Nonpoint Source Pollution Control 
identifies several BMPs that EPA considers economically feasible, there is no documented 
evidence of their suitability for Louisiana’s conditions. The suitability of proposed BMPs
13
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must be assessed in terms of economic feasibility, but also in terms of the producers’ 
willingness to undertake specific BMPs. Specific educational and technical assistance 
needs have to be identified in order to develop an integrated program that will improve the 
acceptance of environmentally desirable BMPs and eventually set up the conditions for 
coercive actions after an effort is been made to get farmers into voluntary compliance. 
Environmentally effective BMPs, depending on their implementation and maintenance 
costs, may require policies involving cost-sharing needs, which need to be determined. 
Objectives
General Objective
The overall objective of this study is to assess the feasibility of alternative 
approaches to meeting agricultural nonpoint pollution control standards for sugarcane in 
Louisiana’s coastal zone management areas.
Specific Objectives
Specific objectives of this study are:
1) Identify and describe the current production and regulatory environment 
surrounding sugarcane production in Louisiana, as well as prospective scenarios, 
within the context of the Coastal Zone Management Act.
2) Develop a conceptual framework for evaluating the economic feasibility and 
environmental effectiveness of alternative policy tools.
3) Develop a model that allows for the description of the current situation and the 
analysis of future scenarios of BMPs adoption, accounting for variables that may 
influence the farmers’ decision to undertake environmentally sound BMPs.
14
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4) Estimate and test the empirical model in the production of sugarcane.
5) Analyze the policy implications of the findings and suggest policy alternatives. 
Research Procedures
Objective One
The first objective of this study was attained through a comprehensive review of 
relevant literature to provide the background to the current environment in the production 
of sugarcane in South Louisiana. Crop budgets published by the LSU Department of 
Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness were reviewed to determine actual production 
costs and production management practices currently implemented. Federal and state 
agency publications were reviewed to identify approved best management practices and 
environmental regulatory requirements. Specific work was reviewed on water quality 
issues relevant to the costal zone management area of Louisiana. Legislation not yet 
implemented was also reviewed to determine its possible effects on sugarcane producers, 
the public sector, and society in general. State proposals on nonpoint pollution control 
alternatives were also reviewed.
Objective Two
Objective two was realized through a review of relevant literature on the use of 
behavioral variables and individuals attitudes in predicting economic behavior. Command- 
and-control versus incentive-based approaches were framed in terms of their ability to 
improve environmental quality. A review of neoclassical economic theory was developed 
to set the background for the attainment of the other objectives of this research.
15
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Objective Three
In the policy decision making process, certain fundamental facts about the issue 
being considered are needed. A detailed qualitative and quantitative description of BMP 
adoption in the area under study is required to determine the extent to which new actions 
may be required. The basic question is whether fanners have adopted or will adopt best 
management practices. This is a case of a phenomena where we are interested in discrete 
rather than continuous models (Maddala, 1983). These are called models with qualitative 
dependent variables (Judge et al, 1988), or qualitative response, quantal, or categorical 
models (Amemiya, 1981). In these models, a discrete outcome such as yes or no decisions 
is to be elicited and evaluated. In these cases, regression analysis is not readily applicable. 
However, it is possible to construct models that link the decision or outcome to a set of 
factors, at least in the spirit of regression (Greene, 1997). The dependent variable in these 
models is interpreted as a probability measure for which the realized value takes extreme 
discrete values, although the theoretical value could be any intermediate value 
(Ramanathan, 1992). There has been an ‘upsurge’ of qualitative response models in 
economics, basically due to the fact that economists deal with many variables that are either 
naturally discrete or are discretely recorded (Amemiya, 1981).
Discrete dependent variables are often cast in the form of random utility models 
(Greene, 1997; Judge et al, 1988) or stochastic utility models (Amemiya, 1981). That is, 
economists assume that economic agents make rational decisions to maximize their utility 
(Machina,1983; Henderson and Quandt, 1986 ). So, we may define the following general 
random utility model:
16
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Ujj = E[Uy] +£” (1)
where the utility function for the ith individual is composed of the expected utility level 
obtained by choosing the jth  alternative, with the random error term e,j.
Consider the specific case of a sugarcane producer who has to decide whether to 
adopt certain best management practices or use traditional production practices. This is a 
binary choice of the ith producer that may be represented by a random variable y, that takes 
the value 1 if  the BMP is adopted and 0 if a given the BMP is not adopted. If P* is the 
probability that yj takes the value 1, then 1 -Pf is the probability that y( is 0. In other words, 
we have the probability function for yj as:
f(yj) = Piy' ( l - P i ) y , - = o , i  (2)
The utility associated with each production process is assumed to be a function of 
the characteristics of the production system and the producer’s socioeconomic
characteristics plus an additive error term. Following Amemiya (1981) and Judge et al
(1988), we have that:
Uj0 = z 'i06 + w'j /  o + ei0 (3)
Uji = z'n§ + w' j / i  + e n (4)
where:
Ujo ,Un = utilities from the two possible choices; 
z'jQjZ'j, = vectors of the characteristics of the two choices; 
w'j = socioeconomic characteristics of the ith individual; and 
e io, eii = random disturbances.
The assumption is that a rational, utility maximizing producer will choose to adopt
17
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BMPs if Un >Ui0 or the unobservable random variable y*-= Un - Uj0 > 0. (An indecision
would exist if Ui0=Un> but that would happen with probability zero if ei0 and en are both
continuous random variables). So, the values of the observable random variable y( are 
determined as:
Yi =1 if y*j > 0  (5)
yj = 0 if y*j < 0 (6)
The unobservable variable y*j can be rewritten as:
y >  (Z ii-zi0) '8  + w 'j ( y , -  y o) + ( e „ -  ei0) (7)
y * i =  [ ( Z j i -Z j0) ' , w ' j ]
S
+  (  e » -  e io) (8 )_yt- r  o_
y*j=x'jP + eV (9)
where x'j = vector of explanatory variables.
P = unknown parameters; and
e*; = random errors in linear statistical model for y’;.
The probability that y; = 1 is then:
Pj = Pr[yi= 1] = Pr[y*j >0] = Pr[x'jp + <  > 0] = Pr[e*j > -x'jP ]. (10)
A particular distribution for e*j must be chosen. The most commonly used are the
normal distribution and the logistic distribution. Probit and logit models are used
correspondingly. In multivariate situations, extensions of these models are used, as
presented in Chapter 3.
Explanatory variables include socioeconomic characteristics of sugarcane producers
in South Louisiana. For example, Lynne, Shonkwiler and Rola (1988), found that farmers
18
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consider it their duty to maintain soil productivity, while Esseks, Kraft, and Furlong (1997), 
found that compliance with regulatory programs is a major force in implementing 
conservation practices, especially if the producer believes that there is high probability of 
violations being detected. Lee and Stewart (1983) report that full-owner operators and 
landowners with small holdings are less likely to adopt BMPs and that cost-sharing may 
be needed to encourage conservation management decisions among these groups. They 
also suggest that personal characteristics and economic factors associated with farm 
operators should be further investigated in this regard, since in many cases operators may 
have more influence than landowners. According to Norris and Batie (1987), financial 
factors, including income and debt, are the most important factors influencing producers 
decision to undertake conservation practices. They also indicate that other factors include 
the producer’s perception of soil erosion, education level, off-farm employment, and 
tenancy. Cooper and Keim (1996), in evaluating incentive payments to encourage farmer 
adoption of water quality protection practices used, among others, the following 
explanatory variables: size of operation; formal education of the operator; estimated market 
value per acre of land; operator’s years of experience; and crop. They conclude that 
farmers can be encouraged to voluntarily adopt environmentally sound management 
practices through the use of economic incentives.
Rahm and Huffman (1984), evaluating the role of human capital in the adoption of 
reduced tillage, conclude that when the adoption is not always economically feasible, 
human capital variables such as producer’s education, experience, and health enhance the 
efficiency of adoption. They also indicate that the probability of adoption differs widely,
19
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
depending on soil characteristics, current cropping systems, and size of farming operation. 
Purvis et al (1989), while doing an evaluation of farmer’s response to a filter strip program, 
found the following variables significant in the producer’s decision to undertake this 
practice: yearly incentive payment; average yield on filter strip land (reflecting opportunity 
cost); concern about conserving soil on the farm; and concern about the environment.
Family characteristics including age, years of education, primary occupation, 
ethnicity, religion, and active participation on social organizations, were considered by 
Salamon et al. (1997) to determine their effect on adoption of sustainable farming systems. 
They emphasize two important barriers to adoption: lack of family consensus and 
community pressure. They indicate that “conventional farmers watch the field, yields, 
evidence of finances, and farm size o f‘sustainable adopters’ and judge them poor managers 
based on these criteria.” In comparing conventional versus conservation practices, Napier 
and Camboni (1993) used the following relevant explanatory variables for the use of 
selected practices: perceived health threat; knowledge of groundwater pollution in the 
county; impact on production costs; days of off-farm employment; age of primary operator; 
years farming; acres usually cultivated; debt to asset ratio; gross farm income; concern for 
groundwater pollution; and participation in government farm programs. In their assessment 
of the Water Quality Incentives Program’s (WQIP) chances for acceptance by farmers, 
Kraft, Lant, and Gillman (1996) found that “farmers interest in the WQIP is limited and is 
significantly influenced by farmer’s attitudes toward governmental involvement with
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wetland regulation, education, tenure status, contact with Natural Resources Conservation 
Service, and percentage of farm sales derived from specialty crops.”
Objective Four
Objective four was the empirical component of the research. Models developed in 
objective three were estimated using corresponding econometric techniques and software 
(LIMDEP, SAS). The predictive power of the models was assessed through the use and 
comparison of different measures of goodness of fit. For those purposes, a survey 
instrument was designed and implemented to collect the needed data. A modified version 
of the Dillman method (Dillman, 1978; Dillman, 1991) was used to conduct a mail survey. 
Primary data collection was attained by surveying the population of sugarcane producers 
in the study area. The survey questionnaire was designed to determine which BMPs (and 
in what proportion) were currently being used in sugarcane production in Louisiana; the 
factors affecting farmer’s willingness to adopt environmentally desirable BMPs; the 
educational and technical assistance needs to improve adoption rates and efficiency; and 
the impact of cost-sharing programs on the adoption of environmentally effective BMPs.
Objective Five
Results generated from objectives one through four were interpreted in line with 
expectations of the information needs of policy makers and sugarcane producers. Policy 
implementation will be discussed in terms of 1) achievement of environmentally desirable 
goals and 2) the aim of keeping agriculture as an economically viable activity. Through the 
realization of objective five, this research sheds light on the description of the current 
situation of BMPs in sugarcane production in Louisiana, the producer’s characteristics that
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policy makers should take into account in designing policies oriented toward the 
compliance with required nonpoint pollution control programs, and alternative tools that 
can be effectively used.
22
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CHAPTER2
POLICY APPROACHES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A COASTAL 
NONPOINT POLLUTION CONTROL PROGRAM FOR AGRICULTURE
In this chapter, the theoretical basis of general approaches to environmental policy
are first discussed. Then, environmental policies within the context of the agricultural
sector in the United States are reviewed. Later, U.S. water quality policy is discussed in
terms of three major pieces of legislation: The Clean Water Act (CWA); the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA); and the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of
1990 (CZARA). Coastal zone management in Louisiana is then presented in terms of how
it has evolved and its current situation. Finally, the role of Best Management Practices
(BMPs) for agriculture is discussed in the context of current water quality legislation and
its applicability to the State of Louisiana.
General Approaches of Environmental Policy
Although as suggested by Smith (1995), the role of government in environmental
regulation may be described as lying on a continuum that runs from free market all the way
to total federal government control, there are basically three general approaches that have
been used to deal with environmental problems. Each of these approaches varies
depending on the degree of government intervention. The first one is the reliance on self-
interest and voluntarism. No government intervention is defined, and it’s essentially the
free market option. The second approach is the so-called command-and-control approach.
Here the government, through specific agencies, sets the standards and means to enforce
them. A third option often proposed is the incentive-based mechanisms approach, where
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some monetary measure (taxes, subsidies) is established to find the most efficient way to 
limit pollution. Each of these approaches is characterized below.
Voluntarism or Self-Regulation
This approach has also been called the Free Market Approach. A market may be 
defined as a social system in which individuals pursue their own welfare by exchanging 
things with others whenever trades are mutually beneficial (Stone, 1997). The conceptual 
market model of society has the following relevant characteristics: the unit of analysis is 
the individual; behavioral motivations are based on self-interest; and the major conflict is 
one of self-interest vs. self-interest. Collective activity is based on competition and the 
criteria for individual decisions is the maximization of self-interest while minimizing costs, 
given information that is accurate, complete, and fully available. Material resources are 
assumed finite and diminish with use. Changes are motivated by material exchange and 
the quest to maximize one’s own welfare (Stone, 1997).
However, markets fail to allocate resources efficiently. A market failure is likely 
to create a divergence between private costs and social costs. According to Kahn (1998), 
there are five categories of market failure that are important for environmental and natural 
resources: imperfect competition; imperfect information; public goods; inappropriate 
government intervention; and externalities (Kahn, 1998). It can be said that, in the absence 
of market failure, the ‘invisible hand’ of the market is an efficient allocator of resources. 
In the case of pollution, however, social costs are greater than private costs, because social 
costs include not only the private costs of production but also the additional costs of the 
damage generated by pollution (Smith, 1995; Kahn, 1998). Most of the criticisms of the
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market system are based on the distributional aspects of those costs among members of 
society (Kahn, 1998; Stone, 1997).
The Command-and-Control Approach
This approach, also called ‘standards and enforcement,’ is described as a regulatory 
style or strategy where the state sets and enforces pollution limits and in some cases 
specifies the technologies to be used to achieve such limits. That is, some government unit 
pre-defines what the appropriate level of a given pollutant is, sets the standard, and 
establishes the rules to enforce adherence to such standards (Reams, 1995; Smith, 1995). 
In the United States, this is the primary means of environmental regulation and includes 
permitting, setting standards for discharges, and the requirement that information on 
discharges be reported. It also includes the banning of certain activities, zoning, and 
adjudication (Smith, 1995)
It is believed that the command-and-control approach produces equity in 
implementation, since given a uniform standard, polluters are theoretically treated alike. 
It is also argued that it is less expensive to administer, because it eliminates the need to 
investigate individual cases. Finally, it is believed that this approach is less susceptible to 
political influence and manipulation (Smith, 1995) and that some command-and-control 
efforts, such as more aggressive but traditional enforcement actions by states, may lead to 
improved environmental conditions (Reams, 1995). Some conditions favor the use of 
direct control, including those cases where monitoring costs are high, the optimal level of 
emissions is at or near zero, or during random events or emergencies that change the 
relationship between emissions and damages (Kahn, 1998).
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Command-and-control regulations have been criticized for several apparent flaws. 
According to Schultze (1977) and Schelling (1983), cited by Reams (1995), fundamental 
economic inefficiencies are inherent in the command-and-control approach. It has led to 
widely varying pollution control costs among different industries because it does not take 
into account variations among polluters, both in terms of the costs associated with pollution 
and the risks that different sources of pollution imply (Reams, 1995). It is also argued that 
command-and-control suffers from fragmentation by environmental media, as it focuses 
on only one point-source polluting activity and one pollutant at a time. On occasions it has 
led to reduced pollution in one medium, but increased pollution in other media. 
Command-and-control is also criticized for its inconsistency with the philosophy that 
pollution prevention is the most desirable management strategy, because by defining 
mandatory technology for pollution reduction, it often discourages technological innovation 
(Reams, 1995). The inability of command-and-control regulations to quickly respond to 
change is another strong criticism.
In summary, the criticisms to the command-and-control approach may be stated as 
follows: uniform national standards ignore varying local conditions; national standards may 
or may not provide an incentive to find the least costly method of pollution control; once 
a standard is set, there is no incentive for pollution discharges less than the established 
amount; and, standards limit the flexibility that might allow pollution reductions at the 
lowest cost (Smith, 1995).
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Economic Incentives
Economic incentives, economic inducements, market-based incentives, or incentive- 
based mechanisms to environmental management are defined as tools that rely on a system 
of economic rewards (positive incentives) or penalties (disincentives) to promote a desired 
behavior (Diagne, 1996). The idea behind econofnic incentives is that knowledge of a 
threatened penalty or a promised reward motivates polluters to act differently than they 
would otherwise do. With positive incentives, policy makers make it easier or more 
rewarding for polluters to do what is believed to be better for society; with disincentives, 
policy makers make it much harder or more expensive for polluters to do undesirable 
actions. The purpose of economic inducements is to bring individual motives into line with 
community goals. This approach is based on the theory that society can alter people’s self- 
propelled progress toward their goals by changing the obstacles and opportunities they face 
(Stone, 1997). The economic-incentives approach seeks ways to internalize external 
diseconomies by compensation, creating incentives for alternative behavior. It relies little 
on education or moral suasion, no matter how desirable these efforts may be (Katzman and 
Cale 1995).
It is argued that incentive-based approaches will reduce pollution at lower costs and 
lead to large gains in economic efficiency by leaving to individual firms the decisions about 
howto achieve environmental goals. Incentives can be applied independently of, or within, 
the command-and-control regulatory framework (Reams, 1995). It is also believed that 
economic incentives minimize total abatement costs by equating the marginal abatement 
costs across polluters. Economic incentives are also thought to encourage more research
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and development into abatement technologies and alternatives to activities that generate 
pollution (Kahn, 1998).
In general, policy instruments suggested include: taxes; subsidies; deposit-refunds; 
bonding systems; liability systems; and transferrable permits (Kahn, 1998). However, 
potential economic incentive-based policy instruments may be classified into two broad 
categories: taxes and subsidies, and marketable pollution permits (Diagne, 1996).
Taxes and Subsidies 
Externalities create differences between private and social costs and benefits. 
According to Pigou (1938) an externality can not be mitigated by contractual negotiation 
between the affected parties and requires coercion on the part of government or taxation 
against the polluting party. A per unit of pollution tax will induce all polluters to equate 
their marginal abatement costs to the tax. It means that if all polluters face the same per 
unit tax, then a tax will equate marginal abatement costs across polluters; consequently, a 
tax on each unit of pollution minimizes the total cost of obtaining a given target level of 
pollution (Kahn, 1998). The optimal Pigouvian tax will be defined at the point where the 
difference between the marginal benefit and the marginal damage caused by the activity is 
equal to zero (Baumol and Oates, 1992).
Policy makers seldom have perfect prior information on the responses of polluters 
to the taxes (Kahn, 1998). Given the difficulty of calculating the money value of the 
damage and benefits caused by pollution generating activities (Diagne, 1996), the correct 
estimation of the optimal Pigouvian tax is impossible for practical purposes.
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Deposit-refund systems are schemes that simultaneously apply taxes and subsidies. 
It is argued that deposit-refund systems are a good way of employing economic incentives 
when monitoring costs are high (Kahn, 1998). This system is similar to a tax, except that 
in the deposit-refund system, the polluter does not pay as the polluting act occurs, but 
rather he or she pays up front, and then he or she is rewarded if they act properly. This 
instrument has been used in beverage and pesticide containers, cars in Scandinavia, 
lubricating oil, lead acid batteries (Kahn, 1998; Diagne, 1996), and suggested for use with 
tires, CFCs in refrigerators, and containers of toxic household products (Kahn, 1998).
Pricing and standards approaches are viable alternatives that avoid the recourse of 
direct controls and retain the use of the price system as a means to control externalities. It 
involves the selection of a set of standards for an acceptable environment. These standards 
in time become a set of constraints that society places on its activities. Then the policy 
maker can levy a uniform set of taxes which, in effect, constitute prices for the private use 
of social resources. The taxes (prices) will then be adjusted to achieve the target reduction 
of pollution (Baumol and Oates, 1992).
Bonding systems work in a similar way to deposit-refund systems. In this case, a 
potential polluter of the environment is required to deposit a large sum of money in an 
escrow account. If the environment is left undamaged or its returned to its original 
condition, then the money is returned to its original owner; otherwise, the money is 
forfeited. The size of the bond has to be large enough to encourage potential polluters to 
play safe and large enough to allow government to clean up damage if it occurs. Bonding 
systems are used in strip mining areas, and have been suggested for companies that have
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leases to cut trees in public forests and for companies that transport oil or other toxic 
substances (Kahn, 1998).
Liability systems are based on the legal definition of liability for damages caused 
by certain polluters and facilitating the collection of these damages. It provides for the 
incorporation of social costs of pollution into the private cost calculation of its externality 
generating activity. That is, it allows for the internalization of the expected damage of the 
potential pollution into the private cost estimation. To ensure that potential polluters take 
appropriate safety measures, the public authority has to increase the probability that the 
firm will have to pay the social cost of its spills. The Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCL A) provides for the application 
of this alternative (Kahn, 1998). A similar alternative suggests the definition of legal 
liability as defined above and requires that potential polluters obtain full insurance against 
any damage their activity may cause. This instrument has been suggested for generators, 
haulers, and disposers of toxic waste (Kahn, 1998).
Pure pollution subsidies are positive incentives in which the polluter is paid a fixed 
amount of money for each unit of pollution that is reduced. In theory, the polluter will 
reduce pollution, up to the point where the subsidy is equal to the marginal cost of 
abatement. That is the same condition under the Pigouvian tax, but with differences in their 
distribution effects. With taxes, polluters have to pay for their polluting activities; with 
subsidies, society transfers resources to polluters. Subsidies also have the perverse effect 
of increasing the number of polluters, by making polluting firms more profitable (Kahn, 
1998).
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Marketable Pollution Permits
This policy instrument combines the desirable properties of the command-and- 
control approach and taxes. The concept was first introduced by Dales (Diagne, 1996), and 
is also known as transferable permits. It begins with the definition of a target level of 
pollution. Then the total level of pollution is allocated among polluters through a system 
of marketable pollution permits. After the initial allocation of pollution permits are made, 
polluters are free to trade the rights to pollute (Rees, 1997). The system creates a new type 
of property right, the right to pollute (Diagne, 1996). The ability to trade the rights to 
pollute allows for the equalization of marginal abatement costs across polluters. If the price 
of a permit is less than a polluter’s marginal abatement cost, that polluter can reduce total 
costs by buying more permits and polluting more. But, if the price of the permit is greater 
than marginal abatement costs, then profits may be increased by selling permits and 
polluting less (Kahn, 1998).
An important issue in this approach is the distributional criteria for the initial 
allocation of tradable permits (Rees, 1997). The permits may be allocated to existing 
polluters proportional to historic pollution level, auctioned to the highest bidder, distributed 
by lottery, or by some other criterion or combination of criteria. The desirable result of 
equating marginal costs across polluters and minimizing total abatement costs is the same, 
independent of the allocation criterion (Kahn, 1998).
U.S. Agriculture and Environmental Policy
Throughout the last half century, agricultural policies in the United States have 
tended to be voluntary (Pealberg, 1989). Rooted in Adam Smith’s fundamental idea that
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“by pursuing his own interest he [the entrepreneur] frequently promotes that of the society 
more effectually than when he really intends to promote it...” society seem to have relied 
on the farmers’ “willingness to participate in proposed programs or adopt suggested 
practices” (Diagne, 1996). It has been consistent with what Smith (1995) calls the U.S. 
Dominant Social Paradigm (DSP), defined as the acceptance of “laissez-faire capitalism, 
individualism, growth and progress, and a faith in science and technology”(Smith, 1995).
Historically, it can be traced back to the enactment of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Act of 1933 (Pealberg, 1989), which was later transformed into a more permanent set of 
protection entitlements by which, as Batie (1990) indicates, “society both accepted and 
institutionalized a social contract: the right of farmers to be protected from income 
instability.” In a way, the existence of such a social contract led to the self regulatory status 
of the agricultural sector, with the assistance of U.S. institutions such as the Department 
of Agriculture, the Cooperative Extension Service, and commodity groups (Lowi, 1969). 
It may also explain ‘seemingly counterproductive’ U.S. government actions such as supply 
controls, which encourage other countries to expand their own production and gain world 
market shares (Batie, 1990). As indicated by Diagne (1996), income support and 
commodity programs were implemented to unconditionally support farmers’ income and 
the maintenance or improvement of productivity.
However, the so-called social contract between society and farmers in the U.S. 
started to lose its robust position when it was altered to include policy responses to urban 
concerns, such as food distribution programs. Nevertheless, food distribution programs and 
the food stamp program actually increased the demand for agricultural products. Another
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limiting condition to the social contract was in response to concerns about wealth 
concentration. As a result, a cap was set on farm programs payment benefits. However, 
according to Batie (1990) the cap could be evaded by “dividing ownership of farms among 
individual family members” (Batie, 1990).
Finally, a more recent and more controversial restraint has been placed on that 
social contract - environmental concerns. As agriculture has been targeted as an important 
source of environmental problems, the self-regulation period seems to be no longer fully 
viable, and alternative policy options have to be considered.
There are two major changes in the political environment in the U.S. that have had 
a great impact on environmental policies. One is the maturing of the environmental 
movement, and the other one is the declining political power of farmers and their 
representatives. Farmers in 1933 were 26 percent of the population; in 1981 they were only 
2.4 percent (Batie, 1985). It was after World War II that the U.S. public began to question 
the expertise of agencies in managing the environment, and the wisdom of human 
manipulation of natural resources. Even though farmers still benefit from an enormous 
amount of public goodwill, representatives of agricultural interests have needed to make 
important concessions and have had to be ‘astute coalition builders’ to achieve results as 
their power has dwindled (Batie, 1985).
Agricultural policy is no longer seen as a farm-oriented problem only. As stated by 
Repko (1994), the “environmental, economic and aesthetic impacts caused... make this a 
formidable regional problem,” with several consequences, such as: water quality
degradation, fish and wildlife impacts, depreciated property values, exorbitant remedial
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costs, clogs drainage ditches, fills harbors and rivers reducing the capacity to hold flood 
waters, among others. In addition to agriculture, other sources of soil erosion are 
construction and other development activities, mining and urban runoff (Shafer, 1996; 
Repko, 1994).
Extreme positions are found, such as the one proposed by Sharon Butala, cited by 
Van Kooten (1993), “Instead of fighting a losing battle for markets, instead of risking 
topsoil and environment... it may be better to move out the farmers and close off these 
areas of marginal land.”
Command-and-control regulations in agriculture alone would not necessarily be 
effective, but the rationality of seeking some kind of transfer payments from other sectors 
to “pay” farmers to prevent soil erosion (subsidies) also shows some contradictory results. 
According to the results of a nationwide survey, related to the 1990 Farm Bill’s measures 
concerning soil erosion caused by U.S. farmers, people “show more support for the 
regulation of soil erosion, including laws and fines, than for government financial support” 
(Jordan, 1992). Similar results are reported by Coxhead (1995) “in the absence of 
substantial technical progress... subsidy interventions reduce the welfare of all groups, and 
in addition promote more rapid agricultural land degradation.” However, Taylor (1995) 
indicates that, “Short-term subsidies coupled with research directed towards reducing the 
cost and yield disadvantages of conservation tillage ... were advocated to maintain long­
term soil productivity.”
In the case of technology, it has been found that, “[yjield increasing technology was 
soil conserving, but, with projected yields of crops that have a high erosion potential
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increasing faster than crops that have a low erosion potential there was an economic 
incentive to grow crops with a high erosion potential in the future” (Smith and Hallan, 
1990). Concern is expressed by Burt (1981) that “methods are needed to reduce soil 
erosion to levels consistent with public policy objectives... the fostering of a ‘conservation 
ethic’ may reduce the necessity for rules and regulations on cropping and tillage practices. 
Yet, as long as the market incentives lead to actions not consistent with social objectives, 
policy options including taxes, regulations, subsidies, and technical assistance will be 
increasingly discussed as alternatives to help reduce the rate of erosion.”
Incentive-based mechanisms are extensively used in land use and conservation 
policies in the U.S. and appear to have yielded some good results. Federal programs such 
as the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) and the Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP) 
are examples where these mechanisms have been implemented with success. Some state 
and local management programs also include incentive-based mechanisms. These 
programs are: Transferable Development Rights (TDRs) and Purchase of Development 
Rights (PDRs).
On the other hand, according to the Wilderness Society (1993), protection is a good 
business, in the sense that protecting plants and wildlife helps meet our need for a stable 
food supply, offers hope and reality for the cure of many diseases such as cancer, and 
providing several other benefits to society in general. Otherwise, extinction would mean 
knowledge forfeited and opportunities lost - food sources never to be tapped, medicines 
never to be extracted. Blum (1997) suggests that “despite previous failures of the market 
to preserve biodiversity, market reform offers nations the best incentive to sustain their
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natural resources...” It may be concluded, according to Reams (1996), that a combination 
of market-based mechanisms and regulation may contribute to the efficient control of 
environmentally damaging activities.
Passage of the Soil and Water Resources Conservation Act (RCA) in 1977 began 
a major evaluation of soil conservation programs that had been in place for nearly half a 
century. It was a response to the need to gain budgetary support for soil conservation 
programs and to reduce conflict between the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), the Congress, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and the Executive 
Office of the President. The OMB had perceived agricultural conservation programs as 
distributing cost-sharing dollars to farmers mainly for production improving practices, 
without respect to the magnitude of farmer’s conservation needs (Batie, 1985).
The 1985 Farm Bill contained a fundamental reorientation of agricultural policy. 
The conservation title included four environmental items: the sodbuster, swampbuster, 
conservation reserve, and conservation compliance provisions (Henning and Luzar, 1988). 
The sodbuster provision provided for a farmer to lose all commodity program benefits if 
he cropped highly erodible land that was not cropped before 1985. If highly erodible land 
had already been in production before 1985, the provision required the implementation of 
appropriate conservation practices if farmers wanted to remain eligible for federal 
programs. The swampbuster provision denied federal benefits to farmers who drained 
wetlands and transformed them into agricultural land.
The conservation reserve provision allowed farmers to bid to receive rental 
payments for land removed from production for a ten year period. And finally, the
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conservation compliance provision made farmers cultivating highly erodible cropland 
ineligible for federal support programs, unless they implemented a conservation plan by 
1990 on the eroding cropping land (Henning and Luzar, 1988).
The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) can be traced back to the Soil Bank Act 
of 1956. At the time, the U.S. Congress, in recognition that eroding cropland had to be 
protected, authorized the USD A to enter into long-term conservation contracts with 
producers and landowners. A cost-sharing strategy was implemented to convert cropland 
from production to protective vegetative cover. The Soil Bank Program lasted 10 years, 
during which nearly 29 million acres of cropland were diverted to conservation programs 
on 306,000 farms. Two long-term contract programs where then implemented, the 
Cropland Conservation Program, in 1962, and the Cropland Adjusted Program, in i965 
(USD A, 1998).
In the early 1980s, the USDA released studies indicating that the nation’s cropland 
was “eroding and suffering losses at a rate exceeding 3 billion tons per year” (USDA,
1998). Wildlife was also affected, as “intensive farming and conversion of fallow land to 
production had destroyed habitats for many species, leading to declining populations” 
(USDA, 1998). As a result, Title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985 established the 
Conservation Reserve Program, as a voluntary, long-term cropland retirement program. 
The primary goal of the CRP when established was to reduce soil erosion. Secondary 
objectives included “protecting the nation’s long run capability to produce food and fiber, 
reducing sedimentation, improving water quality, fostering water life habitat, curbing the
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production of surplus commodities, and providing income support to farmers” (USDA, 
1998).
The CRP provided producers (farm owners, operators or tenants) who chose to 
participate, with an annual per-acre rent plus half the cost of establishing a permanent land 
cover (usually grass or trees), and the land had to be retired from production for 10 to 15 
years. In 1985, the enrollment mandate established was 40-45 million acres. As of 1990, 
USDA had enrolled 33.9 million acres.
The Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act (FACTA) of 1990, extended 
the CPR enrollment period through 1995, broadening the program’s focus to include 
improving water quality and the other environmental goals. As of 1993, 36.4 million acres 
were enrolled. In 1995, the total capping of CRP enrollment was at 38 million acres.
At the end of 1994, a shift took place in the orientation of the CRP. CRP 
participants would be allowed to release all or part of the eligible contract acreage before 
the contract expiration date without incurring a penalty, provided that the released acreage 
was replaced with land meeting more rigorous standards for soil control, water quality, tree- 
planting, or wildlife habitat benefits.
The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996 confirmed 
the new emphasis of the CRP, keeping the maximum enrollment of 36.4 million acres at 
any one time through 2002. Even though it reported that as of October 1996, there were 
36.422 million acres enrolled, the actual enrollment was less because of the early release 
acres and expiration of contracts. The aim now was to achieve the highest 
environmental
38
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
benefits, and consistent with that, bids for new sign-ups were based in an Environmental 
Benefits Index (EBI).
The EBI is calculated based on five factors. Four factors are to quantify the 
environmental contributions of the parcel offered and the fifth factor is related to the 
federal cost of enrolling each parcel. The four factors accounting for environmental 
impacts include water quality protection (both ground water and surface water), creation 
of wildlife habitat, control of soil erodability, and tree planting. Conservation priority areas 
are designations based on a judgement that retiring agricultural lands in these specific areas 
offers the potential of significant improvement of water quality or wildlife habitat (USDA, 
1998).
In January 1998, USDA announced that it would accept 5.9 million acres in the 
CRP’s 16th sign-up. This time the EBI threshold was lower, as offers with an EBI of 247 
or greater were to be accepted. The reason why the EBI was lower was because the cost 
factor was reduced from 200 to 150, which roughly made the 247 score for the 16th sign-up 
equal to 273 points under the 15th sign-up requirements. That is, actual requirements were 
greater under the new threshold (USDA, 1998).
The CRP has resulted in a marked increase in the number of fanners concerned 
about soil conservation. The CRP also yielded several benefits to farmers, including higher 
farmland prices and higher crop prices resulting from the acreage idled (Dodson and 
McElroy, 1995).
A lasting effect is expected from the fact that “about 75 percent of the CRP land in 
the Southern and Southeastern United States has been planted to trees, but since a normal
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production cycle for pine trees in these areas is about 25 years, this CRP land is expected 
to remain in trees for at least 15 years past expiration of current CRP contracts” (Taylor et 
al, 1994), assuming no high crop prices as compared to pulp prices. CRP is also credited 
for having “significantly increased soil organic carbon (SOC) levels... and it has shown that 
agriculturally related COz emissions may be effectively controlled through changes in land 
use and management systems” (Gebhart et al, 1994).
The National Rifle Association has indicated that in many states, because of CRP, 
pheasant populations have doubled, and waterfowl nesting has tripled. Lutz et al (1998) 
highlight that CRP lands “properly interspersed with farmed acreage, are beneficial to early 
successional species such as pheasants, quail, rabbits, doves, and grassland songbirds, as 
well as to white-tailed and mule deer. Woody planting in CRP provide plant diversity 
within grass stands and are beneficial to quail, pheasants, and songbirds.”
According to Lutz et al (1998), the National Wildlife Federation identifies several 
positive results of CRP. CRP provided a stewardship opportunity to move away from 
farming on highly erodible and environmentally sensitive lands. Approximately 87 percent 
of CRP was restored to a grassland habitat, with about two-thirds located in prairie regions. 
CRP has been successful because farmers, taxpayers, wildlife and the environment all 
benefit.
In general, cross-compliance legislation, that is, legislation that make various 
program benefits contingent on farmer’s conservation behavior, has constituted an 
improvement in environmental policy.
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U.S. Water Quality Legislation
Several federal regulations related to water quality have been passed and 
implemented over time. That includes, the Water Quality Control Act, 1969; the Water 
Pollution Control Act, 1972; the Coastal Zone Management Act, 1972; the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 1974; the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 1976; the Clean Water Act 
as amended in 1977 and 1987; the Safe Drinking Water act as amended in 1986 and the 
Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990. The two pieces of regulation most 
directly related with coastal zone management are: the Clean Water Act and the Coastal 
Zone Management Act and its amendments.
The Clean Water Act (CWA)
As a positive consequence of Ohio’s Cuyahoga River turning into flames in 1969, 
the Clean Water Act was passed by Congress in 1972. Even though the CWA set specific 
dates to achieve some major goals, according to a recent report by the Public Interest 
Research Group (PIRG) (1997), 40 percent of rivers, lakes, and estuaries are still too 
polluted to be considered safe for fishing and swimming. During the last 10 years, beaches 
on U.S. oceans, bays, and the Great Lakes have been closed, or advisories issued against 
swimming, on more than 15,994 occasions. Forty-seven states have released advisories 
urging limited consumption of fish from their waters due to major contaminants such as 
mercury, PCBs, chlordane, dioxis, and DDT and its byproducts. Despite these facts, the 
Clean Water Act is considered one of the most successful pieces of legislation ever enacted 
in the United States (PIRG, 1997).
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The CWA recognizes the rights and obligations of states to collaborate and comply 
in the attainment of the objectives of the Act. It states that “It is the policy of the Congress 
to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to 
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use (including 
restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and water resources, and to consult 
with the Administrator in the exercise of his authority under this chapter. It is the policy of 
Congress that the States manage the construction grant program under this chapter and 
implement the permit programs under sections 1342 and 1344 of this title. It is further the 
policy of the Congress to support and aid research relating to the prevention, reduction, and 
elimination of pollution and to provide Federal technical services and financial aid to State 
and interstate agencies and municipalities in connection with the prevention, reduction, and 
elimination of pollution” (CWA, 1972). However, according to the Sierra Club (1997), 
many states have failed to comply with the mandate of the Clean Water Act, and they have 
already filed lawsuits to force EPA to enforce the law in Minnesota, Mississippi, 
Louisiana, Kansas, Georgia, Delaware and California. An important feature is that the Act 
mandates that “Public participation in the development, revision, and enforcement of any 
regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan, or program established by the Administrator 
or any State under this chapter shall be provided for, encouraged, and assisted by the 
Administrator and the States”(CWA, 1972).
The partial success of the CWA was attributed to its focus on controlling activities 
on traditional point sources of pollution such as pipes from sewage treatment plants and 
industrial facilities. However, according to EPA’s surveys, the water quality impairments
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that remained were due essentially to nonpoint sources of pollution. As a result, in 1987 
the CWA was amended by the Congress to focus on national efforts to control nonpoint 
sources of pollution. The Clean Water Act was amended to account for an expeditious 
development and implementation of a National Program for the control of nonpoint sources 
of pollution. Section 319 requires that States address nonpoint pollution by assessing 
nonpoint source pollution problems and causes within the State, adopting management 
programs to control the nonpoint source pollution, and implementing the management 
programs.
The Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA)
The Coastal Zone Management Act was enacted in 1972. The CZMA’s definition 
of coastal zone extends to “inland from the shorelines only to the extent necessary to 
control shorelands, the uses of which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal 
waters” (CZMA, 1972). In its findings, the U.S. Congress found that there was a national 
interest in the effective management, beneficial use, protection, and development o f the 
coastal zone.
There was a recognition that competing demands upon lands and waters of coastal 
zones were on the increase and had resulted in the “loss of living marine resources, 
wildlife, nutrient-rich areas, permanent adverse changes to ecological systems, decreasing 
open space for public use, and shoreline erosion” (CZMA, 1972). In an addendum by PL 
101-508 the Congress incorporates to its findings additional issues such as concerns about 
global warming and water pollution and specifically states that “Land uses in the coastal 
zone, and the uses of adjacent lands which drain into the coastal zone, may significantly
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affect the quality of coastal waters and habitats, and efforts to control coastal water 
pollution from land use activities must be improved” (CZMA, 1972; PL 101-508).
Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990 (CZARA)
The Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990 (CZARA) require that 
each state must submit a Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program (CNPCP) to the 
Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval.
The program required by CZARA shall include: provisions for the implementation 
of management measures in conformity with the Guidance for Coastal Nonpoint Source 
Pollution Control; identification of land uses which cause or may contribute to a 
degradation of coastal waters; identification of critical coastal areas adjacent to coastal 
waters; implementation of management measures applicable to corresponding land uses to 
achieve and maintain water quality standards as provided by the Federal Water Pollution 
Control Act; provision of technical assistance to local governments and the public for the 
implementation of the appropriate management measures; provisions for public 
participation; establishment of coordination mechanisms between agencies; and a proposal 
to modify the State coastal zone as the coastal management agency of the State determines 
is necessary to implement the recommendations made pursuant to subsection (e) (CZARA, 
1990).
For that purpose, Subsection (e) states: “ (e) Inland Coastal Zone Boundaries.-(l) 
Review.- The Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental 
Protection Agency, shall, within 18 months after the effective date of this title, review the 
inland coastal zone boundary of each coastal State program which has been approved or is
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proposed for approval under section 306 of the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, and 
evaluate whether the State's coastal zone boundary extends inland to the extent necessary 
to control the land and water uses that have a significant impact on coastal waters of the 
State. (2) Recommendation. - If the Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator, finds 
that modifications to the inland boundaries of a State's coastal zone are necessary for that 
State to more effectively manage land and water uses to protect coastal waters, the 
Secretary, in consultation with the Administrator, shall recommend appropriate 
modifications in writing to the affected State” (CZARA, 1990).
Coastal Zone Management in Louisiana
Background
According to Coreil and Henning (1995), the State of Louisiana, through Act 35 
of 1971, took its first steps toward dealing with coastal problems. A nine-member 
Advisory Commission on Coastal and Marine Resources was established, which designated 
as the study area the region of the state south of U.S. Highway 190. Two years later, in 
1973, the commission suggested the inclusion of twenty-six southern parishes in a coastal 
zone management plan. At that time, Louisiana State University scientists recommended 
that a boundary close to the five-foot contour on topographic maps should be considered, 
but strong opposition made its way through to place the line within three miles of the Gulf 
of Mexico shoreline. In 1978, the Louisiana state legislature enacted Act 361, the State and 
Local Coastal Resources Management Act, through which a state coastal zone management 
program was established (this program is now officially recognized as the Louisiana 
Coastal Resources Program -LCRP). Act 361 defined an inland coastal zone boundary for
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the state, and the so-called ‘permit line’, which was a second boundary line based on both 
the five-foot contour and the existence of publicly owned levees.
Current Situation
The current Coastal Zone Management Area of Louisiana includes all or portions 
of 19 parishes (Figure 1.1), with an average width of about 28 miles, varying from six miles 
in the center of the state to about 98 miles in southeastern Louisiana. “The current 
Louisiana coastal zone encompasses approximately 5.3 million acres” (Coreil and Henning, 
1995).
To meet the requirements of Section 6217(a) of the Coastal Zone Act 
Reauthorizacion Amendments of 1990, the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources 
(DNR) submitted, in 1995 for review and approval, the Louisiana Coastal Nonpoint 
Pollution Control Program (LCNPCP) to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). For agriculture, two 
major issues were fundamental in the submitted program: the Louisiana DNR proposed to 
maintain a non-regulatory approach to the implementation of the CNPCP specifically as it 
refers to BMPs in agriculture and to keep the current boundaries of the Coastal Zone 
Management Area.
On June of 1997, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) approved the Louisiana 
CNPCP subject to several conditions. Among others, three conditions are relevant to 
agriculture:
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1) Boundary. Accordingto EPA and NOAA, Louisiana’s proposed management area 
“excludes existing land and water uses that have or are reasonably expected to have 
a significant impact on the coastal waters of the State” (EPA-NOAA, 1997), and so 
the condition imposed is that an “appropriate 6217 management area boundary for 
Louisiana consistent with established national guidance for the 6217 program” must 
be determined.
2) Agriculture. EPA and NOAA indicated that the proposed program “does not 
include management measures in conformity with the 6217 (g) guidance and does 
not include enforceable policies and mechanisms to ensure implementation” 
(italics added) (EPA-NOAA, 1997), and so the condition is imposed that within 
three years Louisiana will have to comply by including in its program “management 
measures for agricultural sources in conformity with 6217(g) guidance and 
enforceable policies and mechanisms to ensure implementation of the agricultural 
management measures throughout the 6217 management area.” S h o u l d  
Louisiana not comply with the three-year deadline, the program would not receive 
final approval and federal penalty provisions will be enforced, which imply that 
federal funds supporting the Coastal Zone Management Program and Section 319 
CWA activities will be cut.
3) Monitoring. EPA and NOAA found that “Louisiana’s program does not include a 
plan to assess over time the success of the management measures in reducing 
pollution loads and improving water quality” and the condition imposed indicates 
that within one year Louisiana will include a plan “to assess over time the extent to
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which implementation of management measures is reducing pollution loads and 
improving water quality” (EPA-NOAA, 1997).
As of June 1997, Louisiana’s position regarding those conditions were to propose 
a Statewide Comprehensive Nonpoint Source of Pollution Management Area (Zone A) and 
Louisiana’s Critical Coastal Area (Zone B). The latter is considered the area pursuant to 
the CZARA 6217 requirements. The rationale for this approach was based on the 
avoidance of any duplication of effort by having a statewide comprehensive program; the 
assertion that there was sufficient legal authority to allow for compliance to meet federal 
requirements on both the CWA and the CZARA; and the lack of federal funding to 
respond to the requirements of Section 6217 program. For agriculture and monitoring, the 
basic position was to emphasize the need to use the so-called ‘bad actor’ approach. That 
is, Louisiana proposed to enforce the Louisiana Water Control Law (R.S. 30:2076), and the 
Water Quality Regulations (LAC 33:IX) whenever a violation exists. The Louisiana 
Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) stated that “once education of farmers has 
occurred, and technical assistance and cost-share assistance have been offered, if a 
farmer/producer still does not implement management measures, then the subsequent 
discharges would be intentional and subject to enforcement action or permitting.”
Best Management Practices for Agriculture 
EPA Requirements
In its Guidance for Coastal Nonpoint Source of Pollution Control (EPA, 
1993), EPA defines the following ‘management measures’ for agriculture: Erosion and 
Sediment Control; Confined Animal Facility; Nutrient Management; Pesticide
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Management; Livestock Grazing; and Irrigation. Expert opinion and relevant literature 
indicates that for sugarcane production in Louisiana, the management measures of 
importance are: Erosion and Sediment Control; Nutrient Management; and Pesticide 
Management. For each of these management measures, EPA describes a series of 
‘management practices.’ EPA indicates that the practices listed have been found to be 
representative of the kind of practices that can be applied successfully to achieve the 
management measures. EPA also states that “ [w]hile State programs are required to specify 
management measures in conformity with this guidance, State programs need not specify 
or require the implementation of the particular management practices described in this 
document [the guidance].” It adds that “as a practical matter, however, EPA anticipates that 
the management measure typically will be implemented by applying one or more 
management practices appropriate to the source, location, and climate” (EPA, 1993).
For the Erosion and Sediment Control Management Measure, the following BMPs 
are described in the EPA guidance: conservation cover (327), conservation cropping 
sequence (328), conservation tillage (329), contour farming (330), contour orchard and 
other fruit area (331), cover and green manure crop (340), critical area planting (342), crop 
residue use (344), delayed seed bed preparation (354), diversion (362), field border (386), 
filter strip (393), grade stabilization structure (410), grassed waterway (412), grasses and 
legumes in rotation (411), sediment basins (350), contour strip cropping (585), field 
strip-cropping (586), terrace (600), water and sediment control basin (638), and wetland 
and riparian zone protection. Notice that the list of BMPs presented by EPA includes,
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where applicable, the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS) code for each 
practice.
Best management practices for the Nutrient Management Measure are presented by 
EPA by suggesting practices, components, and sources of information that should be 
considered in the development of a nutrient management plan: use of soil surveys in 
determining soil productivity and identifying environmentally sensitive sites; use of 
producer-documented yield history and other relevant information to determine realistic 
crop yield expectations; soil testing for pH, phosphorus, potassium, and nitrogen; plant 
tissue testing; manure, sludge, mortality compost, and effluent testing; use of proper timing, 
formulation, and application methods for nutrients that maximize plant utilization of 
nutrients and minimize the loss to the environment, including split applications and 
banding of the nutrients; use of nitrification inhibitors and slow-release fertilizers, and 
incorporation or injection of fertilizers, manures, and other organic sources; use of small 
grain cover crops to scavenge nutrients remaining in the soil after harvest of the principal 
crop, particularly on highly leachable soils; use of buffer areas or intensive nutrient 
management practices to manage field limitations based on environmentally high risk areas; 
control of phosphorus losses from fields through a combination of the Erosion and 
Sediment Control Measure and the Nutrient Management Measure; and, a narrative 
accounting of the nutrient management plan that explains the plan and its use.
Finally, BMPs for the Pesticide Management Measure include the following: 
inventory current and historical pest problems, cropping patterns, and use of pesticides for 
each; consider the soil and physical characteristics of the site including mixing, loading and
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storage areas for potential for the leaching and/or runoff of pesticides; use Integrated Pest 
Management (IPM) strategies to minimize the amount of pesticides applied; when pesticide 
applications are necessary and a choice of materials exists, consider the persistence, 
toxicity, and runoff and leaching potential of products along with other factors, including 
current label requirements, in making a selection; maintain records of application of 
restricted use pesticides (product name, amount, approximate date of application, and 
location of application of each such pesticide used) for a 2-year period after such use, 
pursuant to the requirements in section 1491 of the 1990 Farm Bill; use lower pesticide 
application rates than those called for by the label when the pest problem can be adequately 
controlled using such lower rates; consider the use of organic farming techniques that do 
not rely on the use of synthetically compounded pesticides; recalibrate spray equipment 
each spray season and use anti-backflow devices on hoses used for filling tank mixtures; 
purchase of new, more precise application equipment and other related farm equipment 
(including improved nozzles, computer sensing to control flow rates, radar speed 
determination, electrostatic applicators, and precision equipment for banding and 
cultivating) as replacement equipment is needed; and an integrated crop management 
system (Pest Management - 595), a total crop management system that promotes the 
efficient use of pesticides and nutrients in an environmentally sound and economically 
efficient manner.
A Review of BMPs in Louisiana
Consistent with the State proposal, the Louisiana State University Agricultural 
Center, in November 1996, published a review of agricultural production best management
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practices (BMPs) for Louisiana (LSU, 1996). The objective of that publication was to “ 
[pjrovide fanners, foresters, aquaculturists and land owners with a menu of proven BMPs 
from which they can choose for use on their land and in their operations.” Thirteen 
commodity BMP review studies were conducted and incorporated in the document. For 
sugarcane, the following BMPs were considered environmentally effective and 
economically feasible: access road; bedding; chiseling and subsoiling; land smoothing; 
nutrient management; open channel; pest management; row arrangement; surface drain; and 
field ditch. Other BMPs were considered to appear positive but needed research in areas 
of production, economics, and environment. Practices in this category included: 
conservation cropping sequence; cover and green manure crop; and waste utilization. A 
third category was defined as those BMPs that were considered to be effective in reducing 
nonpoint source water pollution, but were not economically feasible without cost-sharing. 
BMPs in this category included: grade stabilization structure; pesticide containment facility; 
precision land forming; pumping plant for water control; structure for water control; 
subsurface drain; and surface drain, main or lateral. Finally, a category was generated for 
practices that were considered as not appropriate for sugarcane production in Louisiana. 
This category included the following practices: conservation tillage; controlled drainage; 
crop residue use; field border; filter strip; grasses and legumes in rotation; irrigation canal 
or lateral; regulating water in drainage systems; waste management system; waste storage 
structure; and water table control.
Basically, both EPA and scientists at the Louisiana State University Agricultural 
Center based their review of environmentally desirable practices on the practices so defined
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by the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS). The adoption of these practices 
is the major concern of this research. The adoption and implementation of some of these 
practices become the dependent categorical variables of the model developed in this study. 
Table 2.1 presents a cross comparison of selected practices as defined by the NRCS, the 
LSU Agricultural Center, and the EPA’s Guidance for Coastal Nonpoint Source of 
Pollution Control. The wording in the description of each specific Management Practice 
is presented in the way it appears in the survey used in this study (Appendix A.l), and is 
developed in such a manner as to be easily understood by sugarcane producers. Four 
management practices are defined for the Erosion and Sediment Control Management 
Measure. Three specific management practices are defined for the Nutrient Management 
Measure. Four management practices are defined for the Pesticide Management Measure. 
In the corresponding columns, the category or definition given by each of the related 
institutions is presented. In defining these specific management practices, we have taken 
into account that EPA recognizes that “there is often site-specific, regional, and national 
variability in the selection of appropriate practices...” and that “the list of practices for each 
Management Measure is not all-inclusive and does not preclude States or local agencies 
from using other technically sound practices” (EPA, 1993).
53
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Reproduced 
with 
perm
ission 
of the 
copyright ow
ner. 
Further reproduction 
prohibited 
without perm
ission.
Table 2.1 Selected BMPs (management practices) for Each of the Management Measures required by EPA, Louisiana
Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption Study.
Agricultural Practice EPA’s Guidance
Management
Measure
EPA’s Guidance 
Management Practice 
(or practices)
Natural Resource 
Conservation Service 
(NRCS) Practice Name 
and Number
LSU Agricultural 
Center’s ‘Agricultural 
Production BMP’s for 
Louisiana’
Do you use any of the following practices to 
control runoff: land smoothing, precision 
leveling, and/or row arrangement?
Erosion and
Sediment
Control
1) Land smoothing (466)
2) Precision land forming 
(462)
3) Row arrangement (557)
1) Land smoothing
2) Precision land 
forming
3) Row arrangement
Do you occupy the fallow period with either 
succession planted sugar cane or a cover crop 
such as wheat, soybeans or others?
1) Conservation 
cropping sequence
2)Cover and green 
manure crop
1) Conservation cropping 
sequence (328)
2)Cover and green manure 
crop (340)
1) Conservation 
cropping sequence
2)Cover and green 
manure crop
Do you delay stubble breakout and maintain 
crop residue (30% or more) through the 
winter months?
1) Delayed seed bed 
preparation
2) Crop residue use
1) Delayed seed bed 
preparation (354)
2) Crop residue use (344)
1) Crop residue use
Do you use drop pipes or other structures to 
reduce bank erosion?
1) Grade stabilization 
structure
1) Grade stabilization 
structure ((410)
1) Grade stabilization 
structure
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Table 2.1 Continued.
Agricultural Practice EPA’s Guidance
Management
Measure
EPA’s Guidance 
Management Practice 
(or practices)
Natural Resource 
Conservation Service 
(NRCS) Practice Name 
and Number
LSU Agricultural 
Center’s ‘Agricultural 
Production BMP’s for 
Louisiana’
Do you determine fertilizer applications based 
on soil testing and expected yields?
Nutrient
Management
1) Soil testing for pH, 
phosphorous, 
potassium, and 
nitrogen.
2)Use of producer- 
documented yield 
history and other 
relevant information to 
determine realistic crop 
yield expectations
1) Nutrient management 
(590)
1) Nutrient management
Do you use any of the following fertilization 
practices: split application of nutrients, 
banded application, slow-release fertilizers?
1) Use of proper 
timing, formulation, 
and application 
methods for nutrients
1) Nutrient management 
(590)
1) Nutrient management
Do you utilize alternate sources of nutrients 
(manure, cover crops, sludge, or any other 
organic matter)?
1) Manure, sludge, 
mortality compost, and 
effluent testing
2) Cover and green 
manure crop
1) Nutrient management 
(590)
2) Cover and green 
manure crop (340)
3) Waste utilization (633)
1) Nutrient management
2) Cover and green 
manure crop
3) Waste utilization
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Table 2.1 Continued.
Agricultural Practice EPA’s Guidance
Management
Measure
EPA’s Guidance 
Management Practice (or 
practices)
Natural Resource 
Conservation Service 
(NRCS) Practice Name 
and Number
LSU Agricultural 
Center’s ‘Agricultural 
Production BMP’s for 
Louisiana’
Do you base chemical applications 
(insecticides, herbicides) on economic 
thresholds as determined by field scouting?
1) Use of IPM strategies to 
minimize the amount of 
pesticides applied
1) Pest management 
(595 A)
1) Pest Management
Do you use a containment facility for mixing, 
loading and storage of farm chemicals?
1) Consider the soil and 
physical characteristics of 
the site including mixing, 
loading, and storage areas 
for potential for the 
leaching and/or runoff of 
pesticides
1) Pest management 
(595 A)
1) Pest management
2) Pesticide containment 
facility
Do you calibrate spray equipment before each 
use?
Pesticide
Management 1) Recalibrate spray equipment each spray 
season and use anti­
backflow devices on hoses 
used for filling tank 
mixtures
1) Pest management 
(595 A)
1) Pest management
Do you use any of the following for precise 
application of chemicals: computer sensing to 
control flow rates, radar speed determination, 
electrostatic applicators?
1) Integrated crop 
management system
1) Pest management 
(595 A)
1) Pest management
CHAPTER 3 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The theoretical basis for the neoclassical and attitudinal analysis of behavior is 
presented in this chapter. The fundamental assumption in the neoclassical economic 
analysis of behavior is that individuals seek to maximize utility. However, neoclassical 
economics usually holds constant other things that affect behavior such as psychological 
attitudes, peer group pressures, personal experiences, and the general cultural environment. 
The analysis of attitudes is discussed and the New Ecological Paradigm Scale (NEPS) is 
presented. Finally, the theoretical model proposed in this study is presented and specific 
estimation procedures are discussed.
The Neoclassical Economic Analysis of Behavior
Social sciences are about the study of human behavior, that is, relationships of 
people to one another and to their environment. Economics is a social science. In fact, 
economics uses a set of principles and propositions to analyze human behavior, and that is 
what makes economics a social science. In the words of Silberberg (1995), “economics, 
as a part of social sciences, is concerned with enunciating positive statements that could be 
false, but which survive empirical testing, so that we believe them to be objectively true.” 
A straight, short definition of economics is often demanded. Yet, for a science that 
encompasses so much and evolves so quickly, a brief definition is not an easy task. 
Henderson and Quandt (1971) state that “economics may be defined as a social science 
which covers the actions of individuals and groups of individuals in the processes of 
producing, exchanging, and consuming goods and services.” Nicholson (1985) defines
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economics as “the study of the allocation of scarce resources among competing ends.” In 
the same context, Samuelson and Nordhaus (1985) state that “economics is the study of 
how people and society choose to employ scarce resources that could have alternative uses 
in order to produce various commodities and to distribute them for consumption, now or 
in the future, among various persons and groups of society.”
Stressing the same principles, Silberberg (1995) says that “since we can use 
resources (land, labor, equipment or capital) to produce many different things, all of which 
at least some people desire, how shall society decide to what uses and to what extent it will 
utilize the country’s resources? Economics is concerned with this central issue. 
Economics is the study of how scarce resources that have alternative uses are allocated 
amongst competing ends.”
In all of these definitions of economics there are some fundamental principles that 
are emphasized: scarcity of resources, competing ends, alternative allocations, and decision 
making. All of these principles are at the heart of the economic analysis of behavior. 
Individual’s Preferences
A fundamental postulate of behavior is that people have preferences (Silberberg,
1995). Consider an individual facing his possible consumption bundles in his consumption 
set X, which is assumed to be in the nonnegative orthant in Rk, and to be a closed and 
convex set. The individual is assumed to have preferences on the consumption bundles in 
set X. For those preferences to order the available sets of bundles the preferences must be 
complete, reflexive, and transitive. Other desirable properties of consumer’s preferences
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are continuity, weak or strong monotonicity, local nonsatiation, and convexity or strict 
convexity (Henderson and Quandt, 1986).
The individual’s preferences are said to be complete if for all x and y in X, either 
x^y or y t x  or both (Where >: means‘as good as’). This property basically means that any
two bundles can be compared. Preferences are reflexive if for all x in X, x>x,  which is
trivial. Transitivity will hold if for all x, y, and z in X, if x>:y or y > z  , then x t z ,  which
basically states that if  preferences were not transitive then there might be sets of bundles 
which had no best elements (Varian, 1992).
The assumption of continuity is needed to rule out discontinuous behavior. It states 
that for all y in X, the sets {x:x>:y} and {x:x^y} are closed sets. It follows that {x:x>y}
and {x:x<y} are open sets (where > stands for ‘strict preference’, that is, x > y  reads ‘x is
strictly preferred to y). As a consequence of continuity, if y is strictly preferred to z and if 
x is a bundle that is close enough to y, then x must be strictly preferred to z (Varian, 1992).
The assumption of strong monotonicity is the assumption that a good is a good. 
That is, if x t y  and x^y, then x>y.  In words it means that ‘at least as much of every good, 
and strictly more of some good, is strictly better.’ Weak monotonicity on the other hand, 
implies that if x^y then x>:y, or ‘at least as much of everything is at least as good’ (V arian, 
1992).
The assumption of local nonsatiation states that the individual can always do a little 
bit better, even if restricted to only small changes in the consumption bundle. That is, given
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any x and X and any e > 0, then there is some bundle y in X with | x-y | <e such that y > \,  
where |x-y | stands for the Euclidean distance between x and y (Varian, 1992).
Finally, convexity is the assumption that the individual prefers averages to 
extremes. That is, given x, y, and z in X such that x>:z and y h z  , then tx + (l-t)y>z, for
all O^ts 1. The set of all consumption bundles that are indifferent to each other is called an 
indifference curve. The assumption of convex indifferent curves implies that such curves 
allow for flat spots. Strict convexity, on the other hand, requires that indifference curves 
be strictly rotund. That is, strict convexity implies that given x^y and z in X, if x >z and
y t z  , then tx + (l-t)y^z, for all O^t^l. According to Varian (1992), convexity is a
generalization of the neoclassical assumption of ‘ diminishing marginal rates of substitution’ 
(Varian, 1992).
Rational Economic Behavior
The point of departure in the theory of an individual’s behavior is the postulate of 
rationality, which assumes that the individual chooses among the alternatives available to 
him in such a manner that the satisfaction derived is as large as possible (Henderson and 
Quandt, 1971). Individuals are assumed not to be paralyzed by indecisions, that is, they 
are aware of the alternatives available, understand them, and can always make up their 
minds about the desirability of those alternatives (Nicholson, 1985; Henderson and Quandt, 
1971). They make those choices that are more favorable to them. That is, “individuals 
seldom take actions that are against their own best interests” (Nicholson, 1985).
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The Utility Function
In the context of neoclassical analysis, an economic agent’s behavior is summarized 
by means of a utility function. All information pertaining to the satisfaction that an 
individual derives from various quantities of goods and services is assumed to be contained 
in its utility function.
The utility function can be expressed as a function u: X-Rsuch that x > y  if and only
if «(x) > w(y). The relevant feature of a utility function is its ordinal nature. If u(x)
represents some preferences t  and f : R-Ris a monotonic transformation, then f(w(x)) will
represent exactly the same preferences since f(w(x)) s f(«(y)) if and only if u(x) > u(y) 
(Varian, 1992).
As indicated before, sufficient conditions for the existence of an individual’s utility 
function require that preferences be complete, reflexive, transitive, and continuous 
(Henderson and Quandt, 1971). Other properties are desirable as well, such as weak or 
strong monotonicity, local nonsatiation, and convexity or strict convexity (Varian, 1992). 
If a utility function is a mathematical representation of an individual's preferences, with the 
general form U(X,, X2, X3,..., Xn), where X„ X2, X3,..., Xn are the quantities of each of the 
n goods being consumed, then this function is unique up to an order-preserving 
transformation. It is in general assumed that X is the nonnegative orthant in Rk, but more 
specific consumption sets may be used. It is always assumed that X is a closed convex set. 
Preferences ought to order sets of bundles, so that they satisfy certain standard properties. 
That is, they are assumed to be complete, reflexive, transitive, monotonic and convex. By
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complete, it is meant that for all x and y in X, either x~y or y=x or both (Where ~ stands 
for as good as). Reflexive means that for all x in X, x«x. Transitive means that for all x, 
y, and z in X, if x=y and y~z, then x=z. Monotonicity means that if x^y then x«y. 
Convexity means that given x, y and z in X such that x=z and y«z then it follows that tx 
+ (l-t)y « z for all O ^tsl (Varian, 1992; Henderson and Quandt, 1986).
Intuitively, the above statements may be summarized by saying that more of a good 
is preferred to less. Another important aspect is that individuals prefer some variety in their 
fare of goods; that is, some balance in consumption is desirable. This last fact is what leads 
economists to the assumption of the shape of the utility function, the assumption of 
diminishing marginal rates of substitution (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1985).
In summary, if preferences are complete, reflexive, transitive, continuous, and 
strongly monotonic, then there exists some continuous utility function which represents 
these preferences.
The Maximization of Utility
In analyzing behavioral postulates, Silberberg (1995) argues that “economics seeks 
refutable explanations of changes in events based on changes in observable constraints, 
using a universal postulate of behavior. This postulate is often labeled maximizing 
behavior.” That is, the tendency to reduce the impact of constraints, which in time means 
to respond to an increase in constraints so as to mitigate the reduction of opportunities that 
the constraints impose, as well as to exploit increased opportunities when constraints are 
relaxed (Silberberg, 1995).
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Thus, the fundamental hypothesis is that from among the available alternatives, 
individuals select the one that maximizes their utility (Nicholson, 1985), or that a rational 
individual “will always choose a most preferred bundle from the set of affordable 
alternatives” (Varian, 1992). Affordable alternatives in that case will be those that satisfy 
the individual’s constraints. We ought to keep into account that the reason for studying 
economics or, for that matter, all of the social sciences is scarcity of goods and resources. 
The term scarce means that there are not enough of the items humans find desirable to 
satisfy everyone’s wants (Silberberg, 1995).
Analysis of Attitudes
Neoclassical economic analysis of choice, as indicated, is based on the theory of 
utility maximization. However, “a person’s utility is affected not only by his or her 
consumption of physical commodities but also by psychological attitudes, peer group 
pressures, personal experiences, and the general cultural environment” (Nicholson, 1985). 
Neoclassical economics, however, usually holds constant those other things that affect 
behavior (Nicholson, 1985).
For practical purposes, the psychological reaction to changes in constraints is not 
something we can readily observe. We are not able to read people’s minds. In order to be 
useful, we must state economic postulates in terms of actions that we can observe, so that 
we can derive empirically refutable propositions (Silberberg, 1995)
Attitude is an abstract term derived from the Latin aptus that signifies ‘fitness’ or 
‘adaptedness’, and connotes a subjective or mental state of preparation for action. Given 
the fact that attitudes are always directed toward some object, it may be defined as a “state
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of mind of the individual toward a value.” Values are social in nature, they are objects of 
common regard to socialized men. Social values are created by the attitudes that are 
common to many men, and these attitudes in time, depend upon pre-existing social values 
(Allpor, 1935).
Attitude is also defined as an implicit response which is anticipatory and mediating 
in reference to patterns of overt responses, which is evoked by a variety of stimulus patterns 
as a result o f previous learning or of gradients of generalization and discrimination. It is 
cue- and drive- producing, and it is socially significant in the individual’s society (Chein, 
1948)
Four criteria have been suggested to define an attitude: a) it must have definite 
orientation in the world of objects (or values), and in this respect differ from simple and 
conditional reflexes; b) it must not be an automatic and routine type of conduct, but must 
display some tension even when latent; c) it varies in intensity, sometimes being 
predominant, sometimes relatively ineffective; and, d) it is rooted in experience, and 
therefore is not simply a social instinct (Allpor, 1935).
Measuring Attitudes
Attitude is a concept that denotes the sum total of an individual’s inclinations and 
feeling, prejudice or bias, preconceived notions, ideas, fears, threats, and convictions about 
some specific value. It may be measured through the use of a statement scale. Such a scale 
consists of a series of opinions which are submitted to the subject for endorsement or 
rejection. Statements are selected in such a way that they constitute an evenly graduated 
series and so that a scale value can be given to each opinion (Thurstone, 1931). It is
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important to keep in mind that the measurement of attitudes expressed by an individual’s 
opinions does not necessarily mean the prediction of what he will do. That is, he or she 
will not necessarily act in accordance with the opinion that he has endorsed. However, it 
is assumed that an attitude scale will be used only in situations in which we expect that the 
individual will tell the truth about his or her convictions or opinions (Thurstone, 1928).
The unit of measurement for the scale of attitudes is the standard deviation of the 
dispersion projected on the psychophysical scale of attitudes by a statement of opinion, 
chosen by a standard. It is indifferent which statement is chosen as the standard since 
scales produced by different standard statements have proportional scale values (Thurstone, 
1928; Chein, 1948). In constructing the scale, each statement should be designed in such 
a way that persons with different points o f view will respond to it differentially. The 
following criteria are suggested in constructing scales: a) all statements must be expressions 
of desired behavior and not statements of fact; b) each proposition should be stated in a 
clear, concise, straight-forward statement; c) it is desirable to word statements in such a 
way that the modal reaction to some individuals is more toward one end of the attitude 
continuum and to others more in the middle or toward the other end of the continuum; d) 
space errors or any tendency to stereotyped responses should be avoided; and e) when 
multiple choice statements are used, different alternatives should involve only a single 
attitude variable (Likert, 1967).
Interpretation of results obtained from an attitude scale should be subject to the 
previous evaluation of internal consistency of the reactions and the desired level of 
reliability. To evaluate internal consistency, the reactions of the group that constitute one
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extreme in the particular attitude being measured are compared with the reactions of the 
group that constitute the other extreme. On the other hand, a sufficient number of 
statements should be used in each form to obtain the desired reliability (Likert, 1967).
Attitudes and Behavior
In considering the relationship between attitudes and behavior, some other 
relationships are to be considered. There is fairly conclusive evidence that an individual’s 
attitude toward any object is a function of his or her beliefs about that object and the 
evaluative aspects of those beliefs. There is also enough evidence that there is a stable and 
high correlation between attitude and behavioral intentions. Behavioral intentions are to 
be considered, however, as being independent from attitude (Fishbein, 1967).
Attitudes are a fundamental determinant of behavior, but not the only one. Theory 
identifies the basic determinants of behavior to be: a) attitudes toward the behavior; b) 
normative beliefs, both personal and social; and c) motivation to comply with the norms. 
Other variables are said to influence behavior, but they operate indirectly by influencing 
any of these three basic determinants. The weights of the three major determinants may 
vary with the type of behavior being considered and they may also vary across individuals. 
Outside variables may be related to the basic determinants of behavior, but they may be 
unrelated to the actual performance of a given behavior (Fishbein, 1967).
An individual’s attitude toward a stimulus is related to his or her behavior with 
respect to that object. It may also be expected that an individual’s attitude toward a given 
stimulus would influence his motivation to comply with a given norm. And, finally,
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variations in the situation may influence one or more of the primary determinants of 
behavior (Fishbein, 1967).
The New Ecological Paradigm Scale (NEPS)
Economics, as a science, is “interested in explanations and predictions” (Silberberg, 
1995). Economists assume that individuals, in their various roles, make those choices that 
are most favorable to them. Individuals undoubtedly derive utility from ‘doing good’ 
(Nicholson, 1985). We know a person is serious when he or she does something that 
entails a personal cost to him or her. That is why ‘actions speak louder than words’ 
(Silberberg, 1995).
In that vein, “[t]here is evidence of a paradigmatic shift in the orientations of 
Americans toward the physical environment... a recent environmental quality movement 
has spawned an alternative, ..., set of beliefs and values” (Albrecht et al, 1982). This 
movement has called for a ‘New Environmental Paradigm’ whose orientations assert the 
desirability of restricting growth, protecting the integrity of ecosystems, and a more 
harmonious relationship between humans and nature (Albrecht et al, 1982). Perceptions 
and expectations of environmental benefits have widened, and there is ever-increasing 
debate by larger segments of society about how natural resources should be managed 
(Edgell and Nowel, 1989)
Pro-environmental attitudes supporting the health and well-being of natural 
ecosystems have increased. Recent environmental disasters on land and in the oceans have 
captured the attention of the public and mass media (Noe and Snow, 1990). There has been 
a rapid accumulation of evidence that suggests that the ecological survival of modem
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societies cannot be taken for granted. A new paradigm has emerged, the New 
Environmental Paradigm (NEP), “which provides a new image of human societies, for it 
entails recognition that despite their possession of exceptional characteristics humans are 
not immune to ecological constraints and cannot evade ecological laws” (Dunlap, 1980). 
Analysts of the global environment are placing a great deal of emphasis on human 
perceptions, attitudes, values and beliefs as factors that both contribute to global change and 
that will likely affect societal response to changing the perspective about Earth and 
humanity’s relationship (Dunlap et al, 1992).
In 1978, Riley Dunlap and Kent Van Liere acknowledged that the NEP appeared 
to have gained considerable popularity in academic and intellectual circles, as well as 
among many college students, but little had been done to determine the extent to which the 
public accepted the content of the NEP and to develop a measure of the New Paradigm. 
Consistent with that concerned, Dunlap and Van Liere proposed a measuring instrument, 
called the New Environmental Paradigm Scale (NEPS) (Dunlap and Van Liere, 1978).
The NEPS was extensively used (Stem, 1992; Shetzer and Moore, 1991 ;Hall, 1990; 
Arcury, 1990; Noe and Snow, 1989; Kuhn and Jackson, 1989; Caron, 1989; Moore, 1989; 
Albretch et al, 1986; Arcury et al, 1986;Van Liere and Dunlap, 1980), and criticized (Noe 
and Snow, 1990; Edgelland Nowell, 1989; Geller and Lasley, 1985; Gray, 1985; Albrecht 
et al, 1982). Among the criticisms, it was recognized that there was a flaw in the original 
scale as “only 4 of the 12 items were worded in an anti-NEP direction, and all four focused 
on anthropocentrism or the belief that nature exists primarily for humans to use and has no 
inherent value of its own” (Dunlap et al, 1992).
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In 1992, Dunlap et al (1992) addressed the imbalance in the direction of the wording 
of items in the original scale, and broadened the scale’s content. They proposed a new and 
improved instrument called the ‘New Ecological Paradigm Scale.’ The new label on the 
scale is based on “broad ‘ecological’ (as opposed to narrower, more specific and less 
systemic ‘environmental’) problems facing the modem world” (Dunlap et al, 1992).
Five potential facets of an ecological worldview were analyzed in the new Scale: 
the reality of limits to growth, anti-anthropocentrism, the fragility of nature’s balance, 
rejection of exemptionalism, and the possibility of an eco-crisis or ecological catastrophe. 
Three items were designed for each of these facets. Eight of the fifteen items were worded 
in such a way that agreement with them will indicate a pro-ecological view, and the other 
seven items were worded so that disagreement indicated a pro-ecological worldview. The 
revised set of 15 items exhibit a good deal of internal consistency, and because the new 
NEP Scale is relates to a wide range of ecological attitudes and behaviors, it possesses 
predictive validity (Dunlap et al, 1992).
The Theoretical Model
Based on the conceptual development of the neoclassical economic analysis of 
behavior and the analysis of attitudes presented above, the current study evaluates policy 
alternatives in the implementation of a coastal nonpoint pollution control program for 
agriculture based on farmers’ adoption of environmentally desirable management practices. 
The theoretical model can be stated, in the following general form:
Adoption of Best Management Practices = f(Economic variables; Socioeconomic 
variables; Institutional variables; Attitudinal variables)
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The unobservable variable ‘Adoption of Best Management Practices’ will be 
assessed through the evaluation of the following observable categorical “management 
measures,” as categorized by EPA (see Chapter 1): Soil Erosion and Sediment Control 
Management Measure, Nutrient Management Measure, and Pesticide Management 
Measure.
Several factors are hypothesized to affect the adoption of BMPs. Although no 
specific work has been done about factors affecting the adoption of BMPs within the 
context of specific regulation as the one enacted in CZARA, numerous studies have been 
done in terms of adoption of soil conservation practices and technology adoption. The 
development, implementation, and evaluation of any nonpoint source (NPS) pollution 
control program should include analysis of factors that influence farm operators’ 
knowledge, attitudes, and behavior (NCSU, 1998).
In this study, the independent variables considered are organized in the following 
categories: economic and socioeconomic variables; environmental attitudes; and, 
institutional factors. The following economic and socio-economic variables are examined: 
education; age; experience; income; debt level; and risk attitudes. Farmers’ environmental 
attitudes are evaluated with two variables: a direct question of whether they believe that 
agriculture reduces the quality of water running off farmland; and the New Ecological 
Paradigm Scale. Institutional aspects are evaluated through the following variables: 
number of contacts with extension personnel; awareness of the existence of NPS pollution 
legislation that affects farmers; and participation in cost-sharing programs.
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Farmers’ education is one of the characteristics that has been consistently 
considered in adoption studies (Norris and Batie, 1987; Cooper and Keim, 1996; Rahm and 
Huffman, 1984; Salamon et al., 1997; Kraft, Lant, and Gillman, 1996; Napier and 
Camboni, 1993; Lichtenberg, Strand, and Lessley, 1993). A positive relationship is 
expected between farmers’ education and the adoption of BMPs. Although discrete 
variables for education are set in the survey questionnaire, these are transformed to a 
continuous variable following Jaeger (1997).
Farmer’s age, is hypothesized to have a negative relationship with the adoption of 
BMPs. Younger farmers are expected to have longer planning horizons and be more 
educated. Consequently, younger farmers are more aware of environmental hazards. That 
would be consistent with results obtained by Kraft, Lant, and Gillman, 1996; Napier and 
Camboni, 1993; Ervin and Ervin, 1982; and Norris and Batie, 1987 (only as it relates to 
adoption of conservation tillage, since it shows a positive sign when related to the use of 
other conservation practices). Age is included as a continuous independent variable.
Farmer’s experience, as measured in terms of number of years farming, has been 
evaluated by Cooper and Keim (1996), who found a negative relationship between the 
adoption water quality protection practices and experience, even though it was not 
significant. Rahm and Huffman (1984), obtained similar results in evaluating the role of 
human capital on the adoption of reduced tillage. Other authors (Napier and Camboni, 
1993; and Lichtenberg, Strand, and Lessley, 1993) encountered different signs in the 
relationship between experience and different conservation practices. This is consistent 
with the expectations of Rahm and Huffman in the sense that farming experience can have
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two opposing effects, “[f]irst, additional experience, holding the planning horizon length 
constant, is expected to increase (adoption) efficiency. Additional experience, however, 
might be associated with a shortened planning horizon over which returns can be captured 
from investing in new technology,” (Rahm and Huffman, 1984) so that the net effect is 
unpredictable. Consequently, no specific sign is hypothesized for experience 
(multicollinearity problems are to be assessed for the age and experience variables, as they 
are expected to be highly correlated).
Although measured in different forms, the income variable has been included by 
several authors (Purvis et al, 1989; Cooper and Keim, 1996; Rahm and Huffman, 1984; 
Salomon et al, 1997; Kraft, Lant, and Gillman, 1996; Napier and Camboni, 1993; 
Lichtenberg, Strand, and Lessley, 1993; and Norris and Batie, 1987). A positive 
relationship between income and adoption of BMPs is hypothesized, since higher income 
is expected to “reduce financial constraints to adoption. Also, higher income farmers 
usually have higher marginal tax rates and thus benefit more from tax incentives than low 
income operators for deductible conservation expenditures” (Norris and Batie, 1987), and 
because environmental quality is said to be income elastic (Bhagwati, 1993). Total gross 
household income is used as the independent variable in this study. The variable farm size 
is also included in the survey and may be used as a proxy for total income, if  farm size and 
total income show a high degree of correlation. Farm size will be a continuous variable. 
Risk is related to family security and is measured in two ways: by asking farmers to self 
describe their risk attitude in a 1 to 10 scale, 10 indicating risk seeking and 1 indicating 
maximum risk aversion; and by gaining views on investment ventures in a scale of 1 to 4,
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where 4 indicates maximum risk seeking and 1 indicates maximum risk aversion (Lynne 
et al, 1988). Although there are some inconclusive results as to the impact of debt levels 
on adoption of best management practices, a positive relationship is hypothesized according 
to Norris and Batie (1987) who state that “[a]n anticipated reaction of operators to high 
debt levels is to plant mostly high-return row crops, with fewer investments in conservation 
practices...”
F or institutional factors, the number of times the farmer met with extension personal 
is assessed as a continuous variable, and a positive relationship is expected with respect to 
the adoption of BMPs. Participation in cost-sharing programs is assessed through a yes or 
no question. A positive relationship is expected between participation in cost-sharing 
programs and adoption of BMPs. This variable will be set at one if the farmer has 
participated in cost-sharing programs for at least one of the 11 BMPs being evaluated. 
Awareness of the existence of legislation related to water quality is assessed through two 
questions related to whether farmers are aware of the regulation related to water quality as 
stated in the Clean Water Act, the Coastal Zone Management Act, and their amendments. 
A positive relationship will be expected between these variables and the adoption of BMPs.
The farmer’s belief that agriculture negatively affects water quality will be 
evaluated through a yes/no question. It is expected to have a positive relationship with the 
adoption of best management practices. The NEPS is a continuous variable in which a 
higher score means greater concern about the environment, and so a positive relationship 
is also expected for this variable.
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Estimation Procedures
As indicated in Chapter 1, discrete dependent variables are often cast in the form 
of random utility models (Greene, 1997; Judge et al, 1988) or stochastic utility models 
(Amemiya, 1981). A particular distribution for the error term must be chosen. The most 
commonly used are the normal distribution and the logistic distribution. According to 
Greene (1997), for mathematical convenience there are some practical reasons to favor one 
over the other, but it is difficult to justify the choice of one distribution or the other on a 
theoretical basis. The c.d.f. for the normal distribution is
Each observation is treated as a single draw from a Bernoulli distribution (binomial 
with one draw). Following Greene (1997), the model with success probability F(P'x) and 
independent observations leads to the joint probability, or likelihood function,
which is to be maximized.
Categorical variables can also be classified into many categories (polychotomous 
variables). Polychotomous variables may be unordered or ordered. Multinomial logit is 
most commonly used to deal with unordered multinomial variables. The general 
formulation is (Greene, 1997):
F(t) = JL  (27t)J/j exp{-x2/2} dx ( 11)
and the c.d.f. for the logistic distribution is
F(t) = l/[l+exp{-t}] (12)
L = n ni=1[F(p'x)]yi[l- F(P'x)]''yi (13)
(14)
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Assuming Po=0
Prob (Y = 0  = e P>j forj = 1,2,. .. ,  J. (15)
i + Z e p’ixJ
Prob (Yi = 0) = 1 (16)
i + S e p'«
Compute Jlog-odds ratios as follows:
In [Py / Pi0] = p’jXj (17)
Ordered probit is widely used when the dependent variable is of ordinal nature. The 
general formulation is (Greene, 1997):
y * = P ’x + s. (18)
y* is unobserved. What is observed is
y = 0 if y* < 0 
y = 1 if 0 < y* < p, 
y = 2 if p, < y* < \x2
y =  J i f  pj., <y*
Given the normal distribution we get:
Pr(y=0) = 0(-P’x),
Pr(y=l)= e (p -P ’x) -  6(-P’x),
Pr(y=2) = 0(p2-p ’x) -  0(p,-p’x),
Pr(y=J) = l-0(Pj.,-P*x).
In multivariate situations, extensions of the previous models can be done. 
Multivariate probit is a theoretical option, but given the number of dependent variables to
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be considered, it has the practical obstacle o f evaluating higher-order multivariate normal 
integrals (Greene, 1997). Nevertheless, recent developments have produced methods to 
obtain accurate estimates of multivariate normal integrals based on simulations by Markov 
chain Monte Carlo simulations (Chib and Greenberg, 1998), and other numerical 
techniques (Greene, 1997; Bock and Gibbons, 1996). Because it is hypothesized that the 
error terms across the different BMPs to be evaluated are contemporaneously correlated, 
a multivariate probit approach is undertaken to account for the correlation of the 
disturbances across equations. The general formulation (Greene, 1998) is:
yim* = Pm,Xini + sjm,m = l,...,M  (18)
yim = 1 if  yim* > 0, and 0 otherwise, 
where sjm, m = 1,...,M are distributed as multivariate normal with mean vector 0 and 
covariance matrix R with diagonal elements equal to 1.
The probabilities that enter the log-likelihood are computed using the GHK 
(Geweke, Hajivassiliou, Keane) simulation method, which produces accurate 
approximations to the M fold integral 
B ( M )  5 ( 1)
P =  J . .. \ f ( x \ (19)
A ( M )  ,4( 1)
Where f(...) is the M-variate normal density o f x with mean vector zero and MxM positive 
definite covariance matrix, W.
The log-likelihood is accumulated as the sum of the logs of the probabilities of the 
observed outcomes, which are computed with the use of the following construction: 
Prob[y„y2,...,yM/x„x2,...,xM] = MVN (Tz, TRT’)
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where z = the vector of utilities, = pm’xim, R is the correlation matrix, and T is a diagonal
matrix with tmm = 2ym - 1.
The theoretical considerations presented in this chapter constitute the basis for the 
theoretical model proposed. In the following chapter, the theoretical model will be 
implemented and tested through a series of empirical applications to achieve the obj ecti ves 
of the current study.
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The theoretical foundations presented in chapter three constitute the basis for the 
analytical framework developed in this chapter. As indicated, the neoclassical economic 
analysis works on the assumption that individuals tend to maximize utility. It is proposed 
that an individual’s beliefs and attitudes may also be determinant factors in the adoption 
of best management practices. In this chapter, the analytical framework is presented and 
applied to the particular variables being evaluated. Several models are presented, under 
different scenarios, aimed at developing policy tools that promote the adoption of best 
management practices, while at the same time, preserving the economic viability of 
farming.
The Theoretical Model Revisited
As indicated in chapter three, the decision to adopt or not adopt a given 
management practice by a decision making farm operator, is a function o f economic 
variables, socioeconomic characteristics, institutional variables and attitudinal variables: 
Adoption of Best Management Practices = f(Economic variables; Socioeconomic 
variables; Institutional variables; Attitudinal variables).
For the purpose of this study, the dependent variables are identified as binary 
variables representing the decision to adopt or not to adopt a given practice. The right hand 
side of the theoretical model constitutes the set of independent variables that are 
hypothesized to influence the yes/no decision of the dependent variables. Dependent and 
independent variables are identified and coded as indicated in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 .
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Table 4.1 Binary Dependent Variables, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management 
___________ Practice Adoption Study._______________________________________
Management
Measures
Management
Practice
Explanation
Soil Erosion 
and Sediment 
Control
SSCP1 Land smoothing, precision leveling, and/or row arrangement.
SSCP2 Use of either succession planting or fallow acreage with a cover crop 
(such as wheat, soybeans or others).
SSCP3 Delay stubble breakout and maintain crop residue (30% or more) 
through the winter months.
SSCP4 Use drop pipes or other grade stabilization structures to reduce erosion.
SSCPTDUM A binary variable for the sum of SSCP| when the sum is greater than 
one (two or more soil erosion and sediment control practices are 
implemented)
SSCPTDU3 A binary variable for the sum of SSCPj when the sum is greater than 
two (three or more soil erosion and sediment control practices are 
implemented)
Nutrient
Management
NMP1 Determine fertilizer applications based on soil testing and expected 
yields.
NMP2 Use any of the following fertilization practices: split application of 
nutrients, banded application, slow-release fertilizers.
NMP3 Utilize alternate sources of nutrients (manure, cover crops, sludge, or 
any other organic matter).
NMPTDUM A binary variable for the sum of NMP; when the sum is greater than 
one (two or more nutrient management practices are implemented)
NMPTDU3 A binary variable for the sum of NMP( when the sum is greater than 
two (three or more nutrient management practices are implemented)
Pesticide
Management
PMP1 Base chemical applications (insecticides, herbicides) on economic 
thresholds as determined by field scouting.
PMP2 Use of a containment facility for mixing, loading and storing farm 
chemicals.
PMP3 Calibrate spray equipment before each use.
PMP4 Precise application of chemicals using computer sensing to control 
flow rates, radar speed determination, and/or electrostatic applicators.
PMPTDUM A binary variable for the sum of PMP( when the sum is greater than 
one (two or more pesticide management practices are implemented)
PMPTDU3 A binary variable for the sum of PMPj when the sum is greater than 
two (three or more pesticide management practices are implemented)
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Table 4.2 Independent Variables and Expected Sign, Louisiana Sugarcane Best 
_________ Management Practice Adoption Study.___________________ ________
Variable Explanation Expected
Sign
ACZMA Awareness of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program as specified in 
the Coastal Zone Management Act (l=yes, 0=no).
+
ACWA Awareness of efforts to control nonpoint sources of water pollution through 
the Clean Water Act (l=yes, 0=no).
+
HBMPT Have heard the term Best Management Practices (BMPs) (l=yes, 0=no). +
TMES Number of times farm operator met with extension service personnel or 
attended educational programs sponsored by the extension service during the 
last year.
+
TAGM Number of times farm operator attended grower meetings during the last year. +
ARWQ Thinks agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off farmland (l=yes, 
0=no).
+
PCS Participation in cost-sharing programs for any of the agricultural practices that 
have had this option (l=yes, 0=no).
+
SPRISK A continuous variable for self perception of risk attitude. +
R1SKB Risk attitude as measured by facing the respondent to investing in a specific 
farm venture.
+
FSIZE Farm size in acres. +
ORG1 Binary variable equal to 1 if the farm is a partnership 0 otherwise (The basis 
is individual operation)
+/-
ORG2 Binary variable equal to 1 if the farm is a family corporation 0 otherwise (The 
basis is individual operation)
+/-
ORG3 Binary variable equal to 1 if the farm is non-family corporation 0 otherwise 
(The basis is individual operation)
+/-
PASS Whether the farm operator plans to pass this farming operation on to a member 
of his/her family (l=yes, 0=no).
+
DEBTR Whether the firm’s debt level is more than 40% of the total estimated value of 
the farm business (l=yes, 0=no).
-
AGE Age of respondent in years. -
SEX Binary variable for sex of respondent (l=male, 0=female). -
EDU Years of education completed by respondent. +
PINOFF Percent of total gross household income off farm. +/-
TENURE Ratio of lease acreage over total farm size -
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Data Collection 
Survey Design and Implementation
A mail survey of Louisiana’s sugarcane producers was conducted through the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness at Louisiana State University. 
The investigator-constructed questionnaire, located in Appendix A.l, included eight 
sections.
Section I of the survey assessed the respondent’s knowledge about legislation 
related to improving water quality. It was specifically designed to determine whether the 
respondent was aware of the efforts to control nonpoint sources of water pollution through 
the Coastal Zone Management Act and the Clean Water Act. It also asked for the primary 
sources of information the respondent had on this topic and whether he/she had modified 
his/her agricultural management practices as a result of his/her understanding of such 
efforts.
Section II was aimed at determining the respondents knowledge of best 
management practices, and assessing some attitudinal variables that may be indicators of 
willingness to adopt environmentally friendly management practices. Specifically, the 
respondent was asked whether he/she thinks that agriculture reduces the quality of water 
coming off farmland. If the respondent had heard the term best management practices, 
he/she was asked whether he/she thinks the use of best management practices would 
improve the quality of water, as compared to conventional production practices. In 
Section II, two specific questions were included to determine the impact that contacts with
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extension personnel and participation in grower meetings had on the adoption of best 
management practices.
Section III was designed to measure the major dependent variables o f the theoretical 
model. Part 1 included eleven questions describing selected best management practices. 
The respondent was given the option to answer yes or no to each of the questions, and then 
provide additional information. The first four questions fell within what EPA has defined 
as the Soil Erosion and Sediment Control Management Measure (see Table 2.1). The next 
three questions related to practices on the Nutrient Management Measure. The last four 
questions were framed by the definition of the Pesticide Management Measure. Under the 
heading Yes, the respondent was given a space to indicate estimated cost/acre and number 
of acres under the specified practice. Under the heading No, the respondent was requested 
to indicate the reason why the practice was not implemented.
Part 2 of Section III assessed the respondent’s perception of the contribution of the 
selected practices toward improved water quality. Part 3 of Section III was aimed at 
determining whether the respondent had ever cost-shared any of the four specific practices 
for which cost-sharing programs had existed.
Section IV was designed to assess the behavior of the respondent in relation to risk. 
Two questions were included. Question 1 allowed the farmer to indicate his/her own 
perception of his/her risk attitude. A continuous line between two extremes was presented 
so that respondents could indicate whether they are risk averse or risk takers. Question 2 
was a traditional construct to assess risk attitudes when the respondent faces an investment 
venture that involves risk (Lynne et al, 1988). A continuous variable was defined where
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responding to the first element of the question had a numerical value of 1 and responding 
to the last element of the question had a value of 4 (Lynne et al, 1988).
Section V was included to elicit the respondent’s environmental attitude as 
measured by Dunlap’s New Ecological Paradigm Scale (Dunlap et al, 1992). Fifteen 
statements about the relationship between humans and the environment were presented and 
the respondent was expected to express whether he/she strongly agreed, mildly agreed, was 
unsure, mildly disagreed, or strongly disagreed with each statement.
Section VI asked for general information about the production unit. Location of the 
farm was requested in Question 1. Question 2 assessed the tenure status, as it asked for the 
amount of land the farm operator owned and the amount leased. Different ratios expressing 
such relationships were later constructed with this information and used in the empirical 
evaluation of the model. Other variables in Section VI include type of organization, farm 
debt level, and whether the operator intended to pass the farming operation on to a member 
of the family.
Section VII elicited socioeconomic characteristics of sugarcane producers in 
Louisiana such as age, sex, education, and income. The variable for education had to be 
re-coded before being used in the empirical models, as discussed in chapter three. Section 
VII also asked how long the respondent had been a farm operator in order to account for 
experience. It also asked the percent of total gross household income coming from farming. 
Finally, Section VIII was an open question for respondents to make any comments about 
water quality, nonpoint sources of pollution, and/or best management practices in the 
production of sugarcane.
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Dillman’s Total Design Method (TDM), as presented in his Mail and Telephone 
Surveys: The Total Design Method (1978); and, The Design and Administration of Mail 
Surveys(1991), was used as the basis for the administration of the mail survey. The first 
mail out included the survey questionnaire, a postage-paid return envelope, and a letter 
stating the purpose of the survey and intended uses of the data collected (Appendix A.2). 
If the questionnaire was not returned after a week, a postcard (Appendix A.3) was sent as 
a reminder. An offer was made to mail another questionnaire if it was needed.
Three weeks after the first mail out, a follow-up package was sent to non­
respondents. This follow-up included: a second copy of the survey questionnaire, a 
postage-paid return envelope, and a second letter explaining the importance of each 
returned survey to the usefulness of this study and the reliability of the results (Appendix 
A.4). The survey was conducted in March-April, 1999. A third follow-up was not 
implemented due to budget and time constraints.
Survey Sample and Response Rates
Twenty-one Louisiana parishes reported commercial production of sugarcane in 
1997. The Louisiana Cooperative Extension Service in each parish provided the 
information necessary to build the mailing list used for this survey. A total of 943 
sugarcane producers were identified, after adjusting for duplicates among parishes and 
undeliverable addresses. Of the 943 questionnaires mailed, a total of 307 completed 
surveys were returned, giving an overall response rate of 32 percent. There were a total 
of 67 questionnaires in which several items were not completed. Another 17 completed
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questionnaires arrived after the empirical analysis was initiated and were not included in 
the data base. A total of 223 responses were used in the empirical analysis.
Summary of Descriptive Statistics 
Current adoption of BMPs
One of the main objectives of this study was to determine the current adoption level 
of BMPs in the production of sugarcane in Louisiana. For the 11 practices included in this 
study, the current rates of adoption were as indicated in Table 4.3.
As indicated before, EPA has stated that to comply with the requirements o f the 
Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program, each management measure will have to 
include at least one management practice. Under this scenario, the proportion of 
responding farmers that will be in compliance with that requirement were: 92 percent for 
the soil erosion and sediment control management measure; 92 percent for the nutrient 
management measure; and 95 percent for the pesticide management measure.
Some of the management practices included in the study were considered by 
farmers to be standard production practices. Given the growing possibility that the EPA 
requirements may be more stringent in the future, two other scenarios were evaluated in the 
empirical analysis. To that end, the descriptive statistics presented in Table 4.3 indicate 
that if sugarcane producers were required to implement at least two practices for each 
management measure, the proportion of farmers already doing so were: 82 percent for the 
soil erosion and sediment control management measure; 69 percent for the nutrient 
management measure; and 86 percent for the pesticide management measure. If the 
requirement was for at least three practices per management measure, the proportions are:
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Table 4.3 Percent of Respondents Implementing Selected BMPs, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management 
Practice Adoption Study.
Management
Measure
Management
Practice
Percent of 
Adoption
Percent Compliance 
Under Condition of at 
Least One Practice
Percent Compliance 
Under Condition of at 
Least Two Practices
Percent Compliance Under 
Condition of at Least Three 
Practices
Soil Erosion and 
Sediment Control
SSCP1 74.89
91.93 82.06 52.91SSCP2 27.80
SSCP3 71.75
SSCP4 66.82
Nutrient
Management
NMP1 87.89
92.38 68.61 11.66
NMP2 72.20
NMP3 12.56
Pesticide
Management
PMP1 84.75
95.07 86.09 48.43PMP2 37.22
PMP3 89.69
PMP4 27.80
53 percent for the soil and sediment control management measure; 12 percent for the 
nutrient management measure; and 48 percent for the pesticide management measure 
(Table 4.3).
Economic and Socio-economic Variables
Table 4.4 presents summary statistics for the economic and socio-economic 
variables considered in this study. The average response for self perception of risk 
(SPRISK) was 4.17 on a scale of 1 to 10, which indicated a tendency toward risk aversion. 
Risk attitude, as measured by an investment venture (RISKB), averaged 1.67, where 1 was 
the level for maximum risk aversion and 4 was the value of least risk aversion or more risk 
taking. About 30 percent of the respondents indicated that their firm debt level was more 
than 40 percent of the total estimated value of farm business (DEBTR).
The average AGE of respondents was 48 years, while average years o f experience 
(EXP) was 23 years. About 95 percent of the respondents were males. For education, 6 
percent completed only grade school, 47 percent completed high school or equivalent 
(EDU1), 12 percent completed trade or technical school (EDU2), 31 percent completed 
college (Bachelor’s degree) (EDU3), and 4 percent completed graduate or professional 
school (EDU4).
The total gross household income was concentrated in one response range, with 63 
percent of the respondents reporting an income less than $249,999 for 1998. About 19 
percent reported an income between $250,000 and $499,999 (INC1), while 10 percent fell 
in the range between $500,000 and $999,999 (INC2). Approximately 9 percent of 
respondents indicated having a total gross household income above $1,000,000
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Table 4.4 Summary Statistics for Economic and Socioeconomic Variables, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice
Adoption Study.
Variable Explanation Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
SPRISK A continuous variable for self perception of risk attitude. 4.17 2.26 1 10 222
RISKB Risk attitude as measured by an investment venture. 1.67 0.67 1 4 222
DEBTR Whether the firm debt level is more than 40% of the total estimated 
value of the farm business.
0.29 0.46 0 1 223
AGE Age in years. 48.08 11.70 21 86 223
EXP Experience in years. 23.25 11.89 3 60 223
SEX Binary variable for sex.(l=male, 0=female). 0.95 0.22 0 1 223
EDU1 Binary variable equal to 1 if highest level of education is high school 
or equivalent and 0 otherwise (The basis is: grade school).
0.47 0.50 0 1 223
EDU2 Binary variable equal to 1 if highest level of education is trade or 
technical school and 0 otherwise (The basis is: grade school).
0.12 0.32 0 1 223
EDU3 Binary variable equal to 1 if highest level of education is college 
(Bachelor’s degree) and 0 otherwise (The basis is: grade school).
0.31 0.47 0 1 223
EDU4 Binary variable equal to 1 if highest level of education is graduate or 
professional school and 0 otherwise (The basis is: grade school).
0.04 0.20 0 1 223
INC1 Binary variable equal to 1 if total gross household income is in 
between $250,000 and $499,999 (The basis is: Less than $249,999).
0.19 0.39 0 1 223
INC2 Binary variable equal to 1 if total gross household income is in 
between $500,000 and $999,999 (The basis is: Less than $249,999).
0.10 0.30 0 1 223
INC3 Binary variable equal to 1 if total gross household income is in 
between $1,000,000 and $1,499,999 (The basis is: Less than 
$249,999).
0.02
..
0.13 0 1 223
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Table 4.4 Continued.
Variable Explanation Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
INC4 Binary variable equal to 1 if total gross household income is in 
between $1,500,000 and $1,999,999 (The basis is: Less than 
$249,999).
0.03 0.16 0 1 223
INC5 Binary variable equal to 1 if total gross household income is over 
$2,000,000 (The basis is: Less than $249,999).
0.04 0.19 0 1 223
PINFF Percent of total gross household income from farming. 85.16 22.40 1 100 223
PASS Whether the farm operator plans to pass this farming operation on 
to a member of his/her family.
0.68 0.47 0 1 223
FSIZE Total farm size in acres. 1433.21 1279.29 7 12000 223
SCO Sugarcane acreage owned. 591.70 1208.64 4 11000 106
FAO Fallow acreage owned. 183.19 226.85 8 1200 60
OTHO Other crops acreage owned. 282.23 670.50 6 2500 13
CATO Cattle acreage owned. 86.00 183.15 2 600 10
SCL Sugarcane acreage leased. 975.01 758.00 0 4440 198
FAL Fallow acreage leased. 276.90 207.28 2 1000 139
OTHL Other crops acreage leased. 321.04 227.76 50 1000 27
CATL Cattle acreage leased. 128.44 102.07 5 250 9
OWN Total acreage own. 350.86 998.60 0 11000 223
LEASED Total acreage leased. 1082.35 944.20 0 5340 223
SCACRE Total sugarcane acreage (own and leased). 1146.96 1116.83 7 12000 223
TENURE Ratio of leased acreage over total farm size 0.78 0.35 0 1 223
ORG1 Binary variable equal to 1 if the farm is a partnership 0 otherwise 
(The basis is individual operation).
0.20 0.40 0 1 223
ORG2 Binary variable equal to 1 if the farm is a family corporation 0 
otherwise (The basis is individual operation).
0.42 0.49 0 1 223
ORG3 Binary variable equal to 1 if the farm is non-family corporation, 
0 otherwise (The basis is individual operation).
0.08 0.27 0 1 223
(INC3 + INC4 + INC5). When asked whether they planned to pass the farm operation on 
to a member of their family (PASS), 68 percent responded yes. The percent of total gross 
household income from farming (PINFF) averaged 85 percent.
Measured characteristics of the operation unit indicated that the total farm size 
(FSIZE) averaged 1,433 acres for respondents, out of which 351 acres were owned (OWN) 
and 1,082 acres were leased (LEASED). The tenure status, as measured in terms of the 
ratio of leased acreage over total farm size (TENURE), indicated that 78 percent of the land 
was leased. Specific data for sugarcane acreage (SC ACRE) indicated that the average total 
sugarcane acreage owned and leased was 1,147 acres, with 106 of the 223 respondents 
(48%) owning an average of 592 acres of land on which they grow sugarcane (SCO). On 
the other hand, 198 of the 223 respondents (89%) indicated that they leased an average of 
975 acres of land for sugarcane production (SCL). Only 9 respondents (4%) indicated 
leasing land for cattle production (CATL), while 10 respondents (4%) indicated owning 
land for cattle production (CATO). For other crops, 27 respondents (12%) indicated they 
leased land for other crops (OTHL), while 13 respondents (6%) grew other crops on land 
they owned (OTHO). Finally, 30 percent of the respondents were organized as individual 
operations, 20 percent were organized in partnership (ORG1), 42 percent were family 
corporations (ORG2), and 8 percent were non-family corporations (ORG3)(Table 4.4).
Institutional Variables
Table 4.5 presents a summary of statistics for institutional variables included in this 
study. Institutional factors that may have an impact on the decision to adopt or not adopt 
BMPs were evaluated through several different variables. Awareness of legislation related
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Table 4.5 Summary Statistics for Institutional Variables, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption Study.
Variable Explanation Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
ACZMA Awareness of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program as 
specified in the Coastal Zone Management Act.
0.44 0.50 0 1 223
ACWA Awareness of efforts to control nonpoint sources of water pollution 
through the Clean Water Act.
0.65 0.48 0 1 223
HBMPT Have heard the term Best Management Practices (BMPs). 0.65 0.48 0 1 223
BMPIWQ Thinks the use of BMPs would improve the quality of water. 0.78 0.41 0 1 148
TMES Number of times farm operator met with extension service personnel 
or attended educational programs sponsored by the extension service 
during the last year.
3.38 4.29 0 36 223
TAGM Number of times farm operator attended grower meetings during the 
last year.
2.57 1.90 0 15 223
PCS Participation in cost-sharing programs for any of the agricultural 
practices that have had this option.
0.63 0.48 0 1 223
v o
Table 4.6 Summary Statistics for Environmental Attitudinal Variables, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice 
Adoption Study.
Variable Explanation Mean Standard Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations
ARWQ Thinks agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off farmland. 0.38 0.49 0 1 223
NEPS The New Ecological Paradigm Scale scores. 46.08 8.88 21 69 216
to improving water quality was assessed through two questions. One question asked 
whether the respondent was aware of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program as 
specified in the Coastal Zone Management Act (ACZMA), to which only 44 percent 
responded positively, leaving a significant 56 percent unaware of the existence of such 
legislation. The second question aimed to determine awareness of the Clean Water Act 
(ACWA), to which 65 percent responded positively.
Respondents were also asked whether they have ever heard the term Best 
Management Practices (HBMPT), to which 65 percent indicated yes. An interesting result 
was that out of those who had heard about Best Management Practices, 78 percent indicated 
that they believed that the use of Best Management Practices for sugarcane would improve 
the quality of water when compared to conventional production practices (BMPIWQ).
Results of the survey indicated that respondents met with extension service 
personnel or attended educational programs sponsored by extension personnel services 
(TMES) an average of 3.38 times during 1998. Respondents also indicated that they 
attended an average of 2.57 grower meetings (TAGM) in the same period.
Participation in cost-sharing programs was an important institutional factor, with 
63 percent of the respondents indicating that they had participated in cost-sharing programs 
(PCS) for at least one of the practices that had offered that option in the study area. Expert 
opinion indicated that the following practices have had cost-sharing programs: land 
smoothing, precision leveling, and/or row arrangement; use of drop pipes or other grade 
stabilization structures to reduce erosion; use of alternative sources of nutrients (manure, 
cover crops, sludge, or any other organic matter); and, use of a containment facility for
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mixing, loading and storing farm chemicals. Use of this variable involved aggregation to 
measure overall participation (represented as a binary variable for yes or no) in all empirical 
modeling, under the assumption that cost-sharing participation in at least one practice may 
have an impact on the adoption of other practices.
Environmental Attitudinal Variables
Table 4.6 presents a summary of the responses for the environmental attitudinal 
variables included in the current study. Two variables were considered in the assessment 
of environmental attitudes. The first variable was whether the respondent believes that 
agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off farmland (ARWQ). It was interesting 
to see that only 38 percent of the respondents think agriculture affects water quality. The 
second variable was a much broader one and was defined by the score on the New 
Ecological Paradigm Scale (NEPS). From Table 4.6, it can be seen that the average score 
was 46.07 with a standard deviation of 8.88. That clearly indicates an average position in 
the middle of the scale, which for interpretation purposes could mean that sugarcane 
producers tend to be neutral about the issues presented to assess that particular matter. 
However, individual analysis per item yielded further implications, as discussed in the 
following paragraphs.
Table 4.7 presents a more detailed description of the responses to the questions on 
the NEP scale. An average of 22 percent of the respondents indicated they were unsure 
about the issues that were presented in each item. For a simplified interpretation of results 
in Table 4.7, responses under both “strongly agree” and “mildly agree” were added 
together, as well as responses under “strongly disagree” and “mildly disagree”. That is,
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Table 4.7 Frequency Distributions (Percent) for the New Ecological Paradigm Scale 
Statements1, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption 
____________Study._________________________ _______________ ___________
SA MA U MD SD
1 We are approaching the limit of the number of people 
the earth can support.
16.67 15.28 27.31 23.61 17.13
2 Humans have the right to modify the natural 
environment to suit their needs.
8.80 33.80 18.06 23.61 15.74
3 When humans interfere with nature it often produces 
disastrous consequences.
6.94 18.98 16.20 34.72 23.15
4 Human ingenuity will ensure that we do NOT make the 
earth unlivable.
18.98 36.11 27.78 11.11 6.02
5 Humans are severely abusing the environment. 12.50 27.31 14.81 32.41 12.96
6 The earth has plenty o f natural resources if we just learn 
how to develop them.
41.20 36.57 11.57 8.80 1.85
7 Plants and animals have as much right as humans to 
exist.
13.43 20.83 10.65 21.76 33.33
8 The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the 
impacts of modem industrial nations.
6.48 18.98 27.78 31.48 15.28
9 Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to 
the laws of nature.
0.93 3.24 11.57 37.96 46.30
10 The so called "ecological crisis" facing humankind has 
been greatly exaggerated.
15.74 32.41 36.11 12.96 2.78
11 The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and 
resources.
12.04 25.93 22.22 30.56 9.26
12 Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature. 18.98 26.39 17.13 21.76 15.74
13 The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset. 4.63 16.20 19.91 38.89 20.37
14 Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature 
works to be able to control it.
9.26 20.37 26.85 25.93 17.59
15 If things continue on their present course, we will soon 
experience a major ecological catastrophe.
12.04 27.31 35.19 16.67 8.80
■Question wording: "Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans 
and the environment. For each one, please indicate (by marking the appropriate column) 
whether you STRONGLY AGREE (SA), MILDLY AGREE (MA), are UNSURE (U), 
MILDLY DISAGREE (MD) or STRONGLY DISAGREE (SD) with it”
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strong and mild pro-ecological attitudes were considered together, as well as, strong and 
mild anti-ecological attitudes. In only 2 of the 15 statements did a greater proportion of 
respondents express a pro-ecological view (Statements 8 and 15). In the remaining 13 
statements a greater proportion of responses were against ecological positions.
For Statement 8,47 percent of the respondents had a pro-ecological position, while 
25 percent had an anti-ecological position. For Statement 15,39 percent of the responses 
were in agreement with pro-ecological positions, while 25 percent supported anti-ecological 
views. The most striking anti-ecological opinions were found in responses to Statements 
6 and 9, where 78 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that “[t]he earth has 
plenty of natural resources if we just learn how to develop them” and 84 percent disagreed 
with the statement that “[djespite our special abilities humans are still subject to the laws 
of nature.”
Statements 1,6, and 11 also showed a greater percentage against ecological views. 
It was clear that producers in this case rejected the proposition that there are limits to 
growth. Responses to Statements 4, 9, and 14 imply that most producers believe that 
humans are exempt from the constraints of nature because of their intellectual and other 
talents. More respondents hold an anthropocentric position, since a greater proportion 
expressed that view in Statements 2, 7, and 12.
As indicated before, through Statement 8 respondents expressed some concern 
about the fragility of nature’s balance. However, this was offset by Statements 3 and 13 
having a majority in favor of a rejection of the idea of the fragility of nature’s balance. By 
the same reasoning, even though a greater percentage of respondents accepted the
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possibility of an eco-crisis or ecological catastrophe through their answer to Statement 15, 
this was again offset by their responses to Statements 5 and 10.
Two major issues arise from the analysis of the NEPS: 1) the average score reflects, 
as indicated before, an unsure position with respect to the aggregation of all statements in 
the scale; and 2) the analysis in the preceding paragraphs, based on results presented in 
Table 4.7, indicated that when statements were analyzed individually, sugarcane producers 
in Louisiana were likely to not hold pro-ecological views.
The two issues discussed in the previous paragraph help to explain why including 
the NEPS scale as an explanatory variable for the adoption of environmentally friendly 
management practices would not be significant and would tend to have a negative sign. 
The negative sign would be due to the fact that, as results in Table 4.3 indicate, there was 
already a high percentage of adoption of BMPs; and given the low scores expected on 
NEPS for the ecological attitude reflected in Table 4.7, an inverse relationship will be 
expected (higher NEPS scores would indicate a more pro-ecological attitude).
When the analytical models were run including the NEPS scores as an explanatory 
variable for adoption of BMPs, the expected results did show up. That is, it was not 
significant and the estimated coefficients had negative signs. Because of the theoretically 
inconsistent inverse relationship, the NEPS variable was excluded from further analysis. 
It would be paradoxical to pursue the idea that the less favorable producers are toward 
ecological views, the more they would implement environmentally friendly agricultural 
management practices.
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Analytical Framework and Discussion of Results
As indicated in chapter three, to assess the overall issue of adoption of BMPs within 
the context of the required Nonpoint Pollution Control Program, it is hypothesized that 
there exists contemporaneous correlation among the error terms of the factors that influence 
the adoption of Management Practices within each Management Measure and, perhaps 
more importantly, that contemporaneous correlation exists for errors among Management 
Measures. To analyze this, a multivariate construct for discrete variables was required. 
Figure 4.1 presents the overall analytical framework developed in the present study to 
achieve an integral analysis of the defined Management Measures. The set of Xs represents 
the regressors, and the dependent variables were coded as indicated in Table 4.1.
Four phases were defined in the process of constructing a series of multivariate 
probit structures for the overall analysis of the present study. In Phase I, all potential 
explanatory variables were included in the single-probit empirical models for each Best 
Management Practice. Before doing so, a multiple correlation analysis was conducted. As 
shown in Appendix B, most correlation coefficients, although significant, were irrelevant 
(they were below 0.50). The two correlation coefficients that were considered relevant 
were those between Age (AGE) and Experience (EXP) (0.84) (Table B.2), and Farm Size 
(FSIZE) and Gross Household Income (GHINC) (0.58) (Table B. 1). Because of the nature 
of the variables, AGE was left in all models, as it is a more objective measure. For Farm 
Size and Gross Household Income, it was decided to leave Farm Size because it was a more 
direct question, while Income was assessed through a series of ranges that could lead to less 
reliability in the analysis.
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PHASES I AND II PHASE III PHASE IV
SSCP1
SSCP2
BSCSSCP3
SSCP4
NMP1
ABMPsNMP2 NMM
NMP3
PMP1
PMP2
PMM
PMP3Xn
PMP4
Figure 4.1 Analytical Framework, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption Study.
In Phase II, only those regressors that were significant in Phase I, at least at the 25% 
significance level, were included in the models, to ensure convergence of the multivariate 
models to be constructed and provide more efficient estimates (Hendry, 1995; Baneij ee and 
Hendry, 1997). Coefficients were evaluated to ensure that they did not change 
significantly, and more importantly, that they did not change signs.
All regressors included in the single probit models of Phase II were included in 
Phase III. Phase III consisted of the construction of Multivariate Probit models for each of 
the management measures to evaluate the hypothesis that contemporaneous correlation 
exists among the error terms within each management measure.
Finally, Phase IV was developed to evaluate the hypothesis that error terms were 
correlated across management measures. Two scenarios of compliance were evaluated. 
As indicated previously, one scenario was constructed assuming that the requirement for 
compliance demands at least two management practices be implemented for each 
management measure. The other scenario assumed the possibility of more stringent 
requirements, meaning that at least three management practices be implemented for each 
management measure.
In the following Sections, each of the phases is further described. Empirical 
models as specified for each phase are presented and the results discussed.
Phase I
As indicated above, in Phase I a series of univariate probit models were developed 
as a screening process to later construct the multivariate probit models that were essential 
to the present study. The empirical model for each management practice is:
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ABMPj = F(ACZMA, ACWA, HBMPT, TMES, TAGM, ARWQ, PCS, SPRISK, RISKB, 
FSIZE, ORG1, ORG2, ORG3, PASS, DEBTR, AGE, SEX, EDU, PINOFF, 
TENURE, s)
where:
ABMPj = 1 if  the sugarcane producer has adopted the ith BMP; 0 otherwise, 
s = Error term.
All explanatory variables are as defined and coded in Table 4.2
Eleven models were estimated using LIMDEP 7.0 (Greene, 1998). Parameter 
estimates and asymptotic standard errors are reported in the corresponding columns in 
Tables 4.8, 4.9, and 4.10. The number of right predictions and goodness-of-fit measures 
are reported in the corresponding tables in Appendix C.
The columns corresponding to Phase I in Table 4.8, show the value of the 
coefficients for all the explanatory variables included in the models for all BMPs in the soil 
erosion and sediment control management measure. For the SSCP1 practice, the variables 
HBMPT, TMES, TAGM, PCS, DEBTR, EDU, and TENURE were significant to at least 
the 25% significance level and were selected to enter Phase II. For the SSCP2 practice, 
the variables that were carried out to the second phase were: ACWA, TAGM, FSIZE, 
PASS, DEBTR, SEX, and EDU. For the SSCP3 practice the variables that were selected 
to enter Phase II were: ACZMA, ARWQ, PCS, DEBTR, and TENURE. Finally, for the 
SSCP4 practice, the following explanatory variables were selected for Phase II: PCS, 
ORG2, AGE, and EDU.
In Table 4.9, the columns corresponding to Phase I present the value of the 
coefficients and standard errors for best management practices within the nutrient
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Table 4.8 Phases I and II. Single-Probit Model Screening for Soil Erosion and Sediment Control Practices, Louisiana
Variable
SSCP1 SSCP2 SSCP3 SSCP4
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. [Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
ONE •1.549 1.0033 -0.8935 0.5566 -2.1210 1.0716 -2.2173 0.6654 -0.377 0.9996 0.4090 0.2770 -0.8591 0.9966 -0.8468 0.6816
ACZMA 0.044 0.2441 -0.0651 0.2429 -0.621 0.2388 -0.3638 0.1909 0.1851 0.2389
ACWA ■0.087 0.2440 0.3426 0.2593 0.3834 0.2205 0.023 0.2392 0.0921 0.2464
HBMPT 0.409 0.2443 0.3727 0.2158 0.0124 0.2558 0.224 0.2453 -0.0952 0.2470
TMES 0.136 0.0564 0.1292 0.0544 0.0277 0.0276 0.067 0.0433 -0.0051 0.0276
TAGM -0.106 0.0637 -0.1131 0.0609 0.1384 0.0577 0.1656 0.0488 -0.027 0.0588 0.0259 0.0614
ARWQ •0.172 0.2207 -0.0588 0.2161 0.727 0.2223 0.7483 0.2065 -0.2113 0.2159
PCS 0.631 0.2135 0.5489 0.1993 0.0379 0.2214 0.340 0.2103 0.4048 0.1962 1.3318 0.2058 1.3169 0.1954
SPRISK -0.058 0.0490 0.0558 0.0496 -0.001 0.0463 0.0544 0.0499
RISKB 0.112 0.1701 -0.0864 0.1711 0.001 0.1652 -0.1377 0.1669
FSIZE 0.000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
ORG1 -0.157 0.3075 0.2943 0.3040 0.280 0.3124 -0.0412 0.2905
ORG2 0.117 0.2666 -0.1680 0.2750 -0.071 0.2591 0.4426 0.2628 0.4299 0.2045
ORG3 0.069 0.4523 -0.5470 0.4930 -0.138 0.4093 -0.0522 0.4170
PASS -0.167 0.2252 0.2827 0.2361 0.3216 0.2194 0.318 0.2219 -0.1070 0.2221
DEBTR 0.383 0.2308 0.3400 0.2196 0.2840 0.2294 0.3770 0.2110 0.409 0.2298 0.3549 0.2124 -0.1353 0.2211
AGE 0.008 0.0094 -0.0029 0.0096 0.006 0.0092 -0.0096 0.0089 -0.0116 0.0084
SEX 0.239 0.5107 -0.8586 0.4669 -0.9440 0.4223 -0.369 0.5249 0.0512 0.5322
EDU 0.106 0.0425 0.0913 0.0380 0.0909 0.0458 0.0865 0.0418 0.053 0.0405 0.0627 0.0415 0.0701 0.0362
PINOFF -0.003 0.0044 -0.0032 0.0051 -0.007 0.0045 0.0026 0.0047
TENURE -0.439 0.3172 -0.4430 0.2979 -0.0571 0.3042 -0.394 0.3071 -0.3192 0.2796 -0.1437 0.2855
Blanks indicate a probability evel greater than 0.25
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Table 4.9 Phases I and II. Single-Probit Model Screening for Nutrient Management Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane Best
Management Practice Adoption Study.
Variable
NMP1 NMP2 NMP3
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
ONE -0.2383 1.2898 1.1336 0.6006 0.0307 1.0058 -0.3153 0.2662 -5.4298 1.6046 -4.0342 0.9007
ACZMA -0.0031 0.3269 -0.0736 0.2346 -0.1081 0.3229
ACWA 0.1827 0.3021 -0.1067 0.2360 0.1508 0.3479
HBMPT 0.4129 0.3231 0.1509 0.2355 -0.3654 0.3446
TMES 0.1686 0.0984 0.1185 0.0605 -0.0202 0.0280 0.0680 0.0301 0.0720 0.0282
TAGM -0.1114 0.0912 0.1272 0.0620 0.0991 0.0502 0.1907 0.0700 0.1452 0.0594
ARWQ 0.4816 0.3147 0.5840 0.2822 0.4396 0.2124 0.4116 0.1984 -0.2449 0.2906
PCS 0.2287 0.2760 0.0373 0.2068 0.5933 0.3282 0.4563 0.2833
SPRISK 0.0035 0.0638 0.0712 0.0474 0.0507 0.0418 0.0785 0.0658
RISKB 0.1782 0.2208 -0.1287 0.1570 0.0444 0.2230
FSIZE 0.0003 0.0002 0.0005 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
ORG1 -0.0486 0.4028 0.3144 0.2987 -0.2471 0.3870
ORG2 0.0448 0.3467 0.1678 0.2556 -0.4299 0.3557
ORG3 -0.5000 0.5357 0.0501 0.4024 -0.4111 0.5985
PASS 0.2808 0.2799 0.2773 0.2129 0.0507 0.0418 0.2579 0.3262
DEBTR 0.4536 0.3143 0.3799 0.2869 0.4495 0.2270 0.4019 0.2162 -0.1601 0.3133
AGE -0.0179 0.0119 -0.0216 0.0106 -0.0014 0.0087 0.0146 0.0131
SEX -0.0646 0.6699 -0.7858 0.5359 -0.0196 0.6234
EDU 0.0445 0.0518 0.0258 0.0400 0.1601 0.0675 0.1152 0.0583
PINOFF 0.0001 0.0056 -0.0041 0.0045 -0.0058 0.0066
TENURE 0.1331 0.3850 -0.0235 0.2860 -0.2028 0.3814
Blanks indicate a probability level greater than 0.25
management measure. Explanatory variables that were significant at least at the 25% 
significance level, were carried out to Phase II. For practice NMP1 these variables were: 
TMES, ARWQ, FSIZE, DEBTR, and AGE. For practice NMP2 the selected variables 
were: TAGM, ARWQ, SPRISK, PASS, and DEBTR. And finally, for practice NMP3 the 
significant variables were: TMES, TAGM, PCS, FSIZE, and EDU.
Columns corresponding to Phase I in Table 4.10 present the results of the single­
probit models for best management practices within the pesticide management measure. 
Significant variables at the 25% significance level for the PMP1 were the following: 
TMES, ARWQ, PCS, SPRISK, and FSIZE. For practice PMP2 the significant variables 
were: ORG1, DEBTR, and TENURE. Selected variables for practice PMP3 included 
ARWQ, FSIZE, DEBTR, SEX, and PINOFF. Finally, for the PMP4 practice the selected 
variables were: HBMPT, TMES, TAGM, AGE, EDU, and TENURE.
The same structural model was set up between management measures, under the 
two scenarios previously indicated: compliance with 1) at least two and 2) at least three 
management practices per management measure. Formally presented, those models were:
CWMMj= F(ACZMA, ACWA, HBMPT, TMES, TAGM, ARWQ, PCS, SPRISK, RISKB, 
FSIZE, ORG1, ORG2, ORG3, PASS, DEBTR, AGE, SEX, EDU, PINOFF, 
TENURE, s)
where:
CWMMj = 1 if the sugarcane producer adoption rate satisfies the condition for compliance 
for the j th Management Measure; 0 otherwise, 
s = Error term.
All explanatory variables were as defined in Table 4.2
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Table 4.10 Phases I and II. Single-Probit Model Screening for Pesticide Management Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane
Variable
PMP1 PMP2 PMP3 PMtP4
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
ONE 0.9064 1.2236 0.3333 0.2865 0.3894 0.9273 -0.0614 0.2174 •1.4206 1.3443 -0.1432 0.4537 U.1314 1.0876 -4.2775 0.8952
ACZMA 0.1804 0.2951 0.2501 0.2227 0.0803 0.3441 -0.1434 0.2395
ACWA 0.2604 0.2675 -0.1576 0.2272 0.3529 0.3140 ■0.0994 0.2531
HBMPT 0.2857 0.2721 -0.2502 0.2266 0.2655 0.3369 0.5029 0.2535 0.3740 0.2220
TMES 0.0611 0.0544 0.0786 0.0431 L0.0158 0.0235 0.0461 0.0557 0.0786 0.0335 0.0762 0.0302
TAGM -0.0266 0.0726 0.0648 0.0545 ■0.0141 0.0807 -0.1023 0.0670 -0.1108 0.0645
ARWQ 0.9816 0.3122 0.9324 0.2847 1-0.1404 0.1979 0.3497 0.3218 0.3748 0.2784 0.2421 0.2104
PCS 0.3848 0.2473 0.3696 0.2309 •0.0565 0.1950 0.3043 0.2785 0.0227 0.2097
SPRISK -0.0750 0.0557 ■0.0722 0.0474 ■0.0273 0.0438 ■0.0016 0.0695 0.0202 0.0474
RISKB 0.0076 0.1949 0.0067 0.1505 0.1425 0.2347 0.0085 0.1654
FSIZE 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0002 0.0004 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001
ORG1 -0.0640 0.3489 0.1944 0.2682 0.3349 0.2151 •0.6277 0.4080 -0.1867 0.3048
ORG2 0.0609 0.2985 -0.2265 0.2434 -0.2311 0.3653 0.0142 0.2625
ORG3 0.6207 0.6293 -0.0838 0.3955 -0.8037 0.5345 -0.0917 0.4264
PASS -0.0090 0.2686 0.1005 0.2085 0.2273 0.2942 0.0468 0.2250
DEBTR 0.2088 0.2639 0.5290 0.2031 0.5520 0.1908 0.7265 0.3817 0.7430 0.3538 0.2638 0.2219
AGE -0.0033 0.0110 0.0066 0.0082 0.0095 0.0124 0.0225 0.0096 0.0220 0.0089
SEX -0.5247 0.6353 0.1906 0.4805 1.3152 0.5498 0.9469 0.4378 ■0.4615 0.4669
EDU 0.0044 0.0473 -0.0490 0.0386 -0.0471 0.0583 0.1284 0.0460 0.1434 0.0421
PINOFF -0.0035 0.0050 -0.0043 0.0044 -0.0066 0.0056 ■0.0086 0.0049 0.0045 0.0045
TENURE -0.2664 0.3726 -0.6886 0.2684 -0.6506 0.2473 0.3992 0.3910 0.5455 0.2973 0.5258 0.2874
o4a.
Blanks indicate a probability leve greater than 0.25
All regressors that were significant to at least the 25% significance level were 
carried out to the next phase. Table 4.11 shows that under the condition that compliance 
be satisfied with at least two management practices per management measure, the variables 
that were significant for the Soil Erosion and Sediment Control Measure were: TMES, 
PCS, RISKB, FSIZE, and EDU. For the Nutrient Management Measure, variables selected 
to be carried out to Phase II were: TAGM, ARWQ, FSIZE, DEBTR, and EDU. For the 
Pesticide Management Measure, the following variables were selected to enter Phase II: 
TMES, ARWQ, PCS, FSIZE, and DEBTR (number of right predictions and goodness-of-fit 
measures are reported in the corresponding tables in Appendix C).
As expected, when more stringent conditions were imposed, more explanatory 
variables became relevant to the adoption of BMPs. This is reflected in Table 4.12, where 
the variables that turned out to be significant according to the criteria established to enter 
Phase II are presented. For the Soil Erosion and Sediment Control Measure the variables 
were: TMES, PCS, FSIZE, DEBTR, EDU, and TENURE. For this management measure, 
under the more stringent scenario, RISKB dropped out, but two more variables came in: 
DEBTR and TENURE.
For the Nutrient Management Measure, variables selected to be carried out to Phase 
II were: TMES, TAGM, PCS, FSIZE, PASS, AGE and EDU. For this management 
measure, as more stringent conditions were imposed, other variables came into the solution. 
In this case TMES, PCS, PASS and AGE.
For the Pesticide Management Measure under this scenario, the following variables 
were selected to enter Phase II: TMES, SPRISK, FSIZE, and DEBTR, AGE, and
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Table 4.11 Phases I and II. Single-Probit Model Screening for all Management Measures, the Condition for Compliance for
Each Management Measure Being a Total of at Least Two Management Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane Best 
Management Practice Adoption Study. _____________________________________________
Variable
SSCPTDUM NMPTDUM PMPTDUM
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
ONE -0.9215 1.1821 -1.5687 0.6263 -0.7509 0.9648 -1.0936 0.4728 -0.1412 1.2186 -0.0711 0.2556
ACZMA 0.0037 0.2788 -0.0671 0.2333 0.2257 0.3045
ACWA -0.1174 0.2761 0.0390 0.2319 0.0540 0.2864
HBMPT 0.0628 0.2832 0.1847 0.2318 0.1816 0.2956
TMES 0.1624 0.0862 0.1451 0.0632 -0.0081 0.0293 0.0940 0.0564 0.0948 0.0451
TAGM -0.0187 0.0788 0.1217 0.0608 0.1257 0.0505 0.0021 0.0756
ARWQ 0.1812 0.2602 0.4262 0.2075 0.4036 0.1972 0.7715 0.3065 0.6894 0.2721
PCS 1.0852 0.2477 1.0461 0.2309 -0.0132 0.2045 0.3432 0.2566 0.3959 0.2379
SPRISK 0.0718 0.0573 0.0683 0.0467 -0.0056 0.0595
RISKB -0.2757 0.1918 -0.1193 0.1621 -0.0968 0.1549 -0.0428 0.1963
FSIZE 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001
ORG1 0.1736 0.3813 0.3902 0.2976 -0.3404 0.3544
ORG2 0.1600 0.3087 0.1912 0.2512 -0.0130 0.3135
ORG3 -0.0090 0.5104 0.1233 0.4057 0.6870 0.7090
PASS -0.0047 0.2601 0.2489 0.2107 -0.0145 0.2765
DEBTR 0.2347 0.2636 0.4574 0.2213 0.4339 0.2095 0.8668 0.3280 0.8473 0.3113
AGE 0.0007 0.0107 -0.0034 0.0086 -0.0031 0.0114
SEX -0.6593 0.6632 -0.5519 0.4862 0.6015 0.5202
EDU 0.1170 0.0469 0.1164 0.0417 0.0440 0.0396 0.0509 0.0367 -0.0531 0.0514
PINOFF -0.0047 0.0048 -0.0017 0.0045 -0.0010 0.0053
TENURE -0.1870 0.3423 0.0532 0.2853 0.3286 0.3511
Blanks indicate a probability level greater than 0.25
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Table 4.12 Phases I and II. Single-Probit Model Screening for all Management Measures, the Condition for Compliance for
Each Management Measure Being a Total of at Least Three Management Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane Best 
Management Practice Adoption Study._________________________ ______________________________
Variable
SSCPTDU3 NMPTDU3 PMPTDU3
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II PHASE I PHASE II
Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err.
ONE -1.3846 0.9306 -1.7128 0.5382 -5.8854 1.7283 -5.1791 1.2244 -1.5237 0.9101 -0.7699 0.5398
ACZMA -0.4602 0.2288 -0.1831 0.3368 -0.0753 0.2118
ACWA 0.1630 0.2342 0.2419 0.3660 0.0187 0.2210
HBMPT 0.2714 0.2350 -0.3737 0.3671 0.1398 0.2211
TMES 0.0651 0.0346 0.0671 0.0293 0.0734 0.0300 0.0769 0.0306 0.0502 0.0316 0.0500 0.0276
TAGM 0.0379 0.0578 0.1809 0.0716 0.1543 0.0618 -0.0070 0.0539
ARWQ 0.0174 0.1990 -0.1454 0.3064 -0.0832 0.1919
PCS 0.8920 0.2020 0.8199 0.1935 0.6090 0.3451 0.5455 0.3118 -0.0068 0.1903
SPRISK -0.0123 0.0458 0.0895 0.0697 -0.0608 0.0435 -0.0447 0.0392
RISKB -0.1048 0.1591 -0.0486 0.2366 0.1374 0.1487
FSIZE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001
ORG1 0.1042 0.2882 -0.0817 0.4102 -0.1919 0.2721
ORG2 0.1411 0.2486 -0.2886 0.3745 -0.2556 0.2395
ORG3 -0.2506 0.4015 -0.1403 0.6097 -0.3057 0.3778
PASS 0.0562 0.2066 0.5809 0.3747 0.5035 0.3410 0.1554 0.2018
DEBTR 0.4855 0.2165 0.4374 0.2012 -0.3813 0.3461 0.5273 0.2039 0.5592 0.1965
AGE -0.0007 0.0085 0.0187 0.0137 0.0140 0.0117 0.0173 0.0083 0.0154 0.0079
SEX -0.1222 0.4690 -0.0570 0.6375 0.3221 0.4538
EDU 0.0721 0.0399 0.0810 0.0363 0.1423 0.0723 0.1036 0.0619 0.0179 0.0373
PINOFF -0.0051 0.0044 -0.0023 0.0067 -0.0018 0.0041
TENURE -0.5195 0.2800 -0.4470 0.2629 -0.0652 0.4100 -0.4402 0.2638 -0.4701 0.2530
Blanks indicate a probability level greater than 0.25
TENURE. For this management measure, as more stringent conditions were imposed, 
ARWQ and PCS dropped out, while SPRISK, DEBTR, and TENURE entered into the 
solution (Number of right predictions and goodness-of-fit measures are reported in the 
corresponding tables in Appendix C).
Phase II
Phase II consisted in the running of the reduced models as determined by Phase I. 
That is, all variables that were significant to at least the 25% significance level in Phase I, 
for each model, were used for models in Phase II. The main purposes of running these new 
models were: 1) to determine how stable the coefficients for each regressor were once they 
were run only for significant variables; 2) to have the single-probit-model coefficients for 
comparison and analytical purposes once it was determined whether the error terms were 
correlated or not.
It was found that the coefficients did not change significantly when the reduced 
models were run. It was also found that the degree of significance for each variable 
actually increased, which was expected as fewer variables accounted for the variability of 
the model.
The corresponding columns of Tables 4.8,4.9,4.10,4.11, and 4.12 present the new 
coefficients and standard errors for the reduced models out of Phase II. The number of right 
predictions and goodness-of-fit measures are reported in the corresponding tables in 
Appendix C.
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Phase III
As indicated above, Phases I and II were implemented to set up the basis for a 
multivariate probit model for each set of management practices within a management 
measure, and finally a multivariate probit for each management measure under the 
specified scenarios. Phase III was implemented by running multivariate probit models for 
all management practices within each management measure. Results are discussed below.
Soil Erosion and Sediment Control Management Practices
Table 4.13 presents the results of the multivariate probit model for the soil erosion 
and sediment control management practices. For SSCP1, the variables TMES and EDU 
were significant at the 5% significance level, while PCS was significant at the 1% 
significance level. All three significant variables had a positive sign, which was consistent 
with the hypothesized sign. The interpretation of TMES was straight forward, as the 
number of times the producer has met with extension service personnel has a direct and 
positive impact on the use of land smoothing, precision leveling and/or row arrangement 
to control run off. The impact goes in the same direction as that derived from the 
producer’s participation in cost-sharing programs (PCS) and his or her level of education 
(EDU).
For SSCP2 three variables were significant at the 5% significance level: FSIZE, 
SEX, and EDU. TAGM was significant at the 1% significance level. This means that the 
decision to use either succession planting or fallow acreage with a cover crop was 
influenced by the number of times the sugarcane producer had attended grower meetings 
(TAGM), the size of the farm (FSIZE), the producer’s sex (SEX), and level of education
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Table 4.13 Multivariate Probit for Soil Erosion and Sediment Control Management
Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption Study.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Index Function for SSCP1
ONE -0.7669 0.6539
HBMPT 0.3429 0.2303
TMES 0.1096** 0.0545
TAGM -0.1004 0.0679
PCS 0.5543*** 0.2068
DEBTR 0.3507 0.2314
EDU 0.0861** 0.0442
TENURE -0.4762 0.3385
Index Function for SSCP2
ONE -2.2504 0.7094
TAGM 0.1668*** 0.0454
FSIZE 0.0002** 0.0001
SEX -0.9720** 0.4385
EDU 0.0909** 0.0439
ACWA 0.3572 0.2444
DEBTR 0.4051 0.2577
PASS 0.3387 0.2472
Index Function for SSCP3
ONE 0.4130 0.3057
ACZMA .0.4044** 0.2109
ARWQ 0.7823*** 0.2248
PCS 0.4010** 0.2051
DEBTR 0.3721 0.2399
TENURE -0.3168 0.3121
Index Function for SSCP4
ONE -0.7445 0.6776
PCS 1.3036*** 0.2068
ORG2 0.4320* 0.2538
EDU 0.0666* 0.0402
AGE -0.0127 0.0086
Correlation Coefficients
R(01,02) 0.2295 0.1751
R(01,03) 0.2690** 0.1397
R(02,03) 0.0816 0.1557
R(01,04) 0.2932** 0.1366
R(02,04) 0.1952 0.1567
R(03,04) 0.2467* 0.1399
M ultivariate Probit Model: 4 equations 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable MVProbit 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 223 
Iterations completed 41 
Log likelihood function -441.5750 
Replications fo r simulated Drobs. = 100
One, Two, and Three * indicate that parameters are significant at the 10, 5,and 1% 
significance level, respectively.
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(EDU). The signs of the coefficients were all as expected for FSIZE, SEX, and EDU. 
Farm size and education had a positive impact on the implementation of this management 
practice, while the producer’s sex had a negative sign, indicating that the producer was less 
likely to implement this practice if he was male. TAGM had a positive impact on the 
implementation of succession planting or fallow acreage with a cover crop, indicating that 
attending grower meetings had a positive impact on the implementation of this practice.
For the dependent variable SSCP3, two variables were significant at the 5% 
significance level: ACZMA and PCS. The variable ARWQ was significant at the 1 % level. 
In this case, only two variables had the expected sign: PCS and ARWQ. These were both 
positive, indicating that the producer’s participation in cost-sharing programs (PCS) and 
his/her belief that agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off farmland (ARWQ) 
had a direct positive impact on the delay of stubble breakout and maintenance of crop 
residue through the winter months. A disappointing result was obtained, however, for 
ACZMA, as it had a negative sign. The implication of this result was that the producer’s 
awareness of legislation related to the improvement of water quality, as specifically stated 
in the Coastal Zone Management Act, had a negative impact on the adoption of this BMP. 
The result may be interpreted as a negative reaction to regulation of the farm sector, and 
involved agencies may have to reconsider the way the information is being delivered to 
farmers. In this regard, it is important to point out that this was the only management 
practice for which this variable is significant.
Finally, two variables were significant at the 10%  significance level for SSCP4, and 
one was significant at the 1% significance level. These variables were: ORG2, EDU, and
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PCS respectively. All three variables had positive coefficients, indicating that partnership 
organization (ORG2), level of education (EDU), and participation in cost-sharing programs 
(PCS), all had a positive impact on the use of drop pipes or other stabilization structures 
to reduce soil erosion. As it turned out, PCS was highly significant in this case. This was 
expected, as the use of drop pipes was one of the ongoing cost-sharing programs in the 
study area.
It was clear that some variables were significant for most of the practices in this 
management measure. The variables were: EDU, PCS, TMES. Some variables were not 
significant, but deserve some comments. Such was the case for variable TENURE, which 
even though it was not significant, always had the expected negative sign. That is, the 
higher the ratio leased to total farmland, the less likely farmers are to adopt best 
management practices.
As shown in Table 4.13, correlation coefficients were all positive. The 
contemporaneous correlation of the error terms between variables SSCP1 and SSCP3, and 
between variables SSCP1 and SSCP4 were significant at the 5% significance level. While 
the correlation coefficient between variables SSCP2 and SSCP4 was significant at the 10% 
significance level. The significance of the correlation coefficients proved the hypothesis 
that error terms among management practices within the soil erosion and sediment control 
management measure were correlated. This is important for two reasons. First, it indicates 
that the analysis of adoption of BMPs should be done in an integrated manner within 
management measures. Secondly, it has important policy implications that are discussed 
later in this study.
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The last panel of Table 4.13 shows the value of the log likelihood function and 
other statistics about the fit of the model. The value of the likelihood function after forty- 
one iterations were completed was -246.1, with a total o f223 useful observations and 100 
replications for simulated probabilities.
Nutrient Management Practices 
Table 4.14 presents the results of the multivariate probit model for the nutrient 
management practices that were analyzed. Dependent variable NMP1 was significantly 
determined by independent variables TMES and AGE at the 10% significance level. 
ARWQ was significant at the 5% significance level, and FSIZE was significant at the 1 % 
significance level. As expected, TMES, ARWQ, and FSIZE had a positive coefficient. 
That means that the determination of fertilizer applications based on soil testing and 
expected yields was positively affected by the number of times the sugarcane producer has 
met with extension service personnel (TMES) and the size of the farming operation 
(FSIZE). It was also positively affected by the farmer’s belief that agriculture reduces the 
quality of water coming off farmland (ARWQ). Age (AGE) had a negative impact on the 
adoption of this management practice, which means that the older the farmer, the less likely 
he was to implement it. This negative relationship was also expected.
For NMP2, only two variables were statistically significant. These variables were 
TAGM and ARWQ, which both have a positive impact on the use of any of the following 
fertilization practices: split application of nutrients, banded application, or slow-release 
fertilizers. The number of times the producer had attended grower meetings (TAGM) was 
significant at the 10% significance level, while the farmer’s belief that agriculture reduces
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Table 4.14 Multivariate Probit for Nutrient Management Practices, Louisiana
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Index Function for NMP1
ONE 1.1756 0.6891
TMES 0.1398* 0.0814
ARWQ 0.5988** 0.3115
FSIZE 0.0004*** 0.0002
AGE -0.0211* 0.0121
DEBTR 0.3195 0.3138
Index Function for NMP2
ONE -0.2347 0.2701
TAGM 0.1142* 0.0612
ARWQ 0.4082** 0.2146
SPRISK 0.0388 0.0429
PASS 0.2461 0.1968
DEBTR 0.3621 0.2357
Index Function for NMP3
ONE -3.9695 1.4982
TMES 0.0721* 0.0386
TAGM 0.1616** 0.0798
PCS 0.4183 0.3256
FSIZE 0.0001 0.0001
EDU 0.1111 0.0895
Correlation Coefficients
R(01,02) 0.5181*** 0.1479
R(01,03) 0.2620 0.4009
R(02,03) 0.3022 0.2348
M ultivariate  Probit Model: 3 equations 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable MVProbit 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 222 
Itera tions completed 31 
Log likelihood function -246.0694 
Replications for simulated probs. = 100
One, Two, and Three * indicate that parameters are significant at the 10, 5,and 1% 
significance level, respectively.
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the quality of water coming off farmland (ARWQ) was significant at the 5% significance
level.
Two variables were significant determinants of adoption ofNMP3. These variables 
were TMES and TAGM. Both variables had the expected positive sign and were 
significant at the 10% and 5% significance level, respectively. That is, the use of alternate 
sources of nutrients (manure, cover crops, sludge, or any other organic matter) was 
positively affected by the number of times the producer met with extension service 
personnel (TMES) and the number of grower meetings (TAGM) he or she had attended.
Three variables were significant in at least two of the management practices of this 
measure. These variables were: TMES, ARWQ, and TAGM. This is very important, as 
informal education seems to be positive and directly related to the adoption of these 
management practices.
The error terms were highly correlated between variables NMP1 and NMP2. The 
correlation coefficient between these two variables was significant at the 99% confidence 
level, which again proves the hypothesis of contemporaneous correlation among the 
management practices within the nutrient management measure.
The value of the log likelihood function was -246.0694 after 31 iterations were 
completed, with a total of222 observations and 100 replications for simulated probabilities.
Pesticide Management Practices
Table 4.15 presents the results of the multivariate probit model for pesticide 
management practices. Four of the independent variables included in the equation for 
management practice PMP1 were significant. TMES, FSIZE, and SPRISKwere significant
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Table 4.15 Multivariate Probit for Pesticide Management Practices, Louisiana
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Index Function for PMP1
ONE 0.4823 0.2937
TMES 0.0622* 0.0363
ARWQ 0.9160*** 0.3748
PCS 0.3670 0.2513
FSIZE 0.0002* 0.0001
SPRISK -0.0881* 0.0529
Index Function for PMP2
ONE -0.0448 0.2456
DEBTR 0.5329*** 0.2043
TENURE -0.6646*** 0.2675
ORG1 0.3656* 0.2223
Index Function for PMP3
ONE -0.1165 0.5364
FSIZE 0.0003 0.0003
DEBTR 0.6911 0.4937
SEX 1.0002*** 0.4153
PINOFF -0.0067 0.0074
ARWQ 0.3236 0.4611
Index Function for PMP4
ONE -4.1610 0.9444
TMES 0.0772* 0.0418
AGE 0.0213** 0.0098
EDU 0.1403*** 0.0454
TENURE 0.5343* 0.2889
HBMPT 0.3268 0.2409
TAGM -0.1165 0.0806
Correlation coefficients
R(01,02) 0.1961 0.1678
R(01,03) 0.5975*** 0.1596
R(02,03) 0.3436 0.3147
R(01,04) 0.3787** 0.1939
R(02,04) 0.0725 0.1334
R(03,04) 0.3013 0.2540
M ultivariate  Probit Model: 4 equations 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable MVProbit 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 222 
Itera tions completed 38 
Log likelihood function -384.0366 
Replications fo r simulated Drobs. = 100
One, Two, and Three * indicate that parameters are significant at the 10, 5,and 1% 
significance level, respectively.
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at the 10% significance level. ARWQ was significant at the 1% significance level. TMES, 
FSIZE, and ARWQ had the expected positive sign. That means that basing chemical 
applications (insecticides, herbicides) on economic thresholds as determined by field 
scouting was positively affected by the number of times the producer met with extension 
service personnel (TMES), the size of his/her farm operation (FSIZE), and the producer’s 
belief that agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off farmland (ARWQ). The 
variable SPRISK had an unexpected negative sign. As indicated in chapter three, a 
negative relationship was expected, because it was assumed that implementation of best 
management practices may imply riskier decisions to producers. This assumption may need 
to be reviewed in light of the model results, as this may indicate that basing chemical 
applications on economic thresholds not only lowers costs, but was perceived by farmers 
as also being less risky. It is important to restate that SPRISK indicates the farmer’s own 
perception of risk attitude.
For the use of a containment facility for mixing, loading, and storage of farm 
chemicals (PMP2), it was found that three independent variables were significant. DEBTR 
and TENURE were significant at the 1% significance level, while ORG1 was significant 
at the 10% significance level. DEBTR had a positive relationship. Since the construction 
of a containment facility requires large capital investment, it may be that the producer 
estimates that his/her farm debt level was more than 40% of the total estimated value of the 
farm business as a consequence of the investment made in the construction of a 
containment facility. As expected, TENURE had a negative impact on the use of a 
containment facility. This was to be expected. The expected large capital investment,
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would mean that farmers were less likely to construct a containment facility on land they 
do not own. ORG1 was significant and with a positive sign, implying that organization as 
a partnership had a positive impact on the implementation of this management practice.
For management practice PMP3, only one variable was significant. That variable 
was SEX, which was significant at the 1% significance level. SEX has a positive impact 
on the practice of calibrating spray equipment before each use, implying that being male 
made it more likely that the producer would implement this practice. Because calibration 
of spray equipment was both needed for its bio-physical and economic effectiveness, this 
was a practice expected to be implemented by most producers. In fact, as shown in Table 
4.3, almost 90 percent of producers did implement this practice. It may be an explanation 
of why only one variable was significant, since the practice is expected to be implemented 
regardless of the characteristics of the farmer and his operation unit.
Four variables were significant for dependent variable PMP4. These variables 
were: TMES, AGE, EDU, and TENURE. TMES and TENURE were significant at the 
10% significance level, AGE was significant at the 5% significance level, and EDU was 
significant at the 1% significance level. TMES and EDU had the expected positive sign, 
implying that the number of times the producer met with extension service personnel 
(TMES) and the number of years of education (EDU) had a positive impact on the use of 
any of computer sensing to control flow rates, radar speed determination, or electrostatic 
applicators for precise application of chemicals. AGE and TENURE had unexpected signs, 
as both had a positive relationship with the implementation of this practice. The 
implication is that older farmers are more likely to implement this management practice.
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TENURE on the other hand, was positively related to the use of modem technology for 
precise application of chemicals, the implication being that those farmers who have a 
higher ratio of leased to total farm size are more likely to implement this practice. It appears 
to be related to the fact that most large farm units were composed of leased land, and large 
units are more likely to make the kind on investments required for implementation of these 
practices.
The correlation coefficients for the error terms were significant between variables 
PMP1 and PMP3, and between variables PMP1 and PMP4. The correlation coefficients 
were highly significant, at the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively. It again proved 
the hypothesized contemporaneous correlation between the studied variables, and the 
requirement that they be analyzed accordingly.
For this model, the value of the log likelihood function was -384.04, with 222 useful 
observations, 38 completed iterations and 100 replications for simulated probabilities.
Phase IV
Phase III was dedicated to proving the existence of contemporaneous correlation of 
the error terms among the different management practices within each management 
measure. Results indicate that management practices within each management measure 
should be analyzed simultaneously to account for such correlation.
Phase IV was the next level of analysis. Phase IV was dedicated to proving the 
existence of contemporaneous correlation of the error terms among management measures. 
Two scenarios were analyzed. As indicated previously, these scenarios were: 1) the 
requirement for compliance was that farmers should implement at least two management
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practices per management measure; and 2) the requirement for compliance was that farmers 
should implement at least three management practices per management measure. The 
following sections discuss the results for each of these scenarios.
First Scenario
For this scenario, the condition for compliance was that farmers should implement 
at least two management practices per management measure. Table 4.16 presents the 
results of the multivariate probit model for this scenario. For SSCPTDUM, three variables 
were significant: TMES, PCS, and EDU. TMES was significant at the 10% significance 
level, while PCS and EDU were both significant at the 1% significance level. All three 
variables had the expected positive coefficients. This implies that the number of times the 
producer met with extension service personnel (TMES), participation in cost-sharing 
programs (PCS), and the number of years of education (EDU), had a positive impact on the 
implementation of at least two practices of the soil erosion and sediment control 
management measure. The overwhelming relevance of the influence of institutional 
variables on the likelihood of compliance for this management measure, under this 
scenario, deserves to be highlighted.
The following independent variables were significant for NMPTDUM: TAGM, 
ARWQ, DEBTR, and FSIZE. Their level of statistical significance was 1%, 10%, 10%, 
and 5% respectively. All variables had a positive sign. This implies that the number of 
times the sugarcane producer attended grower meetings (TAGM), the producer’s belief that 
agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off the farmland (ARWQ), and the size of 
the farming operation (FSIZE) had a positive impact on the implementation o f at least
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Table 4.16 Multivariate Probit for All Management Measures, Condition for
Compliance Being at Least Two Management Practices per Measure,
Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption Study.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error
Index Function for SSCPTDUM
ONE -1.7563 0.6109
TMES 0.1263* 0.0793
PCS 1.0379*** 0.2337
EDU 0.1310*** 0.0376
FSIZE 0.0002 0.0001
RISKB -0.0981 0.1644
Index Function for NMPTDUM
ONE -1.0920 0.4738
TAGM 0.1255*** 0.0514
ARWQ 0.3591* 0.1976
DEBTR 0.3698* 0.2213
FSIZE 0.0002** 0.0001
EDU 0.0553 0.0373
Index Function for PMPTDUM
ONE 0.0522 0.2717
TMES 0.0882** 0.0339
ARWQ 0.6349** 0.3163
FSIZE 0.0002 0.0001
DEBTR 0.7587* 0.4542
PCS 0.3088 0.2864
Correlation Coefficients
R(01,02) 0.5244*** 0.1292
R(01,03) 0.5064*** 0.1888
R(02,03) 0.3582** 0.1622
M ultivariate Probit Model: 3 equations 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable MVProbit 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 222 
Itera tions completed 31 
Log likelihood function -262.5111 
Replications for simulated orobs. = 100
One, Two, and Three * indicate that parameters are significant at the 10, 5,and 1% 
significance level, respectively.
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two management practices within the nutrient management measure. DEBTR had a 
positive sign. It implies that the firm’s debt level being more than 40% of the total 
estimated value of the farm business had a positive effect on implementation of at least two 
of the management practices of this management measure.
Three independent variables were significant in determining PMPTDUM. TMES 
and ARWQ were both significant at the 5% significance level, while DEBTR was 
significant at the 10% level. The first two variables had the expected positive sign, 
implying that the number of times the producer met with extension service personnel 
(TMES) and the producer’s belief that agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off 
farmland (ARWQ) had both a positive impact on the implementation of at least two 
practices within the pesticide management measure. DEBTR has a positive sign, implying 
that firm’s debt level being more than 40% of the total estimated value of the farm 
business, has a positive effect on implementation of at least two of the management 
practices of this management measure.
A very important result in this scenario was that the correlation coefficients of the 
error terms among all variables were highly significant. Contemporaneous correlation 
between variables SSPTDUM and NMPTDUM, and between variables SSPTDUM and 
PMPTDUM were significant at the 1% significance level. The correlation coefficient for 
the error terms between NMPTDUM and PMPTDUM was significant at the 5% 
significance level. It once again suggests that the analytical framework proposed was the 
correct one, and that policy alternatives to improve adoption of BMPs should be treated 
accordingly.
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The value of the log likelihood function was -262.51, with 222 observations, 31
iterations completed, and 100 replications for simulated probabilities.
Second Scenario
For this scenario, the condition for compliance was that farmers should implement 
at least three management practices per management measure. Table 4.17 presents the 
results of the multivariate probit model for this scenario. For SSCPTDU3 more variables 
become significant as compared to the first scenario. Variables TMES, DEBTR, and EDU 
were significant at the 5% significance level, while PCS and TENURE were significant at 
the 1% and 10% significance levels, respectively. That means that the number of times the 
producer has met with extension service personnel (TMES), participation in cost-sharing 
programs (PCS), and the number of years of education (EDU) have a positive impact on 
the implementation of at least three practices of the soil erosion and sediment control 
management measure. As expected, the ratio of leased to total farm size (TENURE) had 
a negative relationship with the implementation of practices in this management measure. 
DEBTR had a positive sign, implying that the fact that the firm’s debt level was more than 
40% of the total estimated value of the farm business, has a positive effect on 
implementation of at least three of the management practices of this management measure. 
When compared to the first scenario, the new variables in this scenario were DEBTR and 
TENURE. Variables TMES, PCS, and EDU were significant in both scenarios with the 
relative importance of DEBTR going down, while the relative importance of TMES going 
up. That is, TMES became more significant when a minimum of three practices were
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Table 4.17 Multivariate Probit for All Management Measures, Condition for
Compliance Being at Least Three Management Practices per Measure,
Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption Study.
Variable Coefficient Standard Error.
Index Function for SSCPTDU3
ONE -1.6989 0.5424
TMES 0.0690** 0.0347
PCS 0.8231*** 0.2042
DEBTR 0.4654** 0.2042
EDU 0.0780** 0.0361
TENURE -0.4464* 0.2574
FSIZE 0.0001 0.0001
Index Function for NMPTDU3
ONE -4.8917 1.8200
TMES 0.0808** 0.0375
TAGM 0.1358* 0.0798
PCS 0.4334 0.3905
FSIZE 0.0002* 0.0001
EDU 0.1068 0.0924
PASS 0.4408 0.3850
AGE 0.0107 0.0140
Index Function for PMPTDU3
ONE -0.7485 0.5974
FSIZE 0.0002* 0.0001
DEBTR 0.5683*** 0.2069
AGE 0.0151* 0.0085
TENURE -0.4770* 0.2619
TMES 0.0504 0.0340
SPRISK -0.0485 0.0406
Correlation Coefficients
R(01,02) 0.6140** 0.3197
R(01,03) 0.0639 0.1217
R(02,03) 0.1975 0.2283
M ultivariate  Probit Model: 3 equations 
Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
Dependent variable MVProbit 
Weighting variable ONE 
Number of observations 222 
Itera tions completed 35 
Log likelihood function -324.1200 
ReDlications for simulated Drobs. = 100
One, Two, and Three * indicate that parameters are significant at the 10, 5,and 1% 
significance level, respectively.
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required to be in compliance, in this scenario. Education was highly significant (1%
significance level) in both scenarios.
For the nutrient management measure under this scenario, NMPTDU3 was 
significantly determined by TMES, TAGM, and FSIZE. The significance levels for these 
variables were 5%, 1%, and 1% respectively. All variables had the expected positive sign. 
The implication being that the number of times the sugarcane producer met with extension 
service personnel (TMES), the number of times he/she attended grower meetings (TAGM), 
and the size of the farming operation (FSIZE) have a positive impact on the implementation 
of at least three management practices within the nutrient management measure. As 
compliance requirements become more stringent, institutional variables become more 
important in influencing compliance for this management measure.
Regressors FSIZE, DEBTR, AGE, and TENURE were significant determinants of 
compliance for the pesticide management measure (PMPTDU3) under this more stringent 
scenario. FSIZE, AGE, and TENURE were all significant at the 10% significance level, 
while DEBTR was significant at the 1% significance level. FSIZE and TENURE had the 
expected positive and negative signs, respectively. DEBTR and AGE both had a positive 
sign. The results for this management measure indicate that under a more stringent 
scenario for compliance, older farmers (AGE) would be more likely to comply with this 
requirement. Larger farms (FSIZE) were also expected to be able to comply with the 
requirements of this scenario. As expected, the more land the farm operator leased 
(TENURE), the less likely he/she was to comply with the implementation of at least three 
practices for this management measure.
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For the correlation coefficients, only one was significant at the 5% significance 
level. That is, there is a positive contemporaneous correlation of the error terms for 
between variables SSCPTDU3 and NMPTDU3. This again suggests the need to analyze 
and treat management measures simultaneously, rather that independently.
The value of the log likelihood function for this multivariate model was -324.12, 
after 35 iterations were completed, with 222 observations and 100 replications for 
simulated probabilities.
Predicted Probabilities
For any given set of characteristics of sugarcane producers, the multivariate probit 
models described in the previous section have the ability to predict the probability that a 
certain individual will jointly implement all management practices for any management 
measure, or comply with all management measures simultaneously.
Table 4.18 summarizes the average predicted probability that a producer with the 
characteristics specified will comply with the requirements of both scenarios, as defined 
in the previous section above. For example, producers with total gross household income 
(GHINC) greater than $2,000,000 will have an 81 percent probability of complying with 
the requirements of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program, if the condition for 
compliance was that producers were to implement at least two practices per management 
measure. A producer with total gross household income less than $250,000 will have only 
a 43 percent probability of complying with such requirements. Notice that as requirements 
become more stringent, probabilities drop dramatically, as they drop down to 32 percent 
and 29 percent respectively.
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Table 4.18 Predicted Probabilities of Compliance Under Different Scenarios, for
Producers with a Given Set of Characteristics, Louisiana Sugarcane Best
Management Practice Adoption Study.
Variable Units Values
Probability of 
Compliance Under 
Condition of at 
Least Two Practices
Probability of 
Compliance Under 
Condition of at Least 
Three Practices
GHINC US$ >2,000,000 0.8119 0.3175
<250,000 0.4292 0.2954
EDU Years 18 0.8676 0.3249
6 0.2410 0.3515
TMES Number >12 0.5851 0.3902
0 0.3326 0.3589
AGE Years >65 0.4305 0.2734
<30 0.3943 0.3247
PCS Binary 1 0.4980 0.2482
0 0.3548 0.3404
FSIZE Acres >5000 0.9591 0.3117
<100 0.2126 0.3605
HBMPT Binary 1 0.4863 0.2659
0 0.3675 0.3132
ACZMA Binary 1 0.5001 0.2730
0 0.4032 0.2894
ACWA Binary 1 0.4890 0.2693
0 0.3640 0.3063
TAGM Number 8 0.7881 0.3221
0 0.2789 0.3850
ARWQ Binary 1 0.5297 0.2802
0 0.3936 0.2835
SPRISK Value 10 0.5051 0.1779
1 0.3579 0.3000
RISKB Value 4 0.3205 0.3658
1 0.4373 0.2893
PASS Binary 1 0.4718 0.2708
0 0.3882 0.3067
DEBTR Binary 1 0.5148 0.2900
0 0.4163 0.2791
SEX Binary 1 0.4510 0.2829
0 0.3321 0.2699
PINOFF % >75 0.2241 0.2854
0 0.4101 0.3043
TENURE Ratio 1 0.4368 0.2744
0 0.4735 0.3008
ORG1 Binary 1 0.5183 0.2883
0 0.4265 0.2808
ORG2 Binary 1 0.4615 0.2749
0 0.4333 0.2876
ORG3 Binary 1 0.5400 0.2660
0 0.4367 0.2837
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Producers with 18 years of education (EDU) will have an average predicted 
probability of compliance under the first scenario of 87 percent, while producers with only 
6 years of education will have an average predicted probability of compliance of 24 percent 
under this scenario. Again, probabilities drop significantly as requirements become more 
stringent. In this case however, predicted probabilities were greater for individuals with 
6 years of education, 35 percent, while producers with 18 years of education would only 
have a 32 percent probability of compliance under this scenario.
In the following paragraphs, results from table 4.18 are discussed for the first 
scenario, the one that requires the implementation of at least two practices per management 
measure. Predicted probabilities for the second scenario behave consistently; that is, they 
drop significantly. However, they do not differ significantly between the values compared 
for each variable.
Producers who met more than 12 times with extension service personnel (TMES) 
during the previous year have an average predicted probability of 58 percent of complying 
with the requirement of at least two management practices per management measure, while 
producers that never met with extension service personnel during the previous year will 
have only 33 percent predicted probability of compliance. Farmers who attended eight 
grower meetings (TAGM) during the previous year have an average predicted probability 
of compliance of 79 percent, while farmers who did not attend to those meetings have only 
a 28 percent probability of compliance.
Older producers (AGE) are more likely to comply, as predicted probabilities for 
producers older that 65 year of age are 43 percent, while producers younger than 30 years
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of age have only an average predicted probability of compliance of 3 9 percent. Producers 
that have participated in cost-sharing programs (PCS) have an average probability of 
compliance of 50 percent, compared to a predicted probability of only 35 percent for 
farmers who have not participated in cost-sharing programs.
Producers with farm operations greater than 5,000 acres (FSIZE) have an average 
predicted probability of compliance of 96 percent, compared to a predicted probability of 
only 21 percent for farmers with production units less than 100 acres. Producers who have 
heard about best management practices (HBMPT) have a predicted probability of 
compliance of 49 percent compared to a probability of 37 percent for farmers who indicated 
that have never heard the term best management practices.
Producers who indicated they were aware of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control 
Program as specified in the Coastal Zone Management Act (ACZMA) have an average 
predicted probability of 50 percent of compliance, while those who are unaware of it have 
only a 40 percent probability of compliance. Similar results are obtained for farmers who 
indicate they are aware of efforts to control nonpoint sources of water pollution through the 
Clean Water Act (ACWA). These producers have a 49 percent probability of compliance, 
while farmers unaware of the Clean Water Act have only 36 percent probability of 
compliance.
Sugarcane producers who believe that agriculture reduces the quality of water 
coming off farmland (ARWQ) have a greater probability of compliance with the 
requirement of implementing at least two management practices per management measure 
than those who believe that agriculture does not reduce the quality of water coming off
129
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
farmland, as their probabilities of compliance are 53 percent and 39 percent respectively. 
Producers who are planning to pass their farm operation on to a member of their family 
(PASS) have 48 percent probability of compliance, while those who are not planning to 
pass their farm operation on to a member of their family have only a 38 percent probability 
of compliance.
Sugarcane producers who estimate their percent of total gross household income 
off farm (PINOFF) to be greater than 75 percent are less likely to meet the requirements of 
compliance under this scenario than farmers who have no off farm income. Their average 
predicted probabilities are 22 percent and 41 percent respectively. Producers who only 
lease land (TENURE), that is their ratio of leased over total acreage is equal to one, are less 
likely to comply than those who own all the land in which they farm (ratio equal to zero). 
Their respective average predicted probabilities of compliance are 44 percent and 47 
percent.
Predicted probabilities for other variables, as well as for all variables under both 
scenarios, are presented in Table 4.18. As previously indicated, under the scenario that 
would require the implementation of at least three of the studied management practices per 
management measure, the probabilities of compliance drop significantly, as it shown in the 
last column of Table 4.18.
Policy Implications
In summary, it was found that 56 percent of the sugarcane producers in Louisiana 
were not aware of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program as specified in the 
Coastal Zone Management Act (ACZMA), and 35 percent were unaware of water quality
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regulation as specified in the Clean Water Act (ACWA)(Table 4.3). Results also indicate 
that 35 percent of the respondents had never heard the term “best management practices” 
(HBMPT). However, out of the 65 percent who had heard about best management 
practices, 78 percent think that the use of best management practices for sugarcane would 
improve the quality of water compared to conventional production practices 
(BMPIWQ)(Table 4.5). These findings revealed the need for more aggressive extension 
programs to inform producers both about the benefits of best management practices and the 
existence of regulation that may affect their farming decisions.
It was also found that more than 90 percent of producers were implementing at least 
one best management practice for each of the best management measures defined by EPA 
(Table 4.3). However, there were some management practices for which the level of 
adoption was still very low as compared to the other BMPs. Examples include the use of 
alternate sources of nutrients (manure, cover crops, sludge, or any other organic matter) 
(NMP3), the use of either succession planting or fallow acreage with a cover crop (such as 
wheat, soybeans or others) (SSCP2), the use of equipment for precise application of 
chemicals (computer sensing to control flow rates, radar speed determination or 
electrostatic applicators) (PMP4), and the use of a containment facility for mixing, loading 
and storage of farm chemicals (PMP2). For these BMPs, the levels of adoption were 13 
percent, 28 percent, 28 percent, and 37 percent respectively. It should be noted that two of 
these practices were within the pesticide management measure (PMP2 and PMP$). For all 
other BMPs analyzed, levels of current implementation were above 70 percent.
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The reasons given by sugarcane producers as to why they had not yet implemented 
the BMPs evaluated, are summarized in Table 4.19. The reasons, as proposed in the survey 
questionnaire and the average percent of producers indicating such a reason were: seriously 
considering to implement it, 16 percent; farmer needs more information, 12 percent; the 
cost of implementation was too high, 22 percent; risk of yield loss was too high, 4 percent; 
producer had never heard of it, 3 percent; and, farmer thought the BMP was not applicable 
to his circumstances, 43 percent.
The dominant reasons for the low percentage of adoption of NMP3, the use of 
alternate sources of nutrients (manure, cover crops, sludge, or any other organic matter), 
were that this BMP was not applicable (50%) and cost of implementation was too high 
(22%). SSCP2, the use of either succession planting or fallow acreage with a cover crop 
(such as wheat, soybeans or others), had the same reasons, that the BMP was not applicable 
(44%), and cost of implementation too high (21%). The dominant reasons for the low 
percent use of PMP4, equipment for precise application of chemicals (computer sensing to 
control flow rates, radar speed determination or electrostatic applicators) were cost of 
implementation is too high (37%) and not applicable (34%). Finally, reasons for the low 
percentage of producers who do not use PMP2, a containment facility for mixing, loading 
and storage of farm chemicals, were that they believed it was not applicable (29%) and cost 
of implementation was too high (22%).
However, for policy purposes it is important to point out that significant proportions 
of farmers are already seriously considering implementation of some of these practices. For 
example, 30 percent of producers indicated that they are seriously considering the use of
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Table 4.19 Reasons Why BMPs Have Not Been Adopted, as Indicated by Sugarcane Producers,
Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management hactice Ado stion Stud1Y-
BMP
Seriously 
Considering it
Needs More 
Information
Cost of 
Implementation 
is Too High
Risk of Yield 
Loss is Too 
High
Has not 
Heard of it
Not
Applicable
# o f
Respondents
SSCP1 29.79* 17.02 19.15 0.00 4.26 29.79 47
SSCP2 13.10 6.21 21.38 14.48 0.69 44.14 145
SSCP3 13.73 5.88 13.73 11.76 3.92 50.98 51
SSCP4 18.75 9.38 12.50 1.56 1.56 56.25 64
NMP1 13.64 9.09 27.27 4.55 4.55 40.91 22
NMP2 9.43 18.87 20.75 0.00 0.00 50.94 53
NMP3 6.86 16.00 22.29 3.43 1.71 49.71 175
PMP1 3.85 15.38 19.23 7.69 7.69 46.15 26
PMP2 30.25 16.81 21.85 0.00 1.68 29.41 119
PMP3 16.67 11.11 22.22 0.00 5.56 44.44 18
PMP4 15.97 11.11 36.81 0.00 2.08 34.03 144
The values, except for the last column, indicate percentage of producers who indicated that reason
a containment facility for mixing, loading and storage of farm chemicals (PMP2), while 16 
percent are considering use of equipment (PMP4) for precise application of chemicals 
(computer sensing to control flow rates, radar speed determination or electrostatic 
applicators). Thirteen percent of producers are seriously considering the use of either 
succession planting or fallow acreage with a cover crop (such as wheat, soybeans or others) 
(SSCP2), while only a very low 7 percent of the non-adopting respondents are seriously 
considering use of alternate sources of nutrients (manure, cover crops, sludge, or any other 
organic matter) (NMP3).
Results indicate that the decision to adopt BMPs is significantly influenced by the 
number of times producers have met with extension service personnel and the number of 
grower meetings that the producer has attended in the previous year. This is indicative of 
the effectiveness of extension programs and producer leadership, if  channeled to the 
specific goals of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program.
Participation in cost-sharing has also had a very significant effect on adoption of 
best management practices, even if no cost-sharing programs exist for all practices. That 
is, farmers who have participated in cost-sharing are more likely to implement management 
practices for which cost-sharing does not exist. It reflects an important multiplier effect of 
such programs. Risk of yield loss is not a factor in the adoption of the BMPs included in 
the study, as indicated by both its non-significance as an explanatory variable in the 
analytical models and by the fact that only a very low average 4 percent of farmers 
indicated it as a reason not to implement BMPs (with five practices having zero percent 
farmers indicating risk of yield loss as a reason not to implement those BMPs).
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Farmers’ belief that agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off farmland 
is significant for most management measures, indicating it is a very important factor in the 
adoption of BMPs. However, results indicate that only 38 percent of sugarcane producers 
believe that agriculture has a negative impact on the quality of water, and this is clearly a 
policy challenge. That is, informal educational programs need to be designed to increase 
awareness of the effect of agriculture on water quality.
Debt, as defined in the context of this study (the producer estimates his/her farm 
debt level to be more than 40 percent of the total estimated value of the farm business), is 
a significant variable for most management measures with a positive sign. That indicates 
a positive relationship between the variable DEBTR and adoption of BMPs. The analysis 
of specific measures indicates that this is especially true for practices that require high 
capital investments. It may be an indicator of producers’ willingness to bear the costs of 
implementing some practices that are not only environmentally friendly, but also financially 
appropriate. It has also been suggested that a positive relationship may be indicative of the 
fact that adoption of best management practices may be a way to manage financial risk 
(Mcnamara et al., 1991).
As compliance requirements become more stringent, TENURE, as defined in this 
study, becomes a factor, with the expected negative relationship. That is, farmers will be 
unwilling to implement BMPs on land they do not own. This is particularly true for the soil 
erosion and sediment management measure and pesticide management measure, where 
levels of capital investment are high for some management practices. T enure only becomes 
a factor when at least three management practices are required per management measure,
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although, given the low levels of current compliance under that condition, it clearly appears
no to be a viable policy condition in the short run.
This chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis implemented for the 
theoretical model proposed in chapter three. The next chapter, chapter five, summarizes 
the current study, states the basic conclusions derived from it, and suggests some 
recommendations for the implementation of policy actions.
136
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Problem
Agriculture has been singled out as one of the major nonpoint sources of water 
pollution (Smith, 1995; EPA, 1998; Pimentel et al, 1997). Yet, the solution to the problem 
of agricultural nonpoint pollution is a typical policy problem of concentrated costs and 
diffused benefits. Costs are concentrated on farmers. Benefits, on the other hand, are 
diffused among all members of society, including farmers.
The Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments o f1990 (CZARA) require that 
each state submit a Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program (CNPCP) to the Secretary 
of Commerce and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for approval. The program 
must include “enforceable policies and mechanisms to implement the applicable 
requirements of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program of the State required by 
section 6217 of the Coastal Zone Act Reauthorization Amendments of 1990”(CZARA, 
1990).
The State of Louisiana’s Approach and Current Situation
The Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (DNR) submitted, in 1995 for 
review and approval, the Louisiana Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program 
(LCNPCP) to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). For agriculture, two major issues were 
fundamental in the submitted program: the Louisiana DNR proposed to maintain a 
non-regulatory approach to the implementation of the CNPCP specifically as it refers to
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BMPs in agriculture and to keep the current boundaries of the Coastal Zone Management 
Area.
On June of 1997, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) approved the Louisiana 
CNPCP subject to several conditions. According to EPA and NOAA, Louisiana’s 
proposed management area “excludes existing land and water uses that have or are 
reasonably expected to have a significant impact on the coastal waters of the State” (EPA- 
NO AA, 1997), and so the condition imposed is that an “appropriate 6217 management area 
boundary for Louisiana consistent with established national guidance for the 6217 
program” must be determined. For agriculture, EPA and NOAA indicated that the 
proposed program “does not include management measures in conformity with the 6217 
(g) guidance and does not include enforceable policies and mechanisms to ensure 
implementation ” (italics added) and so the condition is imposed that within three years 
Louisiana will have to comply by including in its program “management measures for 
agricultural sources in conformity with 6217(g) guidance and enforceable policies and 
mechanisms to ensure implementation of the agricultural management measures throughout 
the 6217 management area.” Should Louisiana not comply with the three-year deadline, the 
program would not receive final approval and federal penalty provisions will be enforced, 
which implies that federal funds supporting the Coastal Zone Management Program and 
Section 319 CWA activities will be cut. For monitoring, EPA and NOAA found that 
“Louisiana’s program does not include a plan to assess over time the success of the 
management measures in reducing pollution loads and improving water quality” and the
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condition imposed indicates that within one year Louisiana will include a plan “to assess 
over time the extent to which implementation of management measures is reducing 
pollution loads and improving water quality” (EPA-NOAA, 1997). According to the 
current status of the Louisiana CNPCP, if it does not meet EPA and NOAA requirements 
for final approval, the State of Louisiana may face federal penalty provisions, which will 
eventually cut the funding needed to carry out the existing coastal zone management 
program.
The State of Louisiana, in trying to keep a voluntary approach to the implementation 
of the Louisiana Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program (CNPCP), is proposing to 
have a statewide comprehensive program and enforce state laws to correct for violations 
when they occur. The rationale for this approach is based on the avoidance of any 
duplication of effort by having a statewide comprehensive program; the assertion that there 
is sufficient legal authority to allow for compliance to meet federal requirements on both 
the CWA and the CZARA; and the lack of federal funding to respond to the requirements 
of Section 6217 program. For agriculture and monitoring, the basic position is to 
emphasize the need to use the so-called ‘bad actor’ approach. That is, Louisiana proposes 
to enforce the Louisiana Water Control Law (R.S. 30:2076), and the Water Quality 
Regulations (LAC 33:IX) whenever a violation exists. Louisiana Department of 
Environmental Quality (LDEQ) considers that “once education o f farmers has occurred, 
and technical assistance and cost-share assistance have been offered, if a farmer/producer 
still does not implement management measures, then the subsequent discharges would be 
intentional and subject to enforcement action or permitting.” The proposed program
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allows the state to integrate the two coastal zone areas proposed (see Figure 1.1) within the 
framework of an existing program that is already identifiable by the public. At the same 
time educational and technical assistance programs will be developed that will allow the 
expansion of the area covered by the program as the need arises.
The Purposes of the Study
To effectively implement the proposed strategy, policy decision makers in Louisiana 
need a full understanding of the current status of Best Management Practices (BMPs) 
adoption in the state. Policy makers also need to determine how well producers understand 
current and proposed legislation that could affect their farming practices, as well as the 
factors that influence producers’ willingness to adopt proposed BMPs.
The overall objective of this study was to assess the feasibility of alternative 
approaches to meeting agricultural nonpoint pollution control standards in Louisiana’s 
coastal zone management areas. Specific objectives of this study were to: identify and 
describe the current production and regulatory environment surrounding sugarcane 
production in Louisiana, as well as prospective scenarios, within the context of the Coastal 
Zone Management Act; develop a conceptual framework for evaluating the economic 
feasibility and environmental effectiveness of alternative policy tools; develop a model that 
allows for the description of the current situation and the analysis of future scenarios of 
BMPs adoption, accounting for variables that may influence the farmers’ decision to 
undertake environmentally sound BMPs; estimate and test the empirical model in the 
production of sugarcane; and analyze the policy implications of the findings and suggest 
policy alternatives.
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General Procedures
Objective one was attained through a comprehensive review of relevant literature 
to provide the background to the current environment in the production of sugarcane in 
South Louisiana. Federal and state agency publications were reviewed to identify 
approved best management practices and environmental regulatory requirements. Specific 
work was reviewed on water quality issues relevant to the costal zone management area of 
Louisiana. State proposals on nonpoint pollution control alternatives were also be 
reviewed.
Objective two was realized through a review of relevant literature on the use of 
behavioral variables and individuals attitudes in predicting economic behavior. Command- 
and-control versus incentive-based approaches were framed in terms of their ability to 
improve environmental quality. A review of neoclassical economic theory was developed 
to set the background for the attainment of the other objectives of this research.
For objective three, the basic question was whether farmers have adopted or will 
adopt best management practices. This is a typical case of a phenomena where we are 
interested in discrete rather than continuous models (Maddala, 1983). In these models, a 
discrete outcome such as a yes or no decision is to be elicited and evaluated. Models are 
constructed to link the decision or outcome to a set of factors, at least in the spirit of 
regression (Amemiya, 1981; Judge et al, 1988; Greene, 1997). The interpretation of the 
dependent variable in these models is that it is a probability measure for which the realized 
value takes extreme discrete values, although the theoretical value could be any 
intermediate value (Ramanathan, 1992). Discrete dependent variables are often cast in the
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form of random utility models (Greene, 1997; Judge et al, 1988) or stochastic utility models 
(Amemiya, 1981). That is, economists assume that economic agents make rational 
decisions as to maximize their utility (Machina,1983; Henderson and Quandt, 1986 ). So, 
the following general random utility model is defined:
Uy = E[Ujj] +6*
where the utility function for the ith individual is composed of the expected utility level 
obtained by choosing the jth  alternative, with the random error term e,j. The theoretical 
model proposed has the following general form:
Adoption of BMPs = f(Economic Variables; Socioeconomic characteristics;
Institutional variables; Attitudinal variables)
Statistical tests for the theoretical model require the collection of data. Objective 
four was the empirical component of the research. Primary data collection was attained by 
surveying the population of sugarcane producers in the study area. The survey 
questionnaire was designed to account for the determination of: which BMPs are currently 
being used in sugarcane production in Louisiana; factors affecting farmer’s willingness to 
adopt environmentally desirable BMPs; educational and technical assistance needs to 
improve adoption rates and efficiency; and the impact of cost-sharing programs on the 
adoption of environmentally effective BMPs. A summary of all relevant statistics is 
presented in chapter four.
There were many management measures for which compliance needed to be 
evaluated, and there were several best management practices within each management 
measure. A multivariate construct was required, since contemporaneous correlation of the
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error terms was hypothesized. A screening process was implemented through univariate 
probit models, as the basis to the final development of multivariate probit models, both 
within management measures and between management measures. Models were estimated 
using corresponding econometric techniques and software (LIMDEP, SAS). The predictive 
power of the models was assessed through the use and comparison of different measures 
of goodness of fit.
For the attainment of objective five, results generated from objectives one through 
four were interpreted in line with expectations of the information needs of policy makers 
and sugarcane producers. Policy implementation was discussed in terms of 1) achievement 
of environmentally desirable goals and 2) the aim of keeping agriculture as an economically 
viable activity.
Results Summarized
A mail survey of Louisiana’s sugarcane producers was conducted through the 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness at Louisiana State University. The 
investigator-constructed questionnaire, which is attached in Appendix A. 1, included eight 
sections. Dillman’s Total Design Method (TDM), as presented in his Mail and Telephone 
Surveys: The Total Design Method(1978); and, The Design and Administration of Mail 
Surveys(l 991), was used as the basis for the administration of the mail survey. Of the 943 
questionnaires mailed, a total of 307 completed surveys were returned, giving an overall 
response rate of 32 percent. There were a total of 67 questionnaires in which several items 
were not completed. Another 17 completed questionnaires arrived after the empirical
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analysis was initiated and were not included in the data base. A total o f223 responses were 
used in the empirical analysis.
One of the main objectives of this study was to determine the current situation of 
the adoption of BMPs in the production of sugarcane in Louisiana. EPA has stated that to 
comply with the requirements of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program, each 
management measure will have to include at least one management practice. Under this 
scenario, the proportion of responding farmers in compliance with that requirement were: 
92 percent for the soil erosion and sediment control management measure; 92 percent for 
the nutrient management measure; and 95 percent for the pesticide management measure. 
Given the growing possibility that requirements may be more stringent in the future, two 
other scenarios were evaluated in the empirical analysis of this study. If the requirement 
was that sugarcane producers were required to implement at least two practices for each 
management measure, the proportions of farmers already doing so were: 82 percent for the 
soil erosion and sediment control management measure; 69 percent for the nutrient 
management measure; and 86 percent for the pesticide management measure. If the 
requirement is for at least three practices, the proportions are: 53 percent for the soil and 
sediment control management measure; 12 percent for the nutrient management measure; 
and 48 percent for the pesticide management measure (Table 4.3).
It was hypothesized that contemporaneous correlation exists among the error terms 
of the factors that influence the adoption of management practices within each management 
measure, and, perhaps more importantly, that contemporaneous correlation exists for errors 
among Management Measures. A multivariate construct for discrete variables was
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required. Four phases were defined in the process of constructing a series of multivariate 
probit structures for the overall analysis of the present study. In Phase I, all potential 
explanatory variables were included in the single-probit empirical models for each Best 
Management Practice. Phase II consisted in the running of the reduced models as 
determined by Phase I. That is, all variables that were significant to at least the 25% 
significance level in Phase I, for each model, were used for models in Phase II. Phase III 
was dedicated to proving the existence of contemporaneous correlation of the error terms 
among the different management practices within each management measure. Results 
indicate that management practices within each management measure should be analyzed 
simultaneously to account for such correlation.
Multivariate probit models run in Phase III yielded the following general results. 
The contemporaneous correlation of the error terms between variables practices to control 
runoff (SSCP1) and delaying stubble breakout (SSCP3), and between practices to control 
runoff (SSCP1) and use of grade stabilization structures (SSCP4) were significant at the 
5% significance level. The correlation coefficient between use of succession planting 
(SSCP2) and use of grade stabilization structures (SSCP4) was significant at the 10% 
significance level. The error terms were highly correlated between soil testing (NMP1) and 
fertilization practices (NMP2). The correlation coefficient between these two variables was 
significant at the 99% confidence level. The correlation coefficients for the error terms were 
also significant between field scouting (PMP1) and calibration of equipment (PMP3), 
and between field scouting (PMP1) and precise application of chemicals (PMP4). The
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correlation coefficients were highly significant, at the 1% and 5% significance levels,
respectively.
The significance of the correlation coefficients proved the hypothesis that 
contemporaneous correlation of the error terms exists among management practices within 
the studied management measures. This is important for two reasons. First, it indicates that 
the analysis of adoption of BMPs should be done in an integrated manner within 
management measures; and second, because it has important policy implications that are 
discussed in Chapter 4.
Phase IV was dedicated to proving the existence of contemporaneous correlation 
of the error terms among management measures. Two scenarios were considered: 1) the 
requirement for compliance was that farmers should implement at least two management 
practices per management measure; and 2) the requirement for compliance was that farmers 
should implement at least three management practices per management measure.
Under the first scenario results were as follows. The number of times the producer 
has met with extension service personnel (TMES), participation in cost-sharing programs 
(PCS), and the number of years of education (EDU), had a positive impact on the 
implementation of at least two practices of the soil erosion and sediment control 
management measure. The number of times the sugarcane producer attended grower 
meetings (TAGM), the producer’s belief that agriculture reduces the quality of water 
coming off the farmland (ARWQ), and the size of the farming operation (FSIZE) had a 
positive impact on the implementation of at least two management practices within the 
nutrient management measure. The firm’s debt level being more than 40% of the total
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estimated value of the farm business (DEBTR) had a positive effect on implementation of 
at least two of the management practices of this management measure. The number of 
times the producer has met with extension service personnel (TMES) and the producer’s 
belief that agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off farmland (ARWQ) had a 
positive impact on the implementation of at least two practices within the pesticide 
management measure. DEBTR had a positive sign, implying that firm’s debt level being 
more than 40% of the total estimated value of the farm business, has a positive effect on 
implementation of at least two of the management practices of this management measure, 
which was unexpected.
A very important result in this scenario was that the correlation coefficients of the 
error terms among all variables were highly significant. Contemporaneous correlation 
between variables SSPTDUM and NMPTDUM, and between variables SSPTDUM and 
PMPTDUM were significant at the 1% significance level. The correlation coefficient for 
the error terms between NMPTDUM and PMPTDUM was significant at the 5% 
significance level. It once again suggests that the analytical framework proposed is the 
correct one, and that policy alternatives to improve adoption of BMPs should be treated 
accordingly.
Results for the second scenario indicated that the number of times the producer has 
met with extension service personnel (TMES), participation in cost-sharing programs 
(PCS), and the number of years of education (EDU) had a positive impact on the 
implementation of at least three practices of the soil erosion and sediment control 
management measure. The ratio of leased to total farm size (TENURE) had a negative
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relationship with the implementation of practices in this management measure. DEBTR 
had a positive sign, implying that the fact that the firm’s debt level is more than 40% of 
the total estimated value of the farm business has a positive effect on implementation of at 
least three of the management practices of this management measure. When compared to 
the first scenario, the new variables in this scenario were DEBTR and TENURE. Variables 
TMES, PCS, and EDU were significant in both scenarios with the relative importance of 
DEBTR going down, while the relative importance of TMES going up. That is, TMES 
becomes more significant when at least three practices were required to be in compliance, 
in this scenario. Education was highly significant (1 % significance level) in both scenarios.
For the nutrient management measure under this scenario, the number of times the 
sugarcane producer met with extension service personnel (TMES), the number of times 
he/she attended grower meetings (TAGM), and the size of the farming operation (FSIZE) 
had a positive impact on the implementation of at least three management practices within 
the nutrient management measure. As compliance requirements become more stringent, 
institutional variables become more important in influencing compliance for this 
management measure.
For the pesticide management measure (PMPTDU3) under this more stringent 
scenario, results indicate that older farmers (AGE) were more likely to comply with this 
requirement. Larger farms (FSIZE) were also expected to be able to comply with the 
requirements of this scenario. The more land the farm operator leases (TENURE), the less 
likely he/she was to comply with the implementation of at least three practices for this 
management measure.
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For the correlation coefficients, only one was significant at the 5% significance 
level. That is, there was a positive contemporaneous correlation of the error terms between 
variables SSCPTDU3 andNMPTDU3.
For any given set of characteristics of sugarcane producers, the multivariate probit 
models developed in the current study have the ability'’ to predict the probability that a 
certain individual will jointly implement all management practices for any management 
measure, or comply with all management measures simultaneously. Table 4.18 summarizes 
the average predicted probability that a producer with the characteristics specified will 
comply with the requirements under both scenarios. The reasons given by sugarcane 
producers as to why they have not yet implemented the BMPs evaluated, are summarized 
in Table 4.19. The reasons were: seriously considering to implement it, 16 percent; farmer 
needs more information, 12 percent; the cost of implementation was too high, 22 percent; 
risk of yield loss was too high, 4 percent; producer had never heard of it, 3 percent; and, 
farmer thought the BMP was not applicable to his circumstances, 43 percent.
The policy implications of the results are discussed in chapter four and the 
conclusions and recommendations derived are presented in the following section. 
Conclusions and Recommendations
It was found that 5 6 percent of the sugarcane producers in Louisiana were not aware 
of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program as specified in the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (ACZMA), and 35 percent were unaware of water quality regulation as 
specified in the Clean Water Act (ACWA)(Table 4.3). Thirty-five percent of the 
respondents had never heard the term “best management practices” (HBMPT). However,
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out of the 65 percent who had heard about best management practices, 78 percent think that 
the use of best management practices for sugarcane would improve the quality of water 
compared to conventional production practices (BMPIWQ)(Table 4.5). These fin d in g s 
reveal the need for a more aggressive extension program to inform producers both about 
the benefits of best management practices and the existence of regulation that may affect 
their farming decisions.
More than 90 percent of producers were implementing at least one best management 
practice for each of the best management measures defined by EPA (Table 4.3). However, 
there were some management practices for which the level of adoption was still very low 
as compared to the other BMPs. Examples include the use of alternate sources of nutrients 
(manure, cover crops, sludge, or any other organic matter) (NMP3), the use of either 
succession planting or fallow acreage with a cover crop (such as wheat, soybeans or others) 
(SSCP2), the use of equipment for precise application of chemicals (computer sensing to 
control flow rates, radar speed determination or electrostatic applicators) (PMP4), and the 
use of a containment facility for mixing, loading and storage of farm chemicals (PMP2). 
For these BMPs, the levels of adoption were 13 percent, 28 percent, 28 percent, and 37 
percent respectively. For all other BMPs analyzed, levels of current implementation were 
above 70 percent.
The dominant reasons for the low percentage of adoption of NMP3, the use of 
alternate sources of nutrients (manure, cover crops, sludge, or any other organic matter), 
were that this BMP was not applicable (50%) and cost of implementation was too high 
(22%). SSCP2, the use of either succession planting or fallow acreage with a cover crop
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(such as wheat, soybeans or others), had the same reasons, that the BMP was not applicable 
(44%), and cost of implementation too high (21%). The dominant reasons for the low 
percent use of PMP4, equipment for precise application of chemicals (computer sensing to 
control flow rates, radar speed determination or electrostatic applicators) were cost of 
implementation was too high (37%) and not applicable (34%). Finally, reasons for the low 
percentage of producers who do not use PMP2, a containment facility for mixing, loading 
and storage of farm chemicals, were that they believed it was not applicable (29%) and cost 
of implementation was too high (22%).
For policy purposes it is important to point out that significant proportions of 
farmers are already seriously considering implementation of some of these practices. For 
example, 30 percent of producers indicated that they are seriously considering the use of 
a containment facility for mixing, loading and storage of farm chemicals (PMP2), while 16 
percent are considering use of equipment (PMP4) for precise application of chemicals 
(computer sensing to control flow rates, radar speed determination or electrostatic 
applicators). Thirteen percent of producers are seriously considering the use of either 
succession planting or fallow acreage with a cover crop (such as wheat, soybeans or others) 
(SSCP2), while only a very low 7 percent of the non-adopting respondents are seriously 
considering use of alternate sources of nutrients (manure, cover crops, sludge, or any other 
organic matter) (NMP3).
The decision to adopt BMPs is significantly influenced by the number of times 
producers have met with extension service personnel and the number of grower meetings 
that the producer has attended in the previous year. This is indicative of the effectiveness
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of extension programs and producer leadership, if channeled to the specific goals of the 
Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program.
Participation in cost-sharing has also had a very significant effect on adoption of 
best management practices, even if no cost-sharing programs exist for all practices. That 
is, farmers who have participated in cost-sharing are more likely to implement management 
practices for which cost-sharing does not exist. It reflects an important multiplier effect of 
such programs. Risk of yield loss is not a factor in the adoption of the BMPs included in 
the study, as indicated by both its non-significance as an explanatory variable in the 
analytical models and by the fact that only a very low average 4 percent of farmers 
indicated it as a reason not to implement BMPs (with five practices having zero percent 
farmers indicating risk of yield loss as a reason not to implement those BMPs).
Farmers’ belief that agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off farmland 
is significant for most management measures, indicating it is a very important factor in the 
adoption of BMPs. However, results indicate that only 38 percent of sugarcane producers 
believe that agriculture has a negative impact on the quality of water, and this is clearly a 
policy challenge. That is, informal educational programs need to be designed to increase 
awareness of the effect of agriculture on water quality.
Debt, as defined in the context of this study, is a significant variable for most 
management measures, with a positive sign. That indicates a positive relationship between 
the variable DEBTR and adoption of BMPs. The analysis of specific measures indicates 
that this is especially true for practices that require high capital investments. It may be an 
indicator of producers’ willingness to bear the costs of implementing some practices that
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are not only environmentally friendly, but also financially appropriate. It has also been 
suggested that a positive relationship may be indicative of the fact that adoption of best 
management practices may be a way to manage financial risk (Mcnamara et al., 1991).
As compliance requirements become more stringent, TENURE, as defined in this 
study, becomes a factor with the expected negative relationship. That is, farmers will be 
unwilling to implement BMPs on land they do not own. This is particularly true for the soil 
erosion and sediment management measure and pesticide management measure, where 
levels of capital investment are high for some management practices. Tenure only becomes 
a factor when at least three management practices are required per management measure, 
although, given the low levels of current compliance under that condition, it clearly appears 
no to be a viable policy condition in the short run.
Based on the outcomes from the current study, the following general 
recommendations are made:
1. More intensive education programs to inform producers of the existence and 
implications of federal and state laws and regulations that affect agricultural 
production decisions.
2. Develop educational programs that focus on explaining the affect agriculture on 
water quality, and how BMPs can have a positive impact on water quality.
3. New education programs that better explain when it is appropriate to adopt specific 
best managements practices. Emphasis should be placed on the costs and benefits 
of implementing BMPs.
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4. Continue to utilize the Louisiana Cooperative Extension Service and grower 
organizations as primary sources of educational information.
5. Investigate opportunities to cost-share the adoption of BMPs, where feasible.
6. Study the relationship between capital investment in BMPs and rate adoption. 
Focus on the financial appropriateness of such investment.
7. Study the relationship between leased land and implementation of BMPs. What 
influence can land owners have on BMP adoption on leased land?
Limitations of the Study and Further Research Needs
The current study is limited to sugarcane production in Louisiana. Although 
sugarcane is a very important crop in the State of Louisiana, other crops should be studied 
to evaluate their current status and future scenarios of Best Management Practice adoption. 
High levels of compliance may be expected under the current requirements suggested by 
EPA.
Another important assumption constraining this study is related to the specific 
management practices considered for each management measure. More environmentally 
friendly management practices would be hypothesized to reduce the current and predicted 
levels of compliance.
There may be other reasons, not included in this study, as to why farmers do not 
adopt certain best management practices. For example, labor availability may be a 
limitation for the use of cover crops.
Within the sugarcane production area of Louisiana, specific regions may be defined 
and analyzed to gain further knowledge of spatial behavior of the variables included in the
154
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
study. The database for the current study already has information by parish. Should policy 
makers require information by specific regions, the database and developed models could 
be extended to attain that goal, once the desired regions are defined.
Construction of a database for time series analysis will offer an opportunity to study 
the behavior of the adoption of BMPs over time. The survey questionnaire and mailing list 
developed in this study could be used to re-run the study at certain time intervals in the 
future. These instruments could also be adapted to future policy scenarios.
This study represents a pioneering application of multivariate probit models. The 
survey design is believed to have had an impact on the high response rate. In that sense the 
proposed methodology is promising and could be extended to other environments (other 
states in the United States and other countries).
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APPENDIX A
THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE AND COMPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS 
Appendix A.1 
The Survey Questionnaire 
Introduction
This survey is being conducted by the Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Agribusiness in the LSU Agricultural Center. The purpose of this survey is to collect 
information on the adoption of practices designed to improve water quality by reducing 
nonpoint source pollution from sediments, nutrients, and pesticides.
All individual responses will be kept strictly confidential. No data on individual 
responses will ever be reported.
Your participation is vital in assuring as many producers as possible are represented in 
this study. The reliability of the results from this survey depend on the participation of 
individuals such as you.
Thank you, in advance, for your participation. A summary of the results of the survey 
will be sent to all persons returning completed surveys.
Please return the completed survey (in the enclosed postage-paid envelope) to:
Dr. Steve Henning
Department of Agricultural Economic and Agribusiness 
101 Agricultural Administration Building 
Louisiana State University 
Baton Rouge, LA 70803-5604
If you have any questions about the survey, please contact Dr. Henning at (225) 388- 
2718 or by e-mail at shenning@.agctr.l su.edu.
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Section I: WATER QUALITY LEGISLATION
Please check the option that best reflects your knowledge about legislation related to 
improving water quality.___________________________________________________
1. Are you aware of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program as specified
in the Coastal Zone Management Act?
______ yes
 no (if no, skip questions 2 and 3)
2. What is your primary source of information about the Coastal Nonpoint 
Pollution Control Program? (check one)
______ extension service
______ media: tv, radio or magazines
______other farmers, friends, relatives or neighbors
______farm organizations
______ government agencies (NRCS, DNR, DEQ, etc.)
3. Have you modified your agricultural management practices as a result of your 
understanding of the Coastal Nonpoint Pollution Control Program?
 yes
______no
4. Are you aware of efforts to control nonpoint sources of water pollution through 
the Clean Water Act?
______ yes
______no (if no, skip questions 5 and 6)
5. What is your primary source of information about the Clean Water Act? (check 
one)
______extension service
______media: tv, radio or magazines
______ other farmers, friends, relatives or neighbors
______ farm organizations
 government agencies (NRCS, DNR, DEQ, etc.)
6. Have you modified your agricultural management practices as a result of your 
understanding of the Clean Water Act?
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yes
no
Section II: AGRICULTURAL BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Please check the option that best reflects your knowledge of Best Management Practices 
in agriculture.____________________________________________________________
1. Have you ever heard the term Best Management Practices (BMPs)?
 yes
 no (if no, skip questions 2 and 3)
2. Do you think that the use of Best Management Practices for sugarcane would 
improve the quality of water compared to conventional production practices? 
______yes
 no
3. What is your primary source of information about Best Management Practices? 
(check one)
______extension service
______media: tv, radio or magazines
______other farmers, friends, relatives or neighbors
______farm organizations
 government agencies (NRCS, DNR, DEQ, etc.)
4. During the last year, how many times did you meet with extension service 
personnel or attend educational programs sponsored by the extension service? 
______times
5. During the last year, how many times did you attend grower meetings?
 times
6. Do you think agriculture reduces the quality of water coming off farmland?
______yes
no
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Section III: THE FOLLOWING ARE CURRENTLY CONSIDERED SUGARCANE BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
___________ FOR IMPROVING WATER QUALITY______________________________________________________
1. In this section we would like you to indicate whether you currently implement any of these practices. If you do implement
them, please indicate your estimated cost per acre and the number of acres under the YES heading. If you have not 
implemented a practice, please place an X in the column under the heading NO that best approximates the reason.
YES NO
(Check one)
Agricultural Practice Estimated 
cost /acre
Number 
of acres 
under this 
practice
1 am 
seriously 
considering 
it
I need more 
information
Cost of 
implementa­
tion is too 
high
Risk of 
yield loss 
is too 
high
I have 
not 
heard 
of it
Not
appli
cable
Do you use any of the following practices to control runoff: 
land smoothing, precision leveling, and/or row 
arrangement?
Do you use either succession planting or fallow acreage 
with a cover crop (such as wheat, soybeans or others)?
Do you delay stubble breakout and maintain crop residue 
(30% or more) through the winter months?
Do you use drop pipes or other grade stabilization 
structures to reduce erosion?
Do you determine fertilizer applications based on soil 
testing and expected yields?
Do you use any of the following fertilization practices: split 
application of nutrients, banded application, slow- 
release fertilizers?
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Section III Continued.
YES NO
(Check one)
Agricultural Practice Estimated 
cost /acre
Number 
of acres 
under this 
practice
lam
seriously
considering
it
I need more 
information
Cost of 
implementa­
tion is too 
high
Risk of 
yield loss 
is too 
high
I have 
not 
heard 
of it
Not
appli
cable
Do you utilize alternate sources of nutrients (manure, cover 
crops, sludge, or any other organic matter)?
Do you base chemical applications (insecticides, herbicides) 
on economic thresholds as determined by field scouting?
Do you use a containment facility for mixing, loading and 
storage of farm chemicals?
Do you calibrate spray equipment before each use?
Do you use any of the following for precise application of 
chemicals: computer sensing to control flow rates, radar 
speed determination, electrostatic applicators?
2. For each of the following agricultural practices, please give a score from 0 to 10
according to your perception of their contribution to improved water quality (A 
score of 0 meaning no contribution and a score of 10 meaning maximum 
contribution. More than one practice may have the same score)
Agricultural Practice Score (0 to 10)
Land smoothing, precision leveling, and/or row arrangement.
Use of either succession planting or fallow acreage with a cover 
crop (such as wheat, soybeans or others).
Delay stubble breakout and maintain crop residue (30% or more) 
through the winter months.
Use drop pipes or other grade stabilization structures to reduce 
erosion.
Determine fertilizer applications based on soil testing and expected 
yields.
Use any of the following fertilization practices: split application of 
nutrients, banded application, slow-release fertilizers.
Utilize alternate sources of nutrients (manure, cover crops, sludge, 
or any other organic matter).
Base chemical applications (insecticides, herbicides) on economic 
thresholds as determined by field scouting.
Use a containment facility for mixing, loading and storing farm 
chemicals.
Calibrate spray equipment before each use.
Precise application of chemicals using computer sensing to control 
flow rates, radar speed determination, and/or electrostatic 
applicators.
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3. Have you ever cost-shared any of the following agricultural practices? If your 
answer is yes, please indicate your percent contribution.
Agricultural Practice Yes No Your % 
contribution
Land smoothing, precision leveling, and/or row 
arrangement.
Use drop pipes or other grade stabilization structures to 
reduce erosion.
Utilize alternate sources of nutrients (manure, cover 
crops, sludge, or any other organic matter).
Use a containment facility for mixing, loading and 
storing farm chemicals.
Section IV: YOUR FARMING DECISIONS AND RISK
In question 1, please place an X anywhere along the line to indicate how you perceive 
yourself when making decisions that imply risk (Close to risk averse will indicate that 
you avoid risky decisions. On the other hand, close to risk taker will indicate that you 
seek out risky decisions)._________________________________________________
1. When making farm management decisions you consider yourself
Risk Averse [-----!-----!----- !-----!----- !-----!-----!-----!-----!-----] Risk Taker
2. If you have $100,000 for investment in a specific farm venture, will you invest it 
if: (check one)
______You have a 95% chance to recover it, plus a 10 % net profit.
 You have a 70% chance to recover it, plus a 30 % net profit.
______You have a 50% chance to recover it, plus a 40 % net profit.
______You have a 30% chance to recover it, plus a 50 % net profit.
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Section V: ENVIRONMENTAL ATTITUDE
Listed below are statements about the relationship between humans and the 
environment. For each one, please indicate (by marking the appropriate column) 
whether you STRONGLY AGREE (SA), MILDLY AGREE (MA), are UNSURE (U), 
MILDLY DISAGREE (MD) or STRONGLY DISAGREE (SD) with it.
SA MA U MD SD
1 We are approaching the limit of the number of people the 
earth can support.
2 Humans have the right to modify the natural environment to 
suit their needs.
3 When humans interfere with nature it often produces 
disastrous consequences.
4 Human ingenuity will ensure that we do NOT make the earth 
unlivable.
5 Humans are severely abusing the environment.
6 The earth has plenty of natural resources if we just learn how 
to develop them.
7 Plants and animals have as much right as humans to exist.
8 The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the 
impacts of modem industrial nations.
9 Despite our special abilities humans are still subject to the 
laws of nature.
10 The so called “ecological crisis” facing humankind has been 
greatly exaggerated.
11 The earth is like a spaceship with very limited room and 
resources.
12 Humans were meant to rule over the rest of nature.
13 The balance of nature is very delicate and easily upset.
14 Humans will eventually learn enough about how nature 
works to be able to control it.
15 If things continue on their present course, we will soon 
experience a major ecological catastrophe.
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Section VI: INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR FARM
Please provide general information about your farm, by answering in the spaces 
provided.____________________________________________________________
1. Please indicate the name of the parish where most or all of your farmland is
located.
Parish
Concerning the size of your farm operation, please indicate number of acres:
OWNED LEASED
Sugarcane acres Sugarcane acres
Fallow land acres Fallow land acres
Other crops acres Other crops acres
Cattle acres Cattle acres
TOTAL acres TOTAL acres
Is this farm an: (check one)
_________ individual operation
_________ partnership
family corporation 
non-family corporation
Do you plan to pass this farming operation on to a member of your family?
_______ yes
no
5. Do you estimate your farm debt level to be more than 40% of the total estimated
value of your farm business?
_______yes
_______no
Section VII. SOCIOECONOMIC INFORMATION
In this section we would like to learn about the characteristics of sugarcane producers in 
Louisiana. Again, all the answers will remain strictly confidential._________________
1. What is your present age?
__________ years
2. How long have you been a farm operator?
__________ years
3. What is your sex?
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female
male
4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
_______grade school
_______high school or equivalent
_______ trade or technical school
_______college (bachelor’s degree)
_______graduate or professional school
5. What was your total gross household income (from farm and nonfarm sources)
for 1998?
_______ less than $249,999
_______ $250,000 - $499,999
_______ $500,000 - $999,999
_______ $1,000,000 - $1,499,999
_______ $1,500,000 - $1,999,999
_______over $2,000,000
6. Approximately what percent of your total gross household income is from
farming?
_______percent
Section VIII: COMMENTS
If you have any comments about water quality, nonpoint sources of pollution, and/or 
Best Management Practices in the production of sugarcane, please indicate them in the 
space provided or add additional paper if needed.
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN ANSWERING THESE QUESTIONS
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Appendix A.2
Letter Included in the First Mail Out
March 8, 1999
Dear Sugarcane Producer:
Recent environmental policy has focused on reducing nonpoint sources of water pollution. 
Agriculture has been identified as a major source of nonpoint pollution from sediments, 
nutrients, and pesticides. Federal and state agencies are currently developing programs 
designed to monitor and reduce agricultural nonpoint source pollution.
Louisiana has proposed a strategy of 1) identifying appropriate agricultural management 
practices that reduce nonpoint source pollution and 2) implementing voluntary adoption of 
these recommended practices. The LSU Agricultural Center has addressed the first step by 
developing recommendations for management practices of individual commodities 
produced in the state.
The enclosed survey is directed toward addressing the second step in this program for 
sugarcane. The survey asks a series of questions concerning your sources of information 
on water quality programs, current use of recommended practices, and your perception of 
their contribution to improved water quality.
The information collected in this survey will give researchers and policy makers a better 
understanding of the current level of practice adoption and reasons why practices have or 
have not been adopted. This information can then be used in developing strategies to 
increase adoption rates of economically feasible practices.
Your participation is vital in assuring that as many producers as possible are represented 
in this study. The reliability of the results from this survey depend on the participation of 
individuals such as you. All individual responses will be kept strictly confidential. No data 
on individual responses will ever be reported.
Thank you, in advance, for your participation. If you have questions or comments, please 
feel free to contact me. A summary of the results of the survey will be sent to all persons 
returning completed surveys.
Sincerely,
Steven A. Henning 
Associate Professor 
(225)388-2718 
shenning@agctr.lsu.edu
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Appendix A.3
Postcard
Dear Sugarcane Producer:
A few days ago I mailed you a survey form requesting information 
about sugarcane management practices. This card is a reminder to 
please complete and return the survey. If you have already completed 
and returned it, please accept my thanks. If not, please do so today. 
It is extremely important that your survey be completed and returned 
by you, so that the results of this study will be truly representative. 
If by some chance you did not receive the survey, or it has been 
misplaced, please call or e-mail me and another will be sent to you 
immediately.
Sincerely,
Steven A. Henning 
Associate Professor 
(225)388-2718 
shennine@agctr.lsu.edu
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Appendix A.4
Letter Included in the Second Mail Out
March 31, 1999
John Doe 
Doe & Sons 
111 Farm Lane 
Farmland, LA 000000
Dear Sugarcane Producer:
About three weeks ago I wrote to you asking for your participation in a survey on the 
voluntary adoption of economically feasible management practices by Louisiana sugarcane 
producers. As of today, we have not received a response from you.
The information gathered from this survey will be used in a study of adoption rates of 
management practices recommended by the LSU Agricultural Center. The purpose of this 
study is to better understand the current level of management practice adoption and reasons 
why practices have or have not been adopted. The survey asks a series of questions 
concerning your sources of information on water quality programs, current use of 
recommended management practices, and your perception of their contribution to improved 
water quality. This information can then be used in developing strategies that increase 
voluntary adoption rates of economically feasible practices.
I am writing to you again because of the importance of each returned survey to the 
usefulness of this study. The reliability of the results from this survey depend on your 
participation. All individual responses will be kept strictly confidential. No data on 
individual responses will ever be reported.
In the event your survey has been misplaced, a replacement is enclosed. If you have already 
responded to the survey, please accept our thanks.
If you have questions or comments, please feel free to contact me.
Sincerely,
Steven A. Henning 
Associate Professor 
(225)388-2718 
shenning@agctr.lsu.edu
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APPENDIX B
CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Table B.l Pearson Correlation Coefficients, /Prob > |R| under Ho: Rho=0 /, and
Number of Observations, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice
Adoption Study.
ACZMA ACWA HBMPT TMES TAGM ARUQ PCS SPRISK
ACZMA 1.00000 0.42293 0.35182 0.23319 0.19481 0.02729 0.16261 0.03629
0.0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0035 0.6853 0.0151 0.5907
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
ACUA 0.42293 1.00000 0.38890 0.20734 0.24767 0.18881 0.05737 0.05021
0.0001 0.0 0.0001 0.0019 0.0002 0.0047 0.3938 0.4566
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
HBMPT 0.35182 0.38890 1.00000 0.20251 0.29828 0.03902 0.07210 0.02029
0.0001 0.0001 0.0 0.0024 0.0001 0.5622 0.2837 0.7637
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
THES 0.23319 0.20734 0.20251 1.00000 0.43198 0.09149 -0.02629 0.06498
0.0004 0.0019 0.0024 0.0 0.0001 0.1734 0.6962 0.3352
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
TAGM 0.19481 0.24767 0.29828 0.43198 1.00000 0.08881 -0.00148 0.00176
0.0035 0.0002 0.0001 0.0001 0.0 0.1864 0.9825 0.9792
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
ARUQ 0.02729 0.18881 0.03902 0.09149 0.08881 1.00000 -0.00215 0.03295
0.6853 0.0047 0.5622 0.1734 0.1864 0.0 0.9745 0.6253
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
PCS 0.16261 0.05737 0.07210 -0.02629 -0.00148 -0.00215 1.00000 0.04829
0.0151 0.3938 0.2837 0.6962 0.9825 0.9745 0.0 0.4741
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
SPRISK 0.03629 0.05021 0.02029 0.06498 0.00176 0.03295 0.04829 1.00000
0.5907 0.4566 0.7637 0.3352 0.9792 0.6253 0.4741 0.0
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
RISKB -0.02719 0.05642 0.01886 0.03298 -0.04741 0.06943 0.05116 0.35637
0.6871 0.4028 0.7799 0.6251 0.4822 0.3031 0.4482 0.0001
222 222 222 222 222 222 222 222
NEPS -0.18083 -0.11472 -0.09309 -0.11190 -0.00674 -0.04251 -0.09995 -0.01350
0.0077 0.0926 0.1728 0.1010 0.9215 0.5344 0.1432 0.8436
216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216
PSIZE 0.02451 0.05649 0.17754 0.01141 -0.00869 0.05769 0.11169 0.04345
0.7159 0.4012 0.0079 0.8654 0.8973 0.3912 0.0962 0.5196
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
PASS 0.13366 0.03718 0.05030 0.15668 0.07851 0.01479 0.15756 -0.01356
0.0462 0.5807 0.4549 0.0192 0.2430 0.8262 0.0186 0.8407
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
DEBTR -0.02535 -0.02008 -0.09456 0.01731 0.01033 -0.03023 -0.06341 0.11487
0.7066 0.7656 0.1594 0.7972 0.8780 0.6535 0.3459 0.0877
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
AGE -0.09747 -0.08159 -0.07655 -0.08602 -0.11632 0.11271 -0.14286 -0.12308
0.1468 0.2249 0.2549 0.2007 0.0831 0.0931 0.0330 0.0672
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
EXP -0.09638 -0.11872 -0.11346 -0.11968 -0.09129 0.11230 -0.09757 -0.08705
0.1514 0.0769 0.0910 0.0745 0.1743 0.0943 0.1464 0.1963
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
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Table B.l Continued.
ACZMA ACUA HBMPT TMES TAGM ARUQ PCS SPRISK
SEX . 0.11632 0.09106 -0.07832 -0.07663 0.10137 0.13434 0.04102 0.06290
0.0831 0.1754 0.2441 0.2545 0.1312 0.0451 0.5423 0.3509
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
EOU 0.05674 0.16464 0.24844 0.13826 0.13855 0.16624 0.07996 0.02241
0.3991 0.0138 0.0002 0.0391 0.0387 0.0129 0.2344 0.7399
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
GHINC 0.12279 0.02385 0.13838 -0.03522 0.04091 0.12838 0.07783 -0.01908
0.0672 0.7232 0.0389 0.6008 0.5434 0.0556 0.2471 0.7775
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
ORG1 0.03214 0.02200 0.05965 0.10965 0.09666 0.02420 0.01268 0.02236
0.6331 0.7439 0.3754 0.1024 0.1502 0.7193 0.8507 0.7404
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
ORG2 -0.02665 0.07504 0.05953 -0.05950 -0.06711 -0.00059 0.07917 -0.06276
0.6922 0.2645 0.3763 0.3766 0.3185 0.9930 0.2390 0.3520
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
ORG3 0.07207 0.04738 0.11132 0.00853 -0.02828 0.00747 -0.01301 -0.01464
0.2839 0.4814 0.0973 0.8992 0.6745 0.9117 0.8468 0.8283
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
PINOFF -0.19970 -0.07668 -0.03310 -0.00489 0.09538 -0.00474 -0.05129 0.06995
0.0027 0.2542 0.6229 0.9421 0.1557 0.9439 0.4460 0.2994
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
TENURE -0.01811 -0.07910 -0.06866 -0.04666 -0.06240 -0.10620 0.12903 0.03431
0.7880 0.2394 0.3074 0.4882 0.3536 0.1138 0.0543 0.6111
223 223 223 223 223 223 223 222
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Table B.2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients, /Prob > |R| under Ho: Rho=0 /, and
Number of Observations, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice
Adoption Study.
RISKB NEPS FSIZE PASS DEBTR AGE EXP SEX
ACZMA -0.02719 -0.18083 0.02451 0.13366 -0.02535 -0.09747 -0.09638 0.11632
0.6871 0.0077 0.7159 0.0462 0.7066 0.1468 0.1514 0.0831
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
ACWA 0.05642 -0.11472 0.05649 0.03718 -0.02008 -0.08159 -0.11872 0.09106
0.4028 0.0926 0.4012 0.5807 0.7656 0.2249 0.0769 0.1754
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
HBMPT 0.01886 -0.09309 0.17754 0.05030 -0.09456 -0.07655 -0.11346 -0.07832
0.7799 0.1728 0.0079 0.4549 0.1594 0.2549 0.0910 0.2441
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
TMES 0.03298 -0.11190 0.01141 0.15668 0.01731 -0.08602 -0.11968 -0.07663
0.6251 0.1010 0.8654 0.0192 0.7972 0.2007 0.0745 0.2545
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
TAGM -0.04741 -0.00674 -0.00869 0.07851 0.01033 -0.11632 -0.09129 0.10137
0.4822 0.9215 0.8973 0.2430 0.8780 0.0831 0.1743 0.1312
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
ARUQ 0.06943 -0.04251 0.05769 0.01479 -0.03023 0.11271 0.11230 0.13434
0.3031 0.5344 0.3912 0.8262 0.6535 0.0931 0.0943 0.0451
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
PCS 0.05116 -0.09995 0.11169 0.15756 -0.06341 -0.14286 -0.09757 0.04102
0.4482 0.1432 0.0962 0.0186 0.3459 0.0330 0.1464 0.5423
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
SPRISK 0.35637 -0.01350 0.04345 -0.01356 0.11487 -0.12308 -0.08705 0.06290
0.0001 0.8436 0.5196 0.8407 0.0877 0.0672 0.1963 0.3509
222 216 222 222 222 222 222 222
RISKB 1.00000 -0.05084 0.07797 0.01925 -0.04933 0.00442 0.01171 -0.20687
0.0 0.4573 0.2473 0.7755 0.4646 0.9478 0.8622 0.0019
222 216 222 222 222 222 222 222
NEPS -0.05084 1.00000 -0.19030 -0.01047 0.06674 -0.02522 -0.05524 -0.01458
0.4573 0.0 0.0050 0.8784 0.3289 0.7125 0.4193 0.8313
216 216 216 216 216 216 216 216
FSIZE 0.07797 -0.19030 1.00000 0.06302 -0.01604 -0.07181 -0.02297 -0.02336
0.2473 0.0050 0.0 0.3489 0.8117 0.2856 0.7330 0.7287
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
PASS 0.01925 -0.01047 0.06302 1.00000 0.01472 -0.09749 -0.06751 -0.02233
0.7755 0.8784 0.3489 0.0 0.8269 0.1467 0.3155 0.7402
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
DEBTR -0.04933 0.06674 -0.01604 0.01472 1.00000 -0.02556 -0.06184 0.10053
0.4646 0.3289 0.8117 0.8269 0.0 0.7042 0.3580 0.1345
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
AGE 0.00442 -0.02522 -0.07181 -0.09749 -0.02556 1.00000 0.83896 -0.04453
0.9478 0.7125 0.2856 0.1467 0.7042 0.0 0.0001 0.5082
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
EXP 0.01171 -0.05524 -0.02297 -0.06751 -0.06184 0.83896 1.00000 -0.09471
0.8622 0.4193 0.7330 0.3155 0.3580 0.0001 0.0 0.1587
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
SEX -0.20687 -0.01458 -0.02336 -0.02233 0.10053 -0.04453 -0.09471 1.00000
0.0019 0.8313 0.7287 0.7402 0.1345 0.5082 0.1587 0.0
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
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Table B.2 Continued.
EDU -6.05625 -6.2S53$ 6.2$121 " T n w 6.64184 -6.0$$34 -0.12555“ o."65578
0.4009 0.0008 0.0001 0.0740 0.5340 0.1391 0.0132 0.4071
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
GHINC 0.00453 -0.14469 0.57874 0.10940 -0.03960 0.06201 0.05203 -0.02540
0.9465 0.0336 0.0001 0.1032 0.5563 0.3567 0.4394 0.7060
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
0RG1 0.00000 -0.09593 0.04732 -0.01613 -0.02745 0.10369 0.10430 0.01134
1.0000 0.1601 0.4820 0.8107 0.6835 0.1226 0.1204 0.8663
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
ORG2 -0.02730 -0.06793 0.20905 0.18761 -0.08220 0.01908 0.09866 -0.01733
0.6858 0.3203 0.0017 0.0049 0.2214 0.7770 0.1419 0.7969
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
0RG3 0.02467 -0.06130 0.17544 -0.15086 -0.11761 -0.09368 -0.12566 0.06750
0.7147 0.3700 0.0086 0.0243 0.0797 0.1633 0.0610 0.3157
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
PINOFF -0.00572 0.00335 -0.10648 0.04202 0.00817 0.01284 -0.04429 0.04006
0.9325 0.9610 0.1128 0.5325 0.9035 0.8488 0.5106 0.5518
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
TENURE -0.08773 0.09102 -0.08122 0.04703 0.06199 -0.16822 -0.16783 -0.03028
0.1928 0.1826 0.2270 0.4847 0.3568 0.0119 0.0121 0.6529
222 216 223 223 223 223 223 223
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Table B.3 Pearson Correlation Coefficients, /Prob > |R| under Ho: Rho=0 /, and
Number of Observations, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice
Adoption Study.
EDU GHINC ORG1 0RG2 0RG3 PINOFF TENURE
ACZMA 0.05674 0.12279 0.03214 -0.02665 0.07207 -0.19970 -0.01811
0.3991 0.0672 0.6331 0.6922 0.2839 0.0027 0.7880
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
ACWA 0.16464 0.02385 0.02200 0.07504 0.04738 -0.07668 -0.07910
0.0138 0.7232 0.7439 0.2645 0.4814 0.2542 0.2394
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
HBMPT 0.24844 0.13838 0.05965 0.05953 0.11132 -0.03310 -0.06866
0.0002 0.0389 0.3754 0.3763 0.0973 0.6229 0.3074
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
TMES 0.13826 -0.03522 0.10965 -0.05950 0.00853 -0.00489 -0.04666
0.0391 0.6008 0.1024 0.3766 0.8992 0.9421 0.4882
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
TAGM 0.13855 0.04091 0.09666 -0.06711 -0.02828 0.09538 -0.06240
0.0387 0.5434 0.1502 0.3185 0.6745 0.1557 0.3536
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
ARUQ 0.16624 0.12838 0.02420 -0.00059 0.00747 -0.00474 -0.10620
0.0129 0.0556 0.7193 0.9930 0.9117 0.9439 0.1138
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
PCS 0.07996 0.07783 0.01268 0.07917 -0.01301 -0.05129 0.12903
0.2344 0.2471 0.8507 0.2390 0.8468 0.4460 0.0543
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
SPRISK 0.02241 -0.01908 0.02236 -0.06276 -0.01464 0.06995 0.03431
0.7399 0.7775 0.7404 0.3520 0.8283 0.2994 0.6111
222 222 222 222 222 222 222
RISKB -0.05665 0.00453 0.00000 -0.02730 0.02467 -0.00572 -0.08773
0.4009 0.9465 1.0000 0.6858 0.7147 0.9325 0.1928
222 222 222 222 222 222 222
NEPS -0.22539 -0.14469 -0.09593 -0.06793 -0.06130 0.00335 0.09102
0.0008 0.0336 0.1601 0.3203 0.3700 0.9610 0.1826
216 216 216 216 216 216 216
FSIZE 0.29121 0.57874 0.04732 0.20905 0.17544 -0.10648 -0.08122
0.0001 0.0001 0.4820 0.0017 0.0086 0.1128 0.2270
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
PASS 0.11988 0.10940 -0.01613 0.18761 -0.15086 0.04202 0.04703
0.0740 0.1032 0.8107 0.0049 0.0243 0.5325 0.4847
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
DEBTR 0.04186 -0.03960 -0.02745 -0.08220 -0.11761 0.00817 0.06199
0.5340 0.5563 0.6835 0.2214 0.0797 0.9035 0.3568
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
AGE -0.09936 0.06201 0.10369 0.01908 -0.09368 0.01284 -0.16822
0.1391 0.3567 0.1226 0.7770 0.1633 0.8488 0.0119
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
EXP -0.16566 0.05203 0.10430 0.09866 -0.12566 -0.04429 -0.16783
0.0132 0.4394 0.1204 0.1419 0.0610 0.5106 0.0121
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
SEX 0.05578 -0.02540 0.01134 -0.01733 0.06750 0.04006 -0.03028
0.4071 0.7060 0.8663 0.7969 0.3157 0.5518 0.6529
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
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Table B.3 Continued.
EDU 1. oOdftT "3.7(5157- 6.62>7<» 6.6564$ a:11566 6.1566* -6.1U32
0.0 0.0001 0.6776 0.4532 0.0864 0.0171 0.0312
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
GHINC 0.26157 1.00000 0.04066 0.05690 0.04477 -0.12128 -0.05493
0.0001 0.0 0.5458 0.3977 0.5059 0.0707 0.4143
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
ORG1 0.02799 0.04066 1.00000 -0.42527 -0.14899 -0.03637 -0.00367
0.6776 0.5458 0.0 0.0001 0.0261 0.5890 0.9566
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
ORG2 0.05049 0.05690 -0.42527 1.00000 -0.25063 -0.02034 0.07519
0.4532 0.3977 0.0001 0.0 0.0002 0.7626 0.2635
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
ORG3 0.11508 0.04477 -0.14899 -0.25063 1.00000 0.04045 -0.09336
0.0864 0.5059 0.0261 0.0002 0.0 0.5479 0.1647
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
PINOFF 0.15962 -0.12128 -0.03637 -0.02034 0.04045 1.00000 -0.12943
0.0171 0.0707 0.5890 0.7626 0.5479 0.0 0.0536
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
TENURE -0.14432 -0.05493 -0.00367 0.07519 -0.09336 -0.12943 1.00000
0.0312 0.4143 0.9566 0.2635 0.1647 0.0536 0.0
223 223 223 223 223 223 223
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APPENDIX C
FREQUENCIES OF ACTUAL AND PREDICTED OUTCOMES AND FIT 
MEASURES 
Phase I
Table C.l Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes and Fit Measures for Soil 
Erosion and Sediment Control Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane Best 
Management Practice Adoption Study.
+ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
I F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model IProbit model for variable SSCP1 |+ -----------------------------------------------------------------------------+
Proportions P0= .247748 P1= .752252
N = 222 N0= 55 N1= 167
LogL = -103.76626 LogLO = -124.2861
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.18311 .16510 .69348 .20626 .18433 .68264
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.17848 .29536 .16878 .20973 .33052 .19616
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C
C rite ria 1.12402 320.98874 | | C r ite ria 1.15538 327.95071
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted    + -----
Actual 0 1 | Total
0 13 42 I 55
1 7 160 | 167
_______ Total 20 202 | 222________
F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model for variable SSCP2
Proportions P0= .720721 P1= .279279
N = 222 N0= 160 N1= 62
LogL = -107.24724 LogLO = -131.4842
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum pro bab ility .
Predicted    + -----
Actual 0 1 | Total
0 151 9 I 160
1 44 18 | 62
Total 195 27 | 222
+ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +
I F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model I
I Probit model fo r variable SSCP3 |
h--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +
Proportions P0= .283784 P1= .716216
N = 222 N0= 63 N1= 159
LogL = -112.46757 LogLO = -132.4211
t --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
I F it  Measures for Binomial Choice Model I
| Probit model for variable SSCP4 |+-----------------------------------------------------+
Proportions P0= .333333 P1= .666667
N = 222 N0= 74 N1= 148
LogL = -106.63269 LogLO = -141.3061
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.17186 .15068 .66341 .29362 .24538 .68596
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.17192 .28009 .16453 .29352 .42499 .26829
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C
C rite ria 1.20241 338.39137 | | C rite ria 1.14984 326.72161
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted
Actual 0 1 | Total
0 23 40 I 63
1 11 148 | 159
Total 34 188 I 222
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum pro bab ility .
Predicted    + ------
Actual 0 1 | Total
0 47 27 I 74
1 21 127 148
Total 68 154 I 222
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Table C.2 Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes and Fit Measures for
Nutrient Management Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management
____________ Practice Adoption Study._______________________________________
F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model 1 I F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model
Probit model fo r variabLe NMP1 | [ Probit model for variable NMP2
Proportions P0= .121622 P1= .878378 Proportions P0= .274775 P1= .725225
N = 222 N0= 27 N1= 195 N = 222 N0= 61 N1= 161
LogL = -61.05679 LogLO = -82.1719 LogL = -115.73243 LogLO = -130.5250
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.24747 .25696 .83550 .12731 .11333 .65316
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.23560 .37572 .17323 .12936 .21760 .12477
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C r ite ria .73925 235.56981 | | C r ite ria 1.23182 344.92109
Frequencies o f actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted
Actual 0 1 | Total
0 6 21 | 27
1 0 195 | 195    + -----
Total 6 216 | 222
Frequencies o f actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted
I 61
I 161+ ------
Actual 0 1
0 13 48
1 9 152
Total 22 200 222
F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model for variable NMP3
Proportions P0= .873874 P1= .126126
N = 222 N0= 194 N1= 28
LogL = -62.37385 LogLO = -84.1282
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.24333 .25859 .83199
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.24017 .38008 .17798
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C rite ria .75112 238.20392
+  +
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted 
  +  —
Actual 0
1 !
Total
0 192 2 I 194
1 22 6 | 28
Total 214 8 I 222
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Table C.3 Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes and Fit Measures for
Pesticide Management Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management
____________Practice Adoption Study._______________________________________
+ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +
I F it  Measures for Binomial Choice Model I
| Probit model fo r variab le PMP1 |
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
Proportions P0= .153153 P1= .846847
N = 222 N0= 34 N1 = 188
LogL = -76.18737 LogLO = -95.0470
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.17461 .19842 .78572 .12345 .09502 .58863
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.17494 .31484 .15626 .12126 .19602 .11805
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C
C rite ria .87556 265.83097 | | C rite ria 1.38554 379.04643
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted 
+
Actual 0 1 1 Total Actual 0 1 | Total
0 7 27 1 34 0 119 20 I 139
1 3 185 | 188 1 50 33 | 83
Total 10 212 | 222 Total 169 53 | 222
+--------------------------------------------------------------------+
I F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model I
| Probit model for variable PMP2 |
+ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +
Proportions P0= .626126 P1= .373874
N = 222 N0= 139 N1= 83
LogL = -132.79510 LogLO = -146.7387
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum p ro bab ility .
Predicted 
    + ---------
F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model for variable PMP3
Proportions P0= .103604 P1= .896396
N = 222 N0= 23 N1= 199
LogL = -56.23977 LogLO = -73.9104
+ ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +
I F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model IProbit model for variab le PMP4 |+ ---------------------------------f-
Proportions P0= .720721 P1= .279279
N = 222 N0= 160 N1 = 62
LogL = -111.93625 LogLO = -131.4842
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.20396 .23908 .85095 .16038 .14867 .66341
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.20132 .34358 .14717 .16423 .27615 .16147
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C
C rite ria .69585 225.93577 | I C rite ria 1.19762 337.32872
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum p ro bab ility .
Predicted
ActuaI 0 1 i Total Actual 0 1 I Total
0 4 19 I 23 0 148 12 I 160
1 1 198 | 199 1 50 12 | 62
Total 5 217 | 222 Total 198 24 | 222
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Table C.4 Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes and Fit Measures for all
Management Measures, Under Condition of at Least Two Practices per
____________ Measure, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption Study.
| F it  Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model 1 
Probit model fo r variable SSCPTDUM |
I F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model 
I Probit model for variab le NMPTDUM
Proportions P0= .180180 P1= .819820 Proportions P0= .310811 P1= .689189
N = 222 N0= 40 N1= 182 N = 222 N0= 69 N1= 153
LogL = -75.51778 LogLO = -104.7100 LogL = -119.25590 LogLO = -137.5840
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.28633 .27879 .78603 .15705 .13321 .63927
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.27566 .42897 .23125 .15855 .25605 .15221
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C r ite ria .86953 264.49178 | | C rite ria 1.26357 351.96802
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted    + -----
Actual 0 1 | Total    + -----
0 11 29 I 40
1 6 176 | 182
Total 17 205 | 222
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum p ro bab ility .
Predicted 
+  ----------
69
153
222
Actual 0 1
0 25 44
1 11 142
Total 36 186
F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model for variab le PMPTDUM
Proportions P0= .139640 P1= .860360
N = 222 N0= 31 N1= 191
LogL = -69.51403 LogLO = -89.7566
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.21407 .22553 .80851
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.20433 .34498 .16670
Information Akaike I.C . Schwartz I.C .
C rite ria .81544 252.48429
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted
Actual 0 1 I Total
0 6 25 I 31
1 3 188 | 191
Total 9 213 | 222
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Table C.5 Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes and Fit Measures for all
Management Measures, Under Condition of at Least Three Practices per
____________Measure, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption Study.
F it  Measures for Binomial Choice Model 1 
Probit model for variab le SSCPTDU3 |
I F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model 
| Probit model fo r variab le NMPTDU3
Proportions P0= .468468 P1= .531532 Proportions P0= .882883 P1= .117117
N = 222 N0= 104 N1= 118 N = 222 N0= 196 N1= 26
LogL = -125.19145 LogLO = -153.4369 LogL = -56.95780 LogLO = -80.1734
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.23153 .18409 .61700 .27274 .28957 .84782
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.23089 .34959 .22467 .26799 .41245 .18873
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C rite ria 1.31704 363.83913 | | C r ite ria .70232 227.37183
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Actual
0
1
Total
Predicted
0 1 | Total
65 39 I 104
25 93 118
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum p robability .
Predicted 
    + ---------
90 132 | 222
Actual 0 1 I Total
0 193 3 I 196
1 19 7 | 26
Total 212 10 I 222
F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model for variable PMPTDU3
Proportions P0= .513514 P1= .486486
N = 222 N0= 114 N1= 108
LogL = -139.89168 LogLO = -153.7976
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.12370 .09042 .55937
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.11804 .19168 .11775
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C rite ria 1.44947 393.23959
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted 
—  +  —
Actual 0 1 I Total
0 81 33 I 114
1 39 69 | 108
Total 120 102 I 222
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Phase II
Table C.6 Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes and Fit Measures for Soil
Erosion and Sediment Control Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane Best
__________ Management Practice Adoption Study.
F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model for variab le  SSCP1
Proportions P0= .251121 P1= .748879
N = 223 N0= 56 N1= 167
LogL = -107.63666 LogLO = -125.6746
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.16764 .14353 .68296
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.15819 .26279 .14937
Information Akaike I.C . Schwartz I.C .
C rite ria 1.03710 258.53069
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted
Actual 0 1 | Total Actual 0 1 | Total
0 12 44 I 56 0 152 9 I 161
1 8 159 | 167 1 44 18 | 62
Total 20 203 | 223 Total 196 27 | 223
F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model fo r variab le SSCP2
Proportions P0= .721973 P1= .278027
N = 223 N0= 161 N1= 62
LogL = -111.55690 LogLO = -131.8109
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.17067 .15366 .66842
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.17117 .28376 .16611
Information Akaike I.C . Schwartz I .C .  I
C rite ria 1.07226 266.37118 |
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum p robability .
Predicted
F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model I 
Probit model for variab le  SSCP3 |
I F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model 
| Probit model fo r variab le SSCP4
Proportions P0= .282511 P1= .717489 Proportions P0= .331839 P1= .668161
N = 223 N0= 63 N1= 160 N = 223 N0= 74 N1= 149
LogL = -120.86687 LogLO = -132.7540 LogL = -109.49133 LogLO = -141.7105
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.09670 .08954 .63526 .27347 .22736 .67895
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim. Rsqrd ML
.09920 .17726 .10112 .27552 .40057 .25096
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C rite ria 1.13782 274.17676 | | C rite ria 1.02683 246.01852
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted  + ---------
0 1 | Total
2 61 I 63
7 153 | 160  +  ----------
9 214 | 223
Actual
0
1
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum pro bab ility .
Predicted  +  ---------
0 1 | TotalActual
Total
0 49 25 I 74
1 26 123 | 149
Total 75 148 | 223
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Table C.7 Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes and Fit Measures for
Nutrient Management Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management
Practice Adoption Study.
F it  Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model 1 I F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model
Probit model fo r variable NMP1 | | Probit model for variable NMP2
Proportions P0= .121076 P1= .878924 Proportions P0= .274775 P1= .725225
N = 223 N0= 27 N1= 196 N = 222 N0= 61 N1= 161
LogL = -66.31455 LogLO = -82.3012 LogL = -121.55905 LogLO = -130.5250
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.20178 .19425 .82351 .08255 .06869 .63312
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.17573 .29529 .13357 .07983 .13829 .07760
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C r ite ria .64856 165.07214 I | C rite ria 1.14918 275.53416
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum p robability .
Actual 0 1
0 3 24
1 0 196
Total 3 220
Predicted 
+  - - ■
Total
27
196
223
Actual
0
1
Total
Predi cted  +  ---------
0 1 | Total  + -----
7 54 I 61
5 156 | 161  +  ---------
12 210 | 222
F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model for variable NMP3
Proportions P0= .874439 P1= .125561
N = 223 N0= 195 N1= 28
LogL = -66.36267 LogLO = -84.2627
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.19770 .21243 .82455
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.20209 .32138 .14831
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C rite ria .64899 165.16836
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted 
    + -------
Actual 0 1 I Total
0 193 2 I 195
1 22 6 | 28
Total 215 8 I 223
190
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table C.8 Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes and Fit Measures for
Pesticide Management Practices, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management
____________Practice Adoption Study._______________________________________
+ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
I F it  Measures for Binomial Choice Model I
I Probit model fo r variab le PMP1 |
+------------------------------------------------------------------- +
Proportions P0= .153153 P1= .846847
N = 222 N0= 34 N1= 188
LogL = -80.99917 LogLO = -95.0470
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.11767 .14780 .77197 .07514 .05600 .56731
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Z im . Rsqrd ML
.12092 .24354 .11888 .07419 .12100 .07127
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C
C rite ria .78378 194.41440 | | C rite ria 1.28217 299.55151
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted
+  ----------
| Total
I 34 
188
Actual 0 1
0 2 32
1 0 188
Total 2 220 222
+ --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------+
F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model I
Probit model fo r variab le  PMP2 |+----------------------------------------------------- +
Proportions P0= .627803 P1= .372197
N = 223 N0= 140 N1= 83
LogL = -138.96141 LogLO = -147.2056
Frequencies o f actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum p robability .
Predicted
Actual 0 1 I Total
0 133 7 I 140
1 63 20 | 83
Total 196 27 I 223
F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model fo r variab le PMP3
Proportions P0= .103139 P1= .896861
N = 223 N0= 23 N1= 200
LogL = -61.92698 LogLO = -74.0195
+ +
I F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model Probit model fo r variab le PMP4+-------------------------------------------------
Proportions P0= .721973 P1= .278027
N = 223 N0= 161 N1= 62
LogL = -115.88361 LogLO = -131.8109
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.15327 .16337 .84061 .13130 .12083 .65273
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.14100 .24523 .10278 .13426 .23072 .13311
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . I I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C
C rite ria .60921 156.29700 | | C rite ria 1.10210 269.61743
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted Predicted
Actual 0 1 I Total Actual 0 1 I Total
0 3 20 I 23 0 152 9 I 161
1 1 199 | 200 1 52 10 | 62
Total 4 219 | 223 Total 204 19 | 223
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Table C.9 Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes and Fit Measures for all
Management Measures, Under Condition of at Least Two Practices per
_________  Measure, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption Study.
Frequencfes of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted
    + -------
Actual 0 1 | Total
0 10 30 I 40
1 7 175 | 182
Total 17 205 | 222
F it  Measures for Binomial Choice Model 1 I F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model
Probit model fo r variable SSCPTDUM | | Probit model fo r variab le NMPTDUM
Proportions P0= .180180 P1= .819820 Proportions P0= .313901 P1= .686099
N = 222 N0= 40 N1= 182 N = 223 N0= 70 N1= 153
LogL = -78.29199 LogLO = -104.7100 LogL = -123.69074 LogLO = -138.7476
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.24946 .25230 .77689 .14113 .10852 .62583
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.24527 .39604 .21180 .13301 .21458 .12632
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C . 1 I Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C rite ria .75939 189.00004 | | C rite ria 1.16315 279.82451
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum p ro bab ility .
Predicted
Actual 0 1 | Total
0 23 47 I 70
1 12 141 | 153
Total 35 188 | 223
F it Measures fo r Binomial 
Probit model fo r variab le
Choice Model 
PMPTDUM
Proportions P0= .139013 P1= .860987
N = 223 N0= 31 N1= 192
LogL = -74.36617 LogLO = -89.9066
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.16108 .17285 .79668
Cramer Veall/Z im . Rsqrd_ML
.15199 .27403 .13010
+ -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- +
I Information Akaike I.C . Schwartz I.C . I 
I C rite ria  .72077 181.17537 |+-----------------------------------------------------1
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted
Actual 0 1 | Total
0 3 28 I 31
1 2 190 | 192    + -----
_______Total 5 218 | 223
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Table C.10 Frequencies of Actual and Predicted Outcomes and Fit Measures for all
Management Measures, Under Condition of at Least Three Practices per
____________ Measure, Louisiana Sugarcane Best Management Practice Adoption Study.
F it  Measures for Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model for variable SSCPTDU3
Proportions P0= .470852 P1= .529148
N = 223 N0= 105 N1= 118
LogL = -130.44923 LogLO = -154.1927
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.19478 .15399 .59911
Cramer Veall/Zim. Rsqrd ML
.19560 .30251 .19180
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C r ite r ia 1.23273 298.74866
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability.
Predicted    + -----
Actual 0 1 | Total    + -----
0 66 39 I 105
1 34 84 | 118
Total 100 123 | 223
F it Measures fo r Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model fo r variab le NMPTDU3
Proportions P0= .883408 P1= .116592
N = 223 N0= 197 N1= 26
LogL = -59.46075 LogLO = -80.2977
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.25031 .25950 .84412
Cramer Veall/Z im . Rsqrd ML
.24679 .37609 .17046
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C rite ria .60503 162.17888
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum p ro bability .
Actual 0 1
0 195 2
1 20 6
Total 215 8
Predicted
| Total
| 197
I 26
| 223
F it Measures for Binomial Choice Model 
Probit model for variable PMPTDU3
Proportions P0= .513514 P1= .486486
N = 222 N0= 114 N1= 108
LogL = -141.70949 LogLO = -153.7976
Efron McFadden Ben./Lerman
.10630 .07860 .55172
Cramer Veall/Zim . Rsqrd ML
.10273 .16909 .10318
Information Akaike I.C Schwartz I.C .
C rite ria 1.33973 321.23773
Frequencies of actual & predicted outcomes 
Predicted outcome has maximum probability .
Predicted 
  +  —
Actual 0 1 I Total
0 81 33 I 114
1 46 62 | 108
Total 127 95 I 222
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